



**CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE  
DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM**



# **CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN TERRORISM**

**Seminar Report**

**09-10 December 2019  
Ankara, Turkey**

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## General Information

- Subject** : COE-DAT's "Crisis Management in Terrorism Seminar."
- Background** : Authorized in the COE-DAT 2019 Yearly Activity Plan by the COE-DAT Executive Steering Committee and conducted between 09-10 December 2019 at COE-DAT facilities in Ankara, Turkey.
- Aim** : Bring together academics, researchers, practitioners, and planners to discuss methods and policies of crisis management (from terrorism aspect) to identify gaps and develop recommendations for NATO and partner countries.
- Seminar Director** : Cpt. M. Serdar ÖZDEN (TUR A)
- Seminar Assistant** : Sgt.Maj. Oktay ERTURAN (TUR A)
- Academic Advisor** : Prof.Dr. Haldun YALÇINKAYA (TUR)
- Rapporteurs** : Ms. Cemre AYSEL (TUR) and Ms. Alice LÖHMUS (EST)

# Introduction

NATO is one of the most successful alliances throughout history and in contemporary World is the longest lasting alliance. Undoubtedly, its capability to adapt to different threats is central to its longevity. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the end of Cold War, and the 9/11 attacks were some cornerstones of the history, which caused debates against NATO's existence. The product of these events and thereby debates have resulted in NATO's adaptation to new environments without breaking the Alliance system.

NATO, continuously strives to adapt to new developments in the global arena to maintain relevancy. In this spirit of transformation, this seminar seeks to understand if the recent developments in terrorism and counter terrorism require NATO to adapt its crisis management system.

The aim of the seminar was to get together academics, researchers, practitioners, and planners, on one hand, to discuss recent developments in terrorism and counter terrorism; on the other hand, to explain methods and policies of crisis management on terrorism to identify gaps and develop recommendations for NATO and partner countries.

In recent years, the spread of terrorism through violent extremism and foreign terrorist fighters through the Syrian Civil War and rise and fall of Daesh urged COE-DAT to discuss whether recent trends have capacity to discover pitfalls in the existing crisis management system of NATO. Stemming from the conflict in Syria, Iraq, and others there are some new systems and definitions for describing terrorism. For example, according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 foreign fighters, formerly known as volunteers, are described as illegal and described as foreign terrorist fighters. The international community campaigned against them and to some extent their travels are prevented. The Global Counter Terrorism Forum established to facilitate counter-terrorism measures for global common good.

The seminar was broken down to different phases in order to logically examine the current situation, some of the history, and look at areas that could be improved in NATO's crisis management system.

First, discussions described the state approach to terrorism as a type of crisis. This approach encompassed previous experiences and compared the crisis management methods of different nations. This established a basement for other discussions at the rest of the seminar.

Second, the NATO Crisis Management System presented by the Crisis Management and Disaster Response Center of Excellence enlightened the participants on the official NATO Crisis Management System.

Third, the participants began discussing recent and probable future trends of terrorism from practical as well as theoretical perspective. Both predicting the future of terrorism and in which direction terrorism could evolve have discussed.

Fourth, the role of Big Data, Social Media, and technological developments before, during, and after terrorist attacks have presented. The use of these have discussed from the perspective of those committing terrorism or counter terrorism. This led the participants to elaborate on the capability and expectations for the capacity of cyber developments as a toolkit for crisis management in terrorism, in general.

Fifth, the participants discussed and asked for details about the National Counter Terrorism policies of Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States in terms of Crisis Management.

Sixth, NATO HQ's view on NATO's planning methods and preventive strategies against terrorism related activities in terms of crisis management were presented. After presenting the NATO Crisis Management System by the center of excellence, the NATO HQ's explanations became supportive and enlightening for the seminar.

Seventh, the participants had a chance to learn and discuss the best practices of other international organizations and initiatives, namely the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and the United Nations Counter Terrorism Directorate.

Lastly, the participants had moderated discussions based on first seven panels.

This report attempts to convey details of the subjects discussed and points raised during the seminar. In this framework, detailed minutes of the panels, including slides of them, are presented in this report. COE-DAT anticipates that this report will provide insights for planners, researchers, practitioners, and policymakers who are working on recent trends in counter terrorism as well as their possible place in NATO's Crisis Management System.

Prof. Dr. Haldun YALÇINKAYA

## Welcome Address

Dear Distinguished speakers and seminar participants,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my honor and great pleasure to welcome you to our Crisis Management in Terrorism Seminar hosted by the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism. That many of you have travelled long distances just means how much terrorism matters to our professional Agenda and how important our work is. Your presence and commitment to this Seminar is very much appreciated. Thank you for coming.

We are all aware that the global threat of terrorism knows no border, nationality, or religion. Terrorists act transnationally and operate in implicit networks. Terrorism is a phenomenon with psychological, ideological and strategic aspects. For military forces, it has impact at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The drivers of terrorism are complex, with economic, social, political and ideological factors as well as poor governance, limited opportunity, dispossession, corruption and high unemployment; providing fertile ground for recruitment and radicalization. The widely recognized fact, that counter-terrorism is not only the duty of the military or the police or of any single state institution, both internationally and nationally has brought us together around the topic of “Crisis Management in Terrorism”.

Unfortunately, terrorism will likely continue to exist in the future, possessing the features of a changing phenomenon. With the enhancement in technology and weapons, terrorism will likely continue to evolve in new dimensions. Terrorist groups in the future will have easier access to more lethal and sophisticated weaponry. Governance gaps will cause regional instability and unrestrained circulation of sophisticated weaponry. There will be greater use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), snipers and localized ‘swarm’ attacks, suicide attacks as well, particularly in urban centers. Some contemporary terrorist organizations may aspire to use chemical, biological, radiological weapons, with a ‘nightmare scenario’ being their employment to cause civilian mass casualties. New types of communication systems offer the terrorists more opportunities to exploit. The rise of the “lone wolf, free-lance terrorism, or leaderless resistance” phenomena carry the war to their distant enemies. Such actors are extremely difficult to detect and counter because there is little or no warning. Radical ideologies easily exploit suitable breeding grounds for terrorism.

Otherwise, as you very well know, terrorism will continue to be an extremely complex set of phenomena, covering a great diversity of groups with different origins and causes. And it will be, as it is right now, one of the most important components that make up the challenge posed by hybrid war encompassing a set of relationships, dynamics and processes. And, as a result, hybrid war belligerents may continue to use terrorism in its traditional capacity to force populations through fear as a way of reducing an opponents’ motivation to fight back.

That is why we are organizing this seminar, emerging crisis related to terrorism throughout the world needs a compressive approach and tangible steps forward. Although each crisis has its own nature, there should be some common methods and attitudes. We at COE-DAT are committed to investigate, examine, and explore this phenomenon and provide insights to NATO and nations of interest to help them transform to mitigate potential future security challenges.

Just two weeks ago, we held our Executive Level Defence against terrorism seminar, one month ago, we held our Terrorism Experts Conference. Both of them had 80 participants for each from different nations.

To bring different views of terrorism together and to benefit from multinational experience, COE-DAT has developed relationships with numerous international organizations and intuitions all over the world. This relationship include education and training bodies from NATO, international organizations, as well as relevant intuitions, academies, and universities working on defence against terrorism related topics. COE-DAT also collaborates with Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialog, İstanbul Cooperation Initiative Countries, and global partners amongst others.

What we are trying to do in this seminar is bringing together academics, researchers, practitioners, and planners to discuss methods and policies of crisis management (from terrorism aspect) to identify gaps and develop recommendations for NATO and partner countries.

Instead of routine lecture questions and answer cycle, the current seminar is appointed to give the participants a chance to exchange experience, opinions as well as making a good networking tool for presentations and discussions. So please do not hesitate to ask questions to our lecturers. Therefore, active involvement to discussions is highly appreciated.

I am confident that with the diversity of expertise and contribution we are going to achieve the level of ambition of this seminar, afterword's will not only have insights of new ideas for effective strategies but also we will have an enhanced network of countering terrorism.

To complete my words I would like to you have an interesting, dynamic, and fruitful seminar. Your experience toughs and opinions or valuable and priceless for us,

Welcome again and thank you for your attention,

Seminar Started!

Mustafa Özgür TÛTEN  
Colonel (TUR A)  
Director COE-DAT

## **Dramatis Personae**

(In order of their appearance in the report)

**Prof. Dr Haldun YALCINKAYA** (TUR) is the chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at TOBB Economics and Technology University in Ankara / Turkey. He graduated from Kuleli Military High School and later Turkish Military Academy. During his military service as an officer, he completed his post-graduate studies in International Relations at İstanbul University. Dr.Yalçinkaya studied “peacekeeping” at MA level and “transformation of war” at Ph.D. level. After earning his Ph.D. degree, he had post-doctoral Research and joined the Changing Character of War Project in Oxford University between 2009-2010. Furthermore, during his military service, he served in Afghanistan in 2005. He published two books on war issues and several academic articles on International Security issues focusing on new actors of the battlefields as well as terrorism, such as foreign terrorist fighters. After serving more than ten years at Turkish Military Academy he has been Professor in International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology since 2013.

**Col Mustafa Özgür TÜTEN** (TUR A) Director of COEDAT

**Prof. Dr. Ersel AYDINLI** (TUR) is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara. He served as Chair of the department between 2007-2010, and left the Chairship to become Executive Director of the Turkish Fulbright Commission. Dr. Aydinli’s current areas of research include homegrown international relations theorizing, transnational relations and security, terrorism, and Turkish domestic and foreign politics.

**Ms. Stephanie FOGGETT** (USA) She is a Resident Fellow at The Soufan Center and Director of Global Communications at The Soufan Group. Her work at the Center focuses on: multilateral security cooperation; counter-terrorism cooperation with international organizations and governments; crisis management; and narratives and strategic communications as it relates to security and counter-terrorism. From 2012 to 2015, she worked in the Emerging Security Challenges Division at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Her work focused on multi-lateral security cooperation and policy development on emergent threats and challenges, in particular international terrorism. She also worked in support of the United Nations Women, Peace & Security agenda as a senior researcher on a NATO-supported project on gender integration in armed forces and has worked on other areas of gender and conflict. She has spoken at various regional and international conferences and events, including the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/DAESH, and NATO’s Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT).

**Prof. Dr. Max ABRAHMS** (USA) is an Associate Professor of political science at Northeastern University. He is also a faculty affiliate in the School of Public Policy and Urban Affairs; the Global Resilience Institute; Security and Resilience Studies; and International Affairs. Abrahms has published extensively on terrorism with articles in International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Harvard Business Review, Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, and Los Angeles Times. Abrahms frequently fields questions about the contemporary terrorism landscape in the news and for government agencies. At Northeastern, Abrahms teaches undergraduate and graduate courses about terrorism and international security more generally. He has held numerous affiliations with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, the Empirical Studies of Conflict project at Princeton University, the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Military Academy, the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington University, the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, the economics department at Bar Ilan University, the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, the political science department at Johns Hopkins University, and the Belfer Center at Harvard University. His book, Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History, explains why the conventional wisdom about Islamic State was wrong.

**Prof. William RUGER** (USA) He is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato Institute. He is also vice president for research and policy at the Charles Koch Institute and vice president for research at the Charles Koch Foundation. Ruger was previously an Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas State



University and an adjunct assistant professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin. His most recent scholarship appeared in *International Studies Quarterly*, *Civil Wars*, and *Review of Political Economy*. Ruger is the author of *Milton Friedman*, and co-author of two books on state politics including the new 4th edition of *Freedom in the 50 States: An Index of Personal and Economic Freedom*, published by Cato in August 2016. He is a frequent guest on television and radio, and his op-eds have appeared in several national publications, including *Time*, *USA Today*, *Investor's Business Daily*, and the *New York Daily News*. He is on the Executive Council of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Ruger is currently an officer in U.S. Navy (Reserve), and a veteran of the Afghanistan War. He earned his Ph.D. in Politics from Brandeis University and an A.B. from the College of William and Mary.

**Col. Plamen MILANOV** (BGR A) He currently serves in Bulgarian Army as a Colonel and assigned as the Capabilities Branch Chief of Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence.

**Dr. M Afzal ASHRAF** (GBR) He was a senior officer in the British Armed forces with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has served in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has experience of counterterrorism and all-source information fusion and threat assessment in the UK. A Research Fellowship at St Andrews University's Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence led to a PhD in Al-Qaeda's Ideology Through Political Myth and Rhetoric. As a Consultant Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank he designed and delivered a course in international diplomacy. He is currently an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Nottingham University's Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism. He is a frequent commentator on global TV and the press as well as publishing several articles and Op Eds on international affairs and global security.

**Assoc. Prof. Ali Nihat ÖZCAN** (TUR) He received his Bachelors degree from the Military Academy/Ankara and Istanbul University Faculty of Law. Özcan holds Masters and PhD degrees from 9 Eylül University with his dissertation on PKK. Özcan voluntarily retired from Turkish Armed Forces as a Major. After practicing as a lawyer for a short while, Özcan worked on "Terrorism" and "Middle East" issues in various research centers. Özcan taught several courses in 9 Eylül University Faculty of Law, Hacettepe University, Military Academy Institute for Defense Sciences, Institute for National Security, War Academies, and TOBB University of Economics and Technology. Özcan also worked as Strategy Development Counselor in different institutions. Asymmetric war, insurgency, terrorism, Middle East, and civil-military relations are among his research interests. Nihat Ali Özcan works at TEPAV since 2005.

**Assoc. Prof. Murat YEŞİLTAS** (TUR) He completed his BA and MA at the Department of International Relations of Sakarya University, in 2003 and 2009, respectively. He earned his PhD at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Marmara University in 2012 with the thesis titled "Locating Turkey: Geopolitical Mentality and the Army in Turkey." Yeşiltaş was a visiting researcher at the Department of European Studies and International Politics of Lancaster University between 2008 and 2009. He was a visiting researcher at Virginia Tech's Institute of Government and International Relations in 2010-2011. Currently, Yeşiltaş is an Assoc. Professor in the Middle East Institute at Sakarya University. He also holds the position of director of security studies at SETA Foundation, Ankara, Turkey.

**Assoc.Prof. A. Salih BİÇAKCI** (TUR) is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University, Istanbul. He completed his B.A. in History at Marmara University Education Faculty in 1994, and his M.A. at Marmara University in 1996. Bıçakcı completed the Humanities Computing program at Bergen University in Norway in 1999 and received his PhD from Tel Aviv University in Israel in 2004. Dr. Bıçakcı began his academic career at FMV Işık University and took part in numerous academic projects on identity, security, and terrorism. He has taught classes in several national and international universities on the Middle East in International Politics, International Security, International Relations Theory, and Turkish Foreign Policy.

**Ltc. Nils Johnny MAGNUSSEN** (NOR A) He currently serves in the Norwegian Army as a Lieutenant Colonel and is assigned as the NATO Crisis Response System Planner of NATO SHAPE J5.

## **-Minutes-**

### **Day I**

09 December 2019

*Rapporteur: Alice Löhmus*

**10.00-11.00**

### **“Terrorism as a Type of Crisis”**

*by Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınli*

The first session has designed to define if crisis management in terms of tackling terrorism would result in a terrorism trap. As such, the presentation encompassed previous experiences and compared crisis management methods of difference nations, laying ground for discussions for the rest of the seminar.

#### **AIMS**

- Identify difference between 'crisis' and 'perpetual crises' in terrorism/CT
- Present the idea of a 'terrorism trap' as the *real* crisis that needs to be managed
- Show how CT philosophies and practices must be reconsidered as part of a perpetual 'crises' management perspective (based on 5 characteristics of CT)
- Present cases of countries (mis)managing crisis (falling—or not falling—into the terrorism trap)

Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınli's presentation “The Terrorism Trap: Crisis (Mis)management and Avoiding Perpetual Crises” laid ground for understanding the real ‘crisis’ of terrorism crisis management. Prof. Dr. Aydınli stressed that there is a major paradox on the subject matter: - **conventional perspectives and practices in crisis management may turn out to be direct or indirect reasons for a perpetual crisis.** As such, this is an interactive process. This is because from the society's and government's perspective, a terrorist act is the crisis moment, but from the terrorists' perspective, that act is just a starting point of a planned, long-term strategy. Furthermore, Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınli highlighted that as also seen from his recent book “*Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists,*” there are **more similarities and continuities in terrorism** from the times of anarchists up until now. We often talk about new terrorist organizations but they are not really new but carry continuity to informal political violence.

## UNDERSTANDING THE REAL 'CRISIS' OF TERRORISM CRISIS MANAGEMENT

### Two types of terrorism crises:

1. The terrorist act itself (an *immediate crisis*)
2. The 'emergency treatment' response to this act has implications for the long-term 'clinical treatment' period, and may potentially lead to a state of *perpetual crisis*

Furthermore, there are two types of terrorism crises: 1) the terrorist act itself, which refers to an *immediate crisis* and is the beginning of the crisis and 2) the 'emergency treatment' response to this act has implications for the long-term 'clinical treatment' period, and may potentially lead to a state of *perpetual crisis*. As such, the act is often so dramatizing that we forget to 'treat' it.


## THE TERRORISM TRAP

- Terror is the name of a method
- Terror is a rational choice practice
- Terror is part of an asymmetric struggle

Basically:

Terror is a tool for political ends, used by the "weak" of a particular time and context, in order to redistribute political power between themselves and the "strong".

In regard to the *terrorism trap*, terror is the name of a **method**, not the name of an outcome or an output. Terror is a **rational choice practice** - those who conduct terrorism, do so with a rational mind. They are not 'really crazy' people as we think and 99.9% of us would in fact be scared to be a terrorist. Also, terror is part of an **asymmetric struggle**. Terror is a tool for political ends, used by the "weak" of a particular time and context in order to redistribute political power between themselves and the "strong." As such, it is about the power relation - one actor is unhappy with this relation and thus, targets the strong actor.



There are different individual (personal, psychological) and organizational (tactical, political) motives that are often combined (religion, economical, nationalism) and that lead to a terrorist attack and a response to it. Also, some move up in the ladder of these motivations, i.e. willingness to die and to the recruitment stage while others lead to willingness to kill. As such, training and indoctrination does not take that long and can be done within a month to have the will to die. Overall, **real terrorism starts after the terrorist attack**. The responses that governments give and the crisis management determine the future fate of counter efforts. As such, **the consequences of the response becomes a feedback** - this can lead to new motivations and the indoctrination will continue. If we fail with the right response, this will lead to more motivations for the terrorist to die and gives them more legitimacy and success in recruitment. This would thus make their job much easier than it was at the start. Overall, in terrorism cycle (trap), everything is connected. 'Your' response becomes the primary input at the later stage.



Moreover, the weak provokes the strong to fail. However, the problem of asymmetry is that the weak party does not have to win but the strong party has to win. If the strong power cannot win definitively, they are weakened in the eyes of the domestic and international public. However, **for terrorists, their primary purpose is not to lose.** If the strong is unable to finish them off and the struggle continues, then they are winning. Terrorists provoke the state to overreact and use heavier anti-terrorist strategies. As such, it is not easy to differentiate between terrorism and the people you target.

## 5 CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CT RESPONSES

- Time pressures
- Long term versus short term measures
- Leadership style (decision-making)
- Political environment (openness to politicization)
- National security culture

There are five **critical characteristics of CT responses**. Therefore, in order not-to-not fall into the terrorism trap, there are some characteristics of CT that must be considered.

1) Time pressure which refers to the obligation to respond quickly and punish perpetrators: As such, the leaders are often being pressured by the public to react and for the attack not to happen again. Also, societies always want a revenge and quick punishment.

2) Long term versus short term measures: under the influence of the time pressure, do you launch the struggle against the terrorists and the immediate attack or against preventing terrorism in the long-term? As such, short term (emergency) treatments may include combatting the tactics of terrorism; offensive measures, neutralization, proactive policies as well as protection of the population while the long term (clinical) treatments refer to political, legal, security measures and social reforms; restoring social order as well as maintaining of liberal democracy and the rule of law.

3) Leadership style: What are the characteristics of the decision-making behind the counterterrorism response? What to do if the society is not up for debates? Is it a debate including a decision-making system or a single-handed process?

4) Political environment: Some leaders tend to politicize the issue and thus give potential for mobilization. Do they see this as an opportunity to further their own political interests, curb opposition or do they see this like a challenge against the whole system and therefore try to think long-term as well as prioritize institutional and societal interests to combat this?

5) The National Security Culture: Every country has different national security structures and may think that the governments should 'hit back' without thinking most of the time. While some countries talk and analyze the issue first (i.e. UK), others do not. Some countries use a more comprehensive approach, without making the issue perpetual. Overall, based on these issues and how these different characteristics play out in a particular targeted country, we can see how they fall into the terrorist trap - turning the immediate emergency crisis into a perpetual crisis, which is what the terrorists want.

## TURKEY



Furthermore, Prof. Dr. Aydınli gave an overview of three particular cases of crisis management - British (7/7 attacks), US (9/11), and Turkish (PKK and 2003 Al Qaeda's Istanbul bombings). How did each one respond to these critical terrorist cases, based on these five characteristics of CT? According to Prof. Dr. Aydınli, Turkey fell into the terrorist trap in terms of the PKK and this has been turned into a protracted crisis. However, in retrospect, could this have been done differently? As previously noted in scholarship, this issue was seen as a *tuberculosis* case but we tried to treat it as a type of *cold* which actually turned out to be a *cancer*. As such, the PKK wanted the Turkish government and security forces to fall into a terrorist trap. Also, the Al Qaeda wanted to see a divided Turkey but this case was handled differently (did well) by the police and the intelligence in which the crisis was dealt with utmost sensitivity.

## ENGLAND



Furthermore, the UK does better in terms of not falling into a trap by having discussions and analyzing the situation before reacting. For instance, 10 years after the attack, the Municipality of London has a Muslim major. Moreover, neighborhood discussions, community engagement with mosques, societal responses to radicalization potential greatly reduced the chance to fall into the trap.

## THE UNITED STATES



However, the U.S. fell into the terrorist trap in which the time pressure characteristics and public revenge played a crucial role. Also, leadership style was evident in which a close-knit circle decided on the response and the military had to follow it. Moreover, the president politicized the issue and perhaps saw it as an opportunity to also politicize it in an international level. As such, the National Security Culture was designed to 'hit back' and react to those who attack the nation. Thus, seeing this a type of war to fight.

## IN CONCLUSION

- The *potential* of falling into the terrorism trap and becoming part of a perpetual crisis cycle constitutes the hidden crisis that has to be managed in CT
- **Awareness** of this phenomenon and potential, as a nation and government, is the starting point for preemption, and preemption is a critical part of the larger crisis management.

Overall, it is the potential of falling into the terrorism trap and becoming part of a perpetual crisis that constitutes the hidden greater crisis that has to be managed in CT. Thus, management of the protracted crisis cycle is the biggest part of crisis management. As such, **comprehensiveness needs to be part of crisis management**. In addition, awareness of this whole phenomenon is the starting point of the preemption. Preemption is a critical part of the larger crisis management. Once a perpetual crisis starts, it is much harder to get out of it.

### Discussion

During the discussion, the participants further elaborated on the first presentation and questioned whether terrorists are thoroughly rational or if there are other ways how to see terrorism. Prof. Dr. Abrahms emphasized that we need to be careful of distinguishing whether terrorism is strategic, effective or rational. There is under-specification of terrorism in terms of how we think about it. Prof. Dr. Abrahms agreed that terrorists are rational but this does not mean that they are strategic at the same time. We are too quick to conclude that terrorists are strategic but they are also effective - it is like fighting a 'mystical beast' and saying that they are always one step ahead. 9/11 brought USA further to the Persian Gulf. As such, people saw this as terrorists got what they wanted. Also, after Madrid attacks in 2004, the response was opposite and the government withdrew its forces. However, it was again said that terrorists got what they wanted. We take motives out of outcome and often regard terrorist attacks as success but we do not really know if it has been successful or not.

Furthermore, Prof. Ruger pointed out that it may be pedantic but the issue is how we define things and have to have a thorough understanding. We should focus on 1) How we perceive things and 2) how does the psychological factor come in. 'Winning' to me is that terrorists received political Objectives. Terrorists are not really efficient because they do not always do and achieve what they want. It has low effectiveness compared to other means, perhaps only 7%. It is helpful to think what it ultimately means to win.

The participants agreed that responding to terrorism really matters but what if there is no response and governments as well as decision makers prefer not to respond at all? However, Prof. Dr. Aydınlı stressed that **no response is not an option** but this is also related to the type of an attack. For instance, there may be a type of an attack that governments neglect but these all involve lives of people. However, smart and a quiet response is an option instead, not neglecting. The problem is that depending on the very nature of the attack, we often cannot come up with a quick response. Strategic communication plays a role, because terrorists want publicity. Prof. Dr. Aydınlı further reiterated that on an organizational level, all members can be rational or non-rational but it is important to see if the organizational leadership is rational by doing strategic communication without its members even knowing it. For instance, by telling a person that it is their time to blow themselves up but not telling them the strategy.

Moreover, terrorists conduct attacks because they want recognition, to grow, legitimacy and money. After Al Qaeda's attacks on 9/11, the whole world know about it and at the same time, the terrorist group got more legitimacy. Thus, violent non-state actors (VNSAs) want recognition first and this requires strategic communication. They want the enemy to hit back. However, this leads to a strategic trap: the moment an attack place, the governments choose to engage - a terrorist is designed for that game. If a terrorist is already being acknowledged, this is already a type of winning.

Furthermore, Ms. Foggett highlighted the growing phenomenon of **far right terrorism** and these supremacists are often celebrating our responses as well as the jihadist's responses. We have to be smarter in enforcing those 'ecosystems' of terrorism. Prof. Özcan questioned what does crisis management really mean? Also, the main question for leaders is - how can you manage this crisis? Terrorism is a cheap way to conduct attacks but we should understand the attack behind terrorism, both psychologically (mindset) and physically (by preparing systems). According to the crisis, different institutions and media can collect data but how do we organize all institutions to do so? There is no one solution to this problem - each country produces crisis management rules and this is often based on historical experiences. As such, **each terrorist attack is different** from others but the response depends on the organizational capability.

The participants also questioned the definition of crisis management as such - this makes a difference in responses. However, defining this is often the hardest part, but the most critical one. We often think that the immediate crisis is the crisis management but we are realizing that this is part of a much larger crisis. Perhaps we should focus on both immediate crisis and a broader one. Furthermore, Prof. Dr. Aydınlı




highlighted that a terrorist works 24/7 and has a lifelong career while counter-terrorists work 9 AM-6 PM - this is the problem. Terrorists are always one step ahead of counter-terrorists. Overall, the participants agreed that terrorism always needs a response but we should question whether the response that we have 1) is it required and 2) where does it stop?

**11.10-12.00**  
**“NATO Crisis Response System”**  
*by Col. Plamen Milanov*

This session was designed as an introduction to the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) in which Col. Plamen Milanov, representative of Crisis Management and Disaster Response Center of Excellence, enlightened the participants about the official Crisis Management system, especially in regards to how it works in NATO and how it supports crisis response operations and security issues to identify responsibilities of key political and military actors dealing with crisis management in NATO. The lecture had a twofold focus aiming to contribute to the further discussions amongst the audience related to the main topic of the seminar and secondly to show the role and place of Counter terrorism in the current NCRS.

Col. Plamen Milanov highlighted that the NATO Crisis Management Strategic Concept’s main aim is to analyze and monitor the security environment as well as to undertake related actions and measures. As such, a definition of crisis used in NATO is “...a national or international situation in which there is a threat to priority values, interests or goals of the parties involved”. However, on a practical level, NATO has no agreed definition of crisis. As such, CMDR COE came up with another one: “A time-bound state of (objective or subjective) uncertainty and major non-routine events putting to the test the overall resilience and preparedness of a system and its established procedures”.



Furthermore, NATO Art. 3 “...refers to dealing with the crisis: “...the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Therefore, nations respond to develop their own capabilities. Moreover, Art. 4 refers to the consultation: “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of the,, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”. Nations can request consultations when needed. Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked several times. For instance, Turkey in 2003, 2012 (two times) and 2015 and Poland in 2014.



## Fundamentals (3)

Meet Challenges, Seize Opportunities, Anticipate the Future!

### Article 5

*"... an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all and . . . each of them . . . will assist the Party so attacked by taking . . . such action . . . including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area."*



Article 5 was evoked after 9/11 and refers to an armed attack being conducted against one Member is consider as an attack against all Members.



## Fundamentals (4)

Meet Challenges, Seize Opportunities, Anticipate the Future!


### Article 7

*"... the Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security."*



Primacy of the UN for the maintenance of International Peace and Security

Moreover, Article 7 refers to “...the Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the UN, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.”



The slide features a blue header with the text "Fundamentals (5)" and a smaller tagline "Meet Challenges, Seize Opportunities, Anticipate the Future". On the left is a circular logo with a globe and a compass rose. On the right is a larger blue compass rose logo. The main title is "Crisis Management Definition". Below it is a quote: "Coordinated actions taken to diffuse crises, prevent their escalation into armed conflict and/or contain resulting hostilities if they should result". To the right of this quote is the blue compass rose logo. Below the quote is the text: "CMDR COE: 'An iterative process of organised and coordinated, by and among all responsible stakeholders at the local, national, regional and international levels, actions aimed at handling a crisis at all its phases.'" To the right of this text is a photograph of a signpost with the words "CRISIS MANAGEMENT" on a blue background.

NATO understanding of Crisis Management is formulated in MC 400/1 as a tool which provides decision makers with the necessary information and arrangements to use appropriate instruments (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) in a timely and coordinated manner. The Crisis Management definition is referred to as “Coordinated actions taken to diffuse crises, prevent their escalation into armed conflict and/or contain resulting hostilities if they should result”. Furthermore, for the CMDR COE it is “An iterative process of organized and coordinated, by and among all responsible stakeholders at the local, national, regional and international levels, actions aimed at handling a crisis at all its phases.” Crisis Management objectives aim to contribute to effective conflict prevention; manage crises effectively to prevent them becoming conflicts; ensure timely civil and military preparedness; control, prevent escalation and persuade aggressor to cease attack and withdraw; and to de-escalate and re-establish normal order. Overall, there is always the NAC supremacy and decisions are taken by consensus. Furthermore, in decision-making, NATO nations and bodies are involved and it’s not a standalone task. Also, different committees are preparing suggestions for the NAC. Moreover, the Alliance has developed a number of partnership tools and mechanisms to support cooperation, mainly in the area of crisis management, with partner countries through a mix of policies, programmes, action plans and other arrangements - the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. NATO also cooperates with a range of international organisations in different structures such as UN, EU, OSCU, IFRC etc.

## NATO Partners

*Meet Challenges, Seize Opportunities, Anticipate the Future!*

- ✓ **Euro-Atlantic partners:**
  - Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, North Macedonia, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, the Republic of Moldova, Russia\*, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
- ✓ **Istanbul Cooperation Initiative:**
  - Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates.
- ✓ **Mediterranean Dialogue:**
  - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.
- ✓ **Partners across the globe:**
  - Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Mongolia.
- ✓ **International Organizations:**
  - UN, EU, OSCE, IFRC.

\* Cooperation was suspended in April 2014 in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.





The NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) is effectively a guide to support decision within the field of crisis management. Its role is to coordinate effort between the national representatives at NATO HQ, Capitals, and Strategic Commands. The system is designed to be a fully integrated and supporting the Alliance in responding to the full range of crises that might be encountered and to ensure appropriate political control by the NAC. It also enhances civil-military interaction and takes into account interrelationship between civil and military measures, avoiding unnecessary duplication with other NATO procedures and arrangements. The system is capable of supporting NATO's operations and the involvement of Partner or other non-NATO nations.

The NCRS consists of 4 main elements: Components, NATO Crisis Response Process (NCRP), Procedures and Mechanisms which are interconnected and complement each other.



Furthermore, NCRS Components comprises of different sub-elements: preventive options; crisis response measures; counter-surprise; counter-aggression; and NATO security alert states. Preventive options are general courses of actions available for consideration by senior NATO committees designed to prevent escalation of a developing crises. Thus, preventive options relate to the 'courses of action' and is not automatic; cover early stages of an emergency crisis; are precautionary and preventive; and can contribute to the defence against terrorism. As such, this can include improved intelligence sharing, cooperation with partners, arms control, disruption of terrorist organization as well as diplomatic, economic options and public affairs. In this respect, it was stressed the all threats from terrorists against NATO Allies include a wide variety of possibilities. Possible terrorist operations also includes further references to potential responses that should consider a list of Preventive Options related to counter terrorism. It was also noted the importance of national intelligence information sharing amongst nations which is needed for the NAC to make a proper and swift decision.

One of the main elements of NCRS is the NATO Crisis Response Process (NCRP).



It is a six-phase consultation and decision making process in the NCRS that can be adapted flexibly to any Art. 5 or non-Art.5 crisis situation. It is designed to allow the relevant headquarters, committees and working groups to coordinate their work to produce a comprehensive, timely and complete report to the NAC. NCRP basically consists of the following consecutive phases: 1) Indications and warning of potential or ongoing crisis; 2) Assessment of a growing crisis or reassessment of an ongoing crisis situation and its potential or actual consequences for the security of the Alliance; 3) Development of recommended options for response to support NAC's decision making throughout the whole process of the crisis; 4) Planning; 5) Execution of NATO decisions and directives; 6) Transition and termination of NATO's role in crisis management. In general, NAC approval is needed in every stage and the process can also be reversal. Col. Milanov further elaborated as an example that in Kosovo, NATO started with 15,000 troops which was later reduced to 3,000. As such, NATO has implemented some objectives but not all - that is why NATO mission is still present.

Overall, the NCRS Manual is a brief summary of the system components which describes in detail the procedures for their implementation during a crisis. It provides the users with: basic knowledge concerning Crisis Management in NATO and cooperation, between Alliance and the others actors in that domain;

description of the NATO Crisis Response Process (NCRP); recommendations of “Preventative Options”; a means to take preparatory action with Crisis Response Measures (CRMs); scenarios to guide use of the NCRS; and exchange of information between main actors. It also serves as a basis for NATO member-states to develop parallel national and NATO headquarters systems at strategic, military-strategic and operational level for the Alliance command structure.

Also, Col. Milanov touched upon the Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) which is a political/military/strategic exercise and is suitable for Art. 5 and Non-Art. 5 situations. It is designed to test and validate current and evolving crisis management concepts, procedures and arrangements and owned by Nations. As such, it is a forum for testing the revised NCRSM.

### **Discussion**

During the discussion, the participants agreed that further simplification of NATO Crisis Response System is needed. Dr. Ashraf reiterated that terrorism is a political concept - it is a part of military culture to have clarity. Indeed, terrorism is a continuity of a perpetual crisis and as such, conflicts do not end but transform. In Iraq, terrorism transformed into an insurgency. How do you respond to a crisis situation - intervening by foreign politics? How you deal with it makes the response for the future. We often deal with crisis after we understand it. Col. Milanov added that NATO developed matrix for NATO Member States to react swiftly during and after crisis. As such, some procedures are based on authorization from NAC. Prof. Dr. Aydınlı questioned if the Response System is really fast enough in which Col. Milanov pointed out that the NCRSM has envisaged such cases but they are subject for another level of discussion.

**13.30-14.20**

**“Terrorism in the Future”**

*by Prof. Dr. Max Abrahms*

In the third session, Prof. Max Abrahms focused on probable future trends of terrorism from a practical and a theoretical perspective, analyzing current trends. Prof. Abrahms is the author of “Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History” book and thus, focused on which rules militant leaders and groups have or have not followed and why some succeed while others fail. Prof. Max Abrahms stressed that some radicals will become rebels and there are rules for them, too. As such, Prof. Max Abrahms' book starts off where “Rules for Radicals” book ends. There is a surprising amount of agency over rebel leader’s political destiny. Triumph is possible but only for those who know what to do. It turns out there is a science to victory in militant history but even rebels must follow rules.

## Baghdadi – The Supposed Genius



When people think of smart leaders and militant groups, many think of ISIS. ISIS' leader Baghdadi was seen as a some sort of ‘militant genius’, especially by analysts and the media. He declared a Caliphate in 2014 and within couple of years controlled a third of Iraq and Syria equal to the size of Great Britain. Moreover, ISIS ruled over 9 million people in which world saw about 40,000 FTFs heading to Syria and Iraq - more than 4 times the size of mujahideens fighting against the Soviet Union during 1980s. By 2016, 34 different organizations had pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, fighting under the same umbrella.



## ISIS Leaders Are Reportedly Masterminds

"Military Skill and Terrorist technique Fuel Success of ISIS"  
"battlefield successes" "pedigree of its leadership"  
"these guys know the terrorism business inside and out"

The New York Times

"highly intelligent leaders calling the shots"

theguardian

"ISIS is chillingly smart"

FT FINANCIAL  
TIMES

International media was quick to label ISIS' leaders as 'masterminds' - ISIS was believed to be and labelled as a 'smart group' by several think tanks. First, ISIS was believed to know the strategic value of brutalizing civilians. They know that civilian attacks pay. Second, ISIS was smart because it favored civilian attacks and decentralized the organization in terms of its operation and recruitment to maximize civilian carnage. Third, ISIS was seen as a cultivating image of broadcasting its atrocities via social media platform to terrorize the world. Thus, ISIS was seen as 'smart' because of its social media strategies and promoting its violent images.

## Rules for Rebels

1. Learn Terrorism Doesn't Pay
2. Restrain Members from Committing Terrorism
3. Deny Responsibility for Terrorism

Yet, ISIS' blood Caliphate died just as quickly as it had appeared. In fact, Baghdadi and his group were 'extremely stupid terrorists'. In "Rules for Rebels" book, the professor shows scientifically how smart militant leaders follow rules:

1) **Smart leaders recognize that not all violence is equal and learn that terrorism does not pay.** They grasp that some attacks should be carefully avoided because they are deeply counterproductive for the cause - using indiscriminate violence tends to be counterproductive. The first rule for rebels could be for the leaders not to use terrorism at all. Although there is no consensus over the definition of terrorism, but we mostly talk about civilian targets and attacks, i.e. against schools., churches, mosques. Leaders may not grasp the threat over terrorism but the smart leaders learn over time.


2) Rule is for **leaders to structure the organization to restrain lower levels from committing terrorism** and educate soldiers to avoid harming civilians. The key for the leader is to centralize the organization and mark those members who seem prone to harm civilians. While the first rule is for the leader to recognize the value of civilians, the second rule is getting its members to follow the first rule

3) The key to a militant leader is to **make the group look moderate**, even when members act otherwise. For instance, denial of organizational involvement in an attack. Hence, these three rules are the secret for victory - **learning, restraining and denying**. If rebel groups follow these rules, their success can be greater.


But what is the value of terrorism? Prof. Dr. Abrahms further elaborated on his experience in the West Bank. When talking to some people, some Israelis explained that they were not always fans of the wall/fence but were rather interested in trading. However, when in 1990s there was an increase of terrorists attacks from Palestinian Territories, they started to be more in favor of the wall. Therefore, Israelis were more conciliatory but acted in response to the attacks. On the other hand, the Palestinians were seeing the fence as destroying their national aspirations. But if Palestinians were a so called political success story, how have other groups failed that also used terrorism?

## Rule #1: Learning to Win

Analogies to Predict 9/11 Success




Most Frequent Analogies



In regard to 9/11, Bin Laden wanted the U.S to withdraw from the Persian Gulf and for the USA to stop killing Muslims around the world and disrupt the relations between USA and Pakistan/Saudi Arabia. However, 9/11 attack backfired - the U.S. did not withdraw from the Gulf and in fact, increased its relations with Israel/Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. As such, looking from a strategic perspective, 9/11 was a failure. Interestingly, when Bin Laden cites Al Qaeda's actions, he describes a guerilla campaign, not a terrorist campaign. Also, in large-N studies that Prof. Dr. Abrahms conducted during his research, most of the cases

were guerilla groups that used such tactics and where violence were conducted against militaries and governments, i.e. FARC but those who targeted civilians had lower political success (i.e. Abu Sayyaf).


It is believed that terrorism has a high rate of political success. However, Prof. Dr. Abrahms run a correlation between groups that predominantly use terrorism and groups that tend to be political failure. We say that terrorism is the weapon of the weak and such groups may gravitate towards terrorism and have a low political success due to structural issues and target selection. However, groups such as ISIS, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, PKK, and Boko Haram are hardly weak groups and kill the most civilians. Even if one is to control the militants' capabilities, taking into account their size and age of the group but **if a group directs its violence against civilian targets, it reduces the odds that the government would make concessions or respond to any kinds of demands, big or small.**



As such, the first rule of rebels is for the leader to learn not to use terrorism. Secondly, even when the leader learns the cost of terrorism, he must still prevent his fighter from doing that. This is difficult, because militant groups tend to be internally heterogenous. This leads to principal-agent problem in which lower level of soldiers may not have the same level of motivation and have a stronger personal incentive in harming civilians. Key to the leader is to centralize the organization because it helps the leader to communicate to lower level operatives and punish those who harm civilians and vet out prospective members who may harm civilians. If an operative attacks civilians, he is also moving away from the leadership.


## Rule #2: Restraining to Win

Network Graphs of Militant Group Relationships




## Rule #2: Restraining to Win

Target Selection of Affiliates versus Parents



## Rule #2: Restraining to Win

Civilian and Military Targeting




Regarding leadership de-capitulation, many people act as if targeted killing works. Does it reduce frequency of attacks? When you take away the militant leader from a group, it tends to change tactics of operatives and lower level members of calling the shot. In terms of the leadership deficit - **the more drones are shut down, the less influence they have** because they have to go into hiding and thus, empowers lower

level operatives. As such, drone strike density is correlated with rise of attacks. Thus, militant groups tend to become more extreme.

## Rule #2: Restraining to Win


Figure 11.2: Effect of Decapitation Strike on Terrorism




There is only one type of group that would not increase its violence against civilians and that is the kind of group that does not follow rules number one and two (i.e. centralize and limit the group). Groups like that already target civilians about 100% of time, i.e. ISIS. As such, killing ISIS leader Baghdadi would not change the nature of violence of ISIS. Also, Baghdadi did not centralize ISIS and did not follow rule number 3 either. Civilians are still structured up 15% of the time even when the leader can oppose terrorism and centralize the group to limit it. The key is for the leader to make the group moderate to avoid a public relations (PR) disaster. Moreover, Prof. Dr. Abrahms studied business literature and found that smart CEOs go into denial if their employees cause a reputation problem and so do successful military leaders when their operatives create a problem by harming civilians.

Regarding terrorism, how to explain variation whether the leaders or groups claim credit for the attacks - sometimes they do, sometimes they do not. Whether they usually take the credit is based on the target selection of the violence. When violence strikes a civilian target, the odds for the leader for claiming organizational credit for the attack goes down 41%. As the leader gets older and gains experience, the odds for claiming credit for civilian attacks goes down even further. Even radical groups like Al Qaeda and Boko Haram, they feature in their videos less civilian violence than what their operatives actually carry out. However, groups like AQI and ISIS go further by bragging about attacking civilian targets on social media and this mobilizes the world to tackle them. It is no coincidence that ISIS triggered the biggest coalition against it. But the leadership does the exact opposite what successful rebels do. Baghdadi favored indiscriminate violence all over the world and maximized civilian targets. This is a great strategy if your goal is to grow more fear and distribute it on social media, it has been successful. However, this is not so if the goal is to translate violence into political achievements.

### Rule #3: Denying to Win



### Rule #3: Denying to Win



**The key to counter terrorism is to convince terrorists that they are better off politically doing anything other than terrorism.** If we want to understand the future of militant groups, we have to look which terrorist groups are following the rules for rebels. So far, this framework has helped to predict and has been applied from Syria to Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories and Libya, even in the USA.

### Discussion

The discussion further elaborated on the talk and Prof. Dr. Haldun Yalçınkaya questioned what is the take on the NATO side regarding the future of terrorism. Prof. Dr. Abrahms elaborated that there is a tendency among commentators of terrorism to create to the wide perspective that 'extremism pays', that groups would be better if they are more extreme and would do a better job in terms of coercing governments to make concessions and in terms of growing the membership size of the organization. People talk how sophisticated ISIS was in terms of targeting and social media but none of them is based on Political Science. However, the actual empirics of the story runs exact opposite of this. Groups that would be more dangerous and controlling territory and pose geopolitical threat are actually complete opposite of ISIS - it is the groups that are more restrained (in Raqqa, Idlib). They are still around but if they acted like ISIS, they would not be around. These groups often have more local support and more territory, and Baghdadi was relying on them when he went into hiding. But if ISIS did not go around bragging of its killing, they would not be around either.

ISIS is not doing very well in Afghanistan, but Taliban has - it is doing much better at PR, particularly in rule number three than ISIS. It is true that Taliban kills a lot of civilians, more than any other group last year however, the leadership opposes civilian attacks. Also, its code of conduct opposes civilian attacks. A lot of civilian attacks come about to principal-agent problem and loss of control. Loss of control comes from the fact that we have been taking out its leaders and they are replaced with young ones, less experienced and low level operatives are more likely to call the shots. Another example is Libya - there are many militants in Libya but very few are ISIS. In Palestine, militants have become much more moderate and smarter in their PR. Such groups have understood that it actually pays when they do not display how radical they are.

Sometimes, these groups broadcast civilian attacks live and we would think that a common sense to do is to shut down these media broadcasters. Facebook and Twitter would become under pressure because they are seen as facilitators by broadcasting of such violence. However, for such militant groups its usually counterproductive to broadcast such violence. Rather than condemning Facebook and Twitter, they should be commended because they help to turn the world against these groups. But by contrast, this does not mean that we should broadcast everything that militants are doing. However, we should not broadcast manifestos because they are much more dangerous and have much wider appeal among agreed people throughout the world. Regarding Anders Behring Breivik, many people agree with his manifesto but did not agree with his killing. Violence is often less popular but their political ideas are more popular.

Dr. Ashraf agreed that targeting civilians do not work. However, we have to still ask the question why does it still have such appeal? Dr. Ashraf highlighted that the presentation's example of the Israel-Palestine case was a good one but Israelis were willing to trade territory for peace but the willingness never really translated into actuality - those grievances have not been addressed by the international community and the countries involved. **The manifestos are indeed much more dangerous and perhaps this is where we should look. How in the context of crisis management we can deal with it?** Prof. Dr. Abrahms stressed that if you are a lone wolf, you may think that violence against civilians is a good way to reach his goals. Groups that use terrorism think that using violence may be the answer but from a personal/emotional perspective, this can just be a utility. It is not irrational for some others to join these groups. Also, leaders over time tend to learn that civilian targeting is politically complex and it is not irrational in the early stages of militancy. We see more terrorism from militant groups in the early stages of the militant leaders length. This makes CT so difficult - we need to divert terrorism of its utility to convince users not to go into civilian targeting. But there are so many groups that see terrorism as benefitting them. Sometimes terrorism can be seen as fighting 'cancer'. One of the reasons why it is so difficult to fight 'cancer' is because there are so many different pathways to deal with it. We need to try to tackle of all these different utilities and make them understand that such tactics do not get them through politically.

Dr. Ashraf further highlighted that as Prof. Abrahms pointed out examples of Louis Richardson and days of her work on what terrorists want. She is now a Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford and she recalls in her work that she was about to join the IRA in Northern Ireland but decided to join some other groups instead. She is now one of the most effective writers on terrorism. The knowledge is out there but the challenge remains - **how do you prevent the real factors not just the symptoms, so that the crisis does not arrive in the first place.**

Furthermore, Assoc. Prof. Ali Nihat Özcan further elaborated on Turkey's experience under which conditions do terrorists attack civilians from the PKK's side. Terrorism strategies are important. For instance, at the first stage, terrorists need shaping of the public opinion and an understanding of identity - violence is a useful tool for shaping the social structures as an identity issue. As such, they need to declare who they are (terrorists). If you then provide social control of the society and territorial control, you do not need to attack civilians. The next step is creating negative feelings against the state. For instance, PKK provide the social control and created new sympathies among civilians and began to attack military and police forces. But the military and police cannot put political pressure over the state. Although PKK is killing police and military, there is no reaction from the society or the politicians. Afterwards, PKK started to use proxies for attacking civilians because when you kill civilians, you can affect the government's policies. As such, civilian attacks, depend on each case and each terrorist organization's strategy, not the clear definition of terrorism.

Prof. Abrahms pointed out that if he were advising PKK in terms of achieving their goals, he would recommend to follow the "rules for rebels". On the other hand, if you are fighting the PKK, you do not want them to follow these rules. Research shows that it is quite counterproductive to reach their political goals. Assoc. Prof. Ali Nihat Özcan further elaborated that PKK kills civilians because they wanted discussion among civilians. PKK needs political aims and tries to create tension over society. Prof. Yesiltas agreed that PKK is using proxies such as the TAK which is used as a kind of strategy for PKK. Prof. Dr. Abrahms emphasized that affiliates tend to be more radical and often the leadership tries to distance itself from such attacks if civilians are involved - what explains the targeting of civilians in terms of rule number 2 and is not selecting on target selection but looking whole of independent variables and see which ones explain the target selection. Prof. Yesiltas further highlighted that in Turkey, targeted killing, using drones, have been successful and have prevented PKK's mobilizations.

Prof Ruger questioned what if terrorist groups pursued mixed strategies by themselves or by using proxies? Key variable to use for success is their ability to deny that they are the problem. Terrorism could pay as long as they are perceived as redoing it, i.e. their branding is good. For Prof. Abrahms, **the key is not to target civilians**. But the leadership could distance themselves from those attacking or apologize on behalf of them.



14.20-15.10

**“Predicting the Terrorist Threat – New toolkit for CT (Big Data & Social Media Intelligence) and usage of Social Media in crisis”**


*by Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı*

This session was designed to present the role of Big Data, Social Media and technological developments before, during and after terrorist attacks. In his presentation, “Predicting the terrorist threat”, Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı elaborated on the evidence and expectations for the capacity of cyber developments as a toolkit for Crisis Management in terrorism. Assoc. Prof. Bıçakçı highlighted that in today’s evolving world, we also have to be aware of new threats in which terrorists use knife or a truck to further their attacks and this is hard to predict.



Moreover, Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı stressed that when we talk about terrorism, there are many pieces behind it, i.e. motivation and organization theory. The way how terrorists choose the attack it is related the big data and could be used to predict it on some level. **They are always looking for an audience and they have a message** - they want to transfer their message to their audience. To understand that is important. Recruitment is a HR process and is really working. If you have no idea about the background of psychological or socio-economic process to understand this recruitment, they are really smart how to manipulate it. Terrorists have become more flexible, adaptable and less centered. Also, terrorism is almost an economic issue - everything needs to be financed. To do it, terrorists have a trace system which is working well.


# Organized Complexity



Also, we have changed the system of the complexity - now we have complexity that is regulated by different systems. We could not make an easy prediction how terrorists will move. Even when you are from the military or a civilian, it is not easy to understand complexity. As such, even for the big data, it comes with complexity as well. In big data, we are talking about kilo bites, for instance - and it is not easy to get this data, as people think. Large amount of data and this data is coming in variety, i.e. image, voice data. The volume of the data, sometimes it is incredibly high, sometimes incredibly low. As such, the data that we have is not always consistent and not getting the true information.

Data volume is also an issue, i.e. social media - accuracy is important in this. In 2003, there was a prediction done by Google for a flu transition in the USA and how flu will epidemically reach a point and come to them. In 2009, they published an article and repeated the data to see if it was still accurate and working - unfortunately not. Why? Terrorism is relevant with humans and the context - if the context changes, human changes. Whatever the solution we have, it has to be hybrid. We need transition solutions and it needs to be hybrid.

People often think that data comes as organized but this is not so. We are working on social network analysis, i.e. 9/11 has given so many clues how people are connected. However, some researchers are not giving social ground what we have to find out for human intelligence. As such, calculations with psychology and sociology gives more accuracy. Things are changing in social network and terrorists are also changing their tactics. There is also a generational gap - generation is changing, millennials are coming, tactics is changing - they think of how crisis management has to be done. In AFP instance, they sent one Twitter message saying "Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured" - this went viral. In terrorism, they are not only making harm by creating fear and intimidation but also severing the economy just like the one with AFP. Controlling the environment is not easy as it was. There is an environment and domain we need to protect, follow and process and this is affecting our way of understanding.



So, is it possible to detect lonely wolves? Might be yes, might be no - why? Because there is always an anomaly - how they are shaped and how they are working. We can do this by GPS and cellular data. We have literature how cellular data usage about people - some of them mistakenly use **cellular data** to detect them, some of them mistakenly use the GPS data embedded in exit data. We can easily make easy access to it and this is the reason why law enforcement and military do not use these GPS systems/data anymore because it gives a chance about prediction. Another thing to pay attention to is the **security culture**. For instance, in usage of Israel, they started to publish how to be aware of the security culture of counterterrorism and making people aware of the security situation and possible attacks. Is it possible for us to understand the possible attack activity?



In regard to finding the terrorists, we use **CCTVs** - this is especially important in the urban areas. CCTVs are used for surveillance and monitoring but we have to underline one point - data privacy protection rights of the individuals by states from a liberal perspective and also from the security perspective because we can do many things if we are not living in democracy. But if we live in democracy and separation of powers, you have to keep your limitations up - CCTV usage can be problematic in this case.



Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı emphasized that you need human intelligence which needs to care what people are doing in society. Terrorists have goals to reach - in order to defend, you have to follow CCTVs throughout the years and months to be able to detect something and predict. Also, image matching **AI application** helps towards prediction, it is mostly open source - also terrorists can use it. Language understanding is one of the techniques that has improved but few state institutions are using it. Also, removing terrorist clusters is important because there is a high radicalization system in the world - if we could not predict radicalization before they are recruited by the terrorist organizations, it is not going to help us to do it. Also, cross-referencing is important but some Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) who are leading it, do not sometimes cooperate with each other and with some of the states - **NATO could create agreements with some of these companies**. They often do not also want to cooperate in terms of data sharing.

Also, location can be predicting by WIFI signals and the wireless environment, not only heat waves, to predict what people are doing. This could be implemented in law enforcement and CT units as well. Also, intelligence tracking targets and profiling can provide information. Also, psychographic (i.e. Cambridge Analytica) can be used to predict their political and sexual preferences, if they are going to be stubborn, angry. Most of the CCTVs cameras has a technological limit of CCTVs because they need to be changed and updated after five years - this, of course, is costly.

Furthermore, some programs have started to predict the person and combine photos with the Internet search. They are finding your photo, understanding your feelings and make research which photos you have on the Internet and match it. Chinese have already started to use facial recognition systems. Also, cameras collect data, for instance in Turkey's law enforcement. Some emotion control systems (glasses) have also been used in Israel for detecting pedophiles and by seeing their photo they can be on alert if these people go too close to kindergartens. Also, in NLP we can search for radicalization and their grievances about social media

messages to understand the level of threat. - dividing the sentences into pieces and valuing each details. Natural language processing can be used to checking sentences create a radical score which can be taken out of facebook, for instance. We also have to be aware of lip sinking and deep fake strategies. Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı further stressed that we have to change our mindsets and **we need to understand threats**.

### Discussion

Prof. Dr. Aydınlı pointed out that the essence of this big data seems to be that **technology is going to defeat terrorism**. Earlier, when telephones were being tapped in CT for the first time, it was already a development. But then, terrorists started to use fax machines and these could not be tapped and this took more time for the CT officials to react. What are we really trying to predict with more info - a new organization or a collapse of a possible organization? What is the use of all of this information and what are we trying to predict? If it is already an established organization, how will I understand when a certain organization will end, without comparative research and doing this historically by only looking at the data? Technology vs. terrorism - how does that really work?

Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı stressed that terrorism and CT is just a threshold issue - when you rise up the threshold, they rise up even more - it is a vicious circle. Technology is not a solution but it is going to be a doctrinal work, technology will be another domain to fight terrorism and find new ways to deal with it. There is a **generational gap** - it has changed. These platforms can be more beneficial than us for predicting, i.e. clustering new groups, follow recruitment groups. Of course, not every country has a capacity to do this - it is not cheap. However, you can predict possible places terrorists might attack by following cellular activity because we may have a pattern for this.

The problem is that these things are very sophisticated and requires coordination. There are big shifts in NATO, on state level etc, changing direction is hard - strategic communication with audience is often not possible. After any terrorist activity, states do not respond or announce what they are thinking just after attacks, but terrorists mostly do. Social media accounts are something that is interactive but old people think state has a certain understanding and states have to follow others. But this group of new generation has to understand this - we are denying the system. How to be ready for change? Times are changing - we still thinking of Cold War mindset. We have limited backup systems and no alternative communication systems. If an explosion happens, most politicians are visiting sites but we need to change systems after and before terrorist attacks. How we have to do it - small, quickly deployable and quick processes. Decision making priorities need to change because time has changed, technology has changed.

Prof. Dr. Aydınlı further pointed out that a lot of things have changed but the problem with terrorist challenge is that it is one of the most ancient forms of predicting violence, quick adaptation is a problem from a CT perspective and this is one of the risks of getting allured by new technology because a lot of things remain the same. Although a lot of things have changed, and technology has rocketed up - terrorism has not gone down. There is no direct relationship at all between how much you use technology and the number of terrorist attacks/lethality. It is not easy to digest the technological argument as quickly as thought.

Participants further elaborated on the interpretation of data and that this can be challenging because human behavior is complex and is not easily understood by algorithms as such and can cause miscalculation. Machine learning can be a problem because non-state actors can have a hold on this and shape the political-security environment in the future. How can data collection management encompasses this manipulation within irregular and hybrid security environment and on social media? Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı pointed out that Uber has done a trick - they say that they are at a certain point and get the data how far is the airplane and AI predicted that people need Uber - the prices go up or when your phone is on low charge. People have started to use this to their benefit. AI could indeed be exploited by terrorist groups. **We also need sociologists, economists, psychologists, political scientists to understand what is really going on and analyze this data - all of NATO members should do this.**

Prof. Abrahms pointed out his worry of using this kind of frame of fighting terrorism. Reducing number of terrorists rather than focusing on improving data processing and analytics. Trying to limit terrorists in the first place would be a more successful approach because: 1) terrorism is so easy to commit and this is a problem in terms of analyzing data - it is simple to do so (i.e. with knife, truck). 2) almost anybody can become a terrorist and we still do not really know psychologically how to identify who will become a terrorist and who will not. For instance, some of us could be terrorists and creates a methodological problems. 3) Substitution

effect - X ray machines introduced in airports but terrorists stopped doing so much hijacking than before but they simply used other tactics. There are major infringements of civil liberties and this type of surveillance is hardly cost free.

For Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı, the argument that almost everyone can become terrorists is a bit of oversimplification - I am interested in top 20%. For Assoc. Prof. Salih Bıçakçı further pointed out that he is not interested in root causes but the crisis management. Moreover, how will we manage automated cars into not carrying out terrorist attacks or predicting suicide bombings? **Amplifying the message is important** - terrorists are desperate in committing these attacks. Ms. Foggett further pointed out that in the long term, terrorists may not achieve their goals through violence but it does help with propaganda recruitment and financing. In many cases, manifestos are the basis of the attacks and we have to be aware that millions of people may be interested in reading it, if accessible. ISIS is sophisticated because their image is good, their English is good, their leaders get to the point.

Prof. Abrahms stressed that people tend to look at a group that uses violence and some people join these groups and are recruited - media propagates it with their massive stories in which FTFs may actually join these groups (recruitment effect) but the media ignores the other side. Groups that do not use violence, have bigger number of followers. ISIS had small number of followers compared to those groups that did not use ISIS' tactics.

Dr. Ashraf pointed out that we often forget how advanced we may be in the Western sphere and this is not advertised like the Chinese do who often say that their numbers are much bigger than in reality. Indeed, they are trying to catch up with research of artificial intelligence. Interestingly, in Xinjiang, they have police station in every 200 meters. There are deep issues of the interface of technology and the real world.

Col. Tüten concluded that there are two golden sentences in information operations: the perception become reality and there is no one solution for targeting in segmentation analysis but these technologies will shift everything drastically. Meta-data analysis and shifts in technology will also shift our scope in the name of information operations especially.

15.25-16.45

**“National CT Policies in terms of Crisis Management”  
(Turkey, United Kingdom, United States)**

In the final session on Day 1, the focus was on the National CT Policies of Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in terms of Crisis Management.

**“Turkey and PKK”**

*by Assoc. Prof. Nihat Ali Özcan*

Assoc. Prof. Nihat Ali Özcan focused on his presentation on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and elaborated on the strategies of both Turkish law enforcement agencies as well as the changing strategies of the PKK.

Assoc. Prof. Nihat Ali Özcan highlighted that while some terrorism is seen as trans-border, other is domestic. We are often focused on the terrorism strategy that was used during Cold War times. In terms of the PKK, it has changed its strategy throughout the years. For instance, it changed its strategy in 1995 as well as the beginning of the Arab Spring, in which the PKK shifted to Syria.

Moreover, there are different ethno-sectarian groups (both Sunni and Shia) in Turkey and in the region, i.e. the expansion of the Kurdish Hezbollah group. Also, there are some small Al Qaeda, and Daesh related groups in Turkey. Also, there were, during the Cold War, Marxist-Leninist groups in place (PKK). From time to time, they portray themselves as criminal networks but sometimes groups like the PYD work together with the PKK as their proxies in Syria. Their motivation is wider and different - having religious, ethnic, sectarian aspects. Also, there is connectivity - before the Kobane issue many Kurdish youngsters went to Syria and joined Daesh. Others, young Marxists, went also to Syria and fought under the umbrella of the PKK. Hence, these different groups clashed with each other. They fight in Syria and then they carried the conflict to Turkey.

Strategy and tactics of all such groups have been changing according to capacity and needs. The capacity and a response to the state (Police, Gendarmerie responds) but sometimes these threats need military operation by the Turkish Armed Forces which have implemented strategies in Syria and in Iraq. Also, ideologies of these terrorist groups differ - some ideologies are based on religion, sectarianism and ethnicity. However, there is a trans-border character to it - the PKK is working in Qandil and is at the war in five different fronts (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Europe, Turkey). Also, hybrid warfare - sometimes using terrorism and social media as well as using political arena as a front arena. PKK set up itself during Cold War times - it has a party, militia organization and a front group (illegal and legal area). They have never changed the structure but time to time change the structure of the PKK.

The PKK used to be active in the rural areas but in the last 5 decades, the PKK changed its gravity points in the urban areas since people have been moving from rural to urban areas. In the last 5 years, the Turkish Armed Forces have started to use drones and it has affected the PKK's strategy and tactics because drones have changed the meaning of hiding in rural areas. Mountains used to be of advantage of the PKK but these same places have created new problems to the PKK because drones can easily locate them. At the moment, the PKK is trying to find some solutions by moving to urban areas and using small units inside Turkey. Also, the PKK uses proxies, especially in Syria. In the last 10 years, the government's policy (Peace Resolution) the PKK gained quasi-legitimacy among civilians and in the international arena. They are not using terrorism as much and usually say that the groups committing terrorism is not related the PKK directly. However, from time to time, the PKK uses violence against civilians as proxies.

PKK is looking for legitimacy. PKK is used to covert operation groups. As such, VNSAs change behavior like states. But what is Turkey's response? The National Security Culture has been is changing - according to Turkey's Constitution, also Turkey's bureaucratic structure has been changing.

**Discussion**

Prof. Aydınli changing questioned how does the national security culture affect Turkey dealing with the PKK? Assoc. Prof. Özcan further elaborated that the PKK has been changing its strategy four times over the years. For instance, during 1973-1995 as Maoist perspective. 1995-2005, the government tried to find a conflict solution to this issue but the Arab Uprising completely changed the mindset of this issue. Also, 2015

Kobane issue changed the government strategy and tries to have control of the PKK both behind the border and inside Turkey. 1973-1995, the army was the main player. In 1995 the PKK said that their main area was the political arena, terrorism and violence was secondary arena for the group. Violence level has been changed according to law enforcement capacity. During the EU accession years, Turkey's government's approach to the PKK also changed.

Prof. Dr. Haldun Yalçınkaya pointed out that from the NATO perspective there are two dimensions: 1) one of the ally takes threat from the PKK and 2) if any terrorist organization lasted for years its adaptation capacity during the years might change the character of organization which NATO should adopt itself to. Prof. Özcan agreed that Turkey has a lot of terrorism problems and at the moment, the PKK is a high level threat to the government. PKK got the government's attention and they have focused on the PKK issue but Daesh or other groups beyond borders, are secondary and third problems.



## “National CT Policies of Turkey”

by Assoc. Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş

Assoc. Prof Murat Yeşiltaş focused on the “National CT Policies of Turkey” and further elaborated on Turkey’s CT response to the PKK and ISIS. Turkey’s security landscape has been transforming particularly since the Arab Uprisings. There have been three aspects of changing dynamics which is affecting Turkey’s response: 1) terrorism - not only eliminating the PKK but in Iraq directly influenced Turkey from terrorism perspective. Not only the PKK in Iraq but also Al Qaeda in Iraq before the Arab Uprising. 2) Radical transformation in the context of the proliferation of armed groups. In terms of underlining state sovereignty, geopolitical competition have also played a role. 3) Radical transformation in counter terrorism strategy (local, national regional, international). We have external interventions, international organizations have their own CT strategies in regard to Yemen, Syria, Libya. We have to look at **changing dynamics** in the region. Moreover, there is a rising attacks by terrorist attacks in Turkey between 2015-2019. Also, there was an urban insurgency which was part of PKK’s changing strategy towards Turkey.



When we look at Turkey’s response from CT perspective, there are some components to underline: 1) political decisiveness is one of the important dimensions in the fight against the PKK and ISIS and also in the context of Turkey’s extraterritorial operations, i.e. in Syria. 2) the paradigm shifts in counter terrorism strategy relates to a more holistic approach. 3) security sector reform following the failed military coup - this was a turning point for Turkey’s CT strategy and understanding different types of threats. 4) the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level which is one of the important components of Turkey’s new CT strategy in the context of Syria and Iraq. 5) technological innovation (NDS-National Defense Strategy) in the context of military and tactical level.

## Counter-terrorism Strategy: Preemptive operational model

- Firstly, Turkey's new counter-terrorism strategy integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and the technological components that reinforce the state as the ultimate legitimate authority over the population while reducing PKK influence over the Kurdish population, particularly.
- **Reformulation of the military operation modality**
- Turkey's counter-terrorism strategy had been based on one-dimensional strategic calculation aimed to prevent the terrorist attacks conducted by the PKK against the military and security units. This one-dimensional counter-terrorism strategy is **based on the action-reaction operational model in which security forces usually carry a reactionary military operation following the terrorist attack against any target in a specific geographical zone.**
- **The preemptive operational model**
  - *Containing territorial existence*
  - *Constant operation, non-stop CT operation*
  - *Decapitation, TARGETED KILLING, 100>TERRORIST*

In terms of Turkey's new CT strategy which is called the **preemptive operational model**. Firstly, Turkey's new CT strategy integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and the technological components that reinforce the **state as the ultimate legitimate authority** over the population while reducing PKK influence over the Kurdish population, particularly in the Southern part of the region. PKK attempts to organize a new way of urban insurgency which started in 2015 and was aimed to get the public support. Therefore, state authority supported to implement this model in the city centers. Secondly, **reformulation of the military operation modality**. Before the implementation of this strategy, Turkey's CT strategy was based on action-reaction model in which security forces usually carry a reactionary military operation following the terrorist attack against any target in a specific geographical zone but now Turkey started to adapt non-stop CT strategy which aimed to create a liberated zone from the PKK, especially in the Northern Iraq. This strategy affected PKK's mobilization to carry out cross-border attacks and infiltration towards Turkey.

The preemptive operational model includes containing territorial existence; constant operation, non-stop CT operation; decapitation and targeted killing as one of the important novelties in Turkey's CT operations and has been successful strategy in preventing PKK mobilization to Iraq and Syria.

## Security Sector Reform

- While the relocation of the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of the Interior was an act strengthening the effectiveness of the internal counter-terrorism operations, the Turkish Armed Forces found a great opportunity to focus on extra-territorial counter-terrorism operations against the PKK, particularly in Iraq, which operationally prevented the terrorist organization to find extra space for maneuver to infiltrate into Turkey.
- The institutional reformulation of the **Village Guards (VG)** in counter-terrorism operations facilitated the effectiveness of internal operations in rural areas. The numbers show the increasing effectiveness of the Village Guards in fighting against the PKK. While the number of Village Guards reached 52,395 (plus 19912 volunteers) in 2018, the average age among the village guards decreased to 32. This is not limited to the increasing number of the VG; their technological capacity and training programs were also reformulated and improved following the new requirements of the PKK's threat.

Another new dynamic is the security sector reform (SSR) relocation of gendarmerie under the Ministry of Interior to increase effectiveness of CT operations. While the relocation of the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of the Interior was an act strengthening the effectiveness of the internal counter-terrorism operations, the Turkish Armed Forces found a great opportunity to focus on extra-territorial counter-terrorism operations against the PKK, particularly in Iraq, which operationally prevented the terrorist organization to find extra space for maneuver to infiltrate into Turkey.

Also, the institutional reformulation of the Village Guards (VG) in counterterrorism operations facilitated the effectiveness of internal operations in rural areas. While the number of Village Guards reached 52,395 (plus 19912 volunteers) in 2018, the average age among the village guards decreased to 32. This is not limited to the increasing number of the VG; their technological capacity and training programs were also reformulated and improved following the new requirements of the PKK's threat.

## *Intelligence Collection and Tech-centric CT Strategy*

- The reformulation of intelligence sharing, improvement of joint operation room and joint operational information mechanism facilitated the joint counter-terrorism operations.
- The number of professionals in Gendarmerie is 65 %, which is incredibly high as compared to previous years.

In terms of intelligence collection and tech-centric CT, the reformulation of intelligence sharing, improvement of joint operation room and joint operational information mechanism facilitated the joint counter-terrorism operations. The number of professionals in Gendarmerie is 65 %, which is incredibly high as compared to previous years.

## *Doronification*

- To detect and end terrorist mobilization, especially in special counter-terrorism operations, drone technology provided Turkey another great opportunity in containing the PKK threat. Except for the TAF's drone capacity, the drone capacity of the Ministry of Interior has increased 50 percent over the last two years. This is especially vital in creating a joint security umbrella to sustain active intelligence and rapid reaction against the PKK.
- Preventing terrorist mobilization
- Reducing ability to conduct cross-border terrorist attacks
- Intelligence superiority
- Undermining leadership cadre-Decapitation

Moreover, dronification is another important dimension and aims to detect and end terrorist mobilization, especially in special counter-terrorism operations, drone technology provided Turkey another

great opportunity in containing the PKK threat. Except for the TAF's drone capacity, the drone capacity of the Ministry of Interior has increased 50 percent over the last two years. This is especially vital in creating a joint security umbrella to sustain active intelligence and rapid reaction against the PKK. It also used in preventing terrorist mobilization, reducing the ability to conduct cross-border terrorist attacks, intelligence superiority and has undermined leadership cadre-decapitation. As such, using drones has been a game changer in terms of assessing and attacking targets.

## YPG in Syria

- Transformation of the PKK
- -Territorial component
- -Political component
- -Operational component
- -Organizational component

We also have to look how the PKK and YPG in Syria are changing their strategies and how they transformed since the Syrian uprising. YPG is an offshore organization of the PKK's in Syria but we have to separate these threats. YPG in Syria is completely different from PKK in Iraq and Turkey because it has a territorial component, political component, strong organizational component and operational component since USA military assistance to the YPG in terms of delivering materials but also in terms of training methodology and training doctrine. Organizational component is one of the challenging components of YPG and also to Turkey.

# Objectives

- Preventing territorial mobilization is vital for Turkey
- Weakening military capacity is the main objective
- Containing financial mobilization
- Preventing radicalization and violent extremism
- Transforming political project is long-term objective

What are the objectives of Turkey? However, CT strategy has a different toolkit than fighting insurgency. Preventing territorial mobilization is vital for Turkey; weakening military capacity is the main objective; containing financial mobilization; preventing radicalization and violent extremism because there is a mutual relationship between the PKK and YPG in terms of radicalizing youth. This is not an easy task for Turkey to tackle. PKK's radicalization in Turkey is gradually becoming institutionalized and this is very challenging for Turkey. You cannot easily separate who is a terrorist and who is not in terms of violent extremism. Also, transforming political project is long-term objective.

We should think how to transform YPG's political project in Syria because looking at the future of Syrian army, imagine that sectarian part is already established and in addition to that there is also Shia militia supported by Iran and plus these two sectarian bodies of the new Syrian army and the PKK would easily become part of this. Syrian-Arab army would be a threat to Turkey not only in terms of asymmetric threat but also conventional threat. Turkey's CT strategy is directly shaped by these new strategic challenges in the region.

# The Turkish Campaign Against ISIS

- **Operation: Police Raids and Operations**
- Turkish security forces have carried out a total of 4,536 operations against ISIS since 2016, arresting 13,696 suspects, with 4,517 of them sent to custody.
- 2016: 783 operations were conducted
- 2017: 1,391 operations
- 2018: 1,327 operations
- 2019: 1,035 operations
- **RIS: Risk Analysis Unit**
- Turkish security forces have carried out a total of 4,536 operations against ISIS since 2016, arresting 13,696 suspects, with 4,517 of them sent to custody.
- **No-Entry List**
- 75,480 foreign nationals, who were planning to go to conflict zones passing through Turkey, were barred from entering the country, after being detected by Turkish security units in coordination of intelligence agencies of other countries.
- **Border Security**
- **Global Coalition against ISI**

In terms of ISIS threat, it started to target Turkey in 2014. There are different aspects of ISIS threat in Turkey, especially before Turkey carried out the Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016. After Turkey took unilateral military decision against ISIS, ISIS threat to Turkey became a tactical and operational threat. Turkey's police raids against ISIS has increased significantly. Turkish security forces have carried out a total of 4,536 operations against ISIS since 2016, arresting 13,696 suspects, with 4,517 of them sent to custody. In 2016: 783 operations were conducted; in 2017: 1,391 operations were conducted; in 2018: 1,327 operations were conducted and in 2019: 1,035 operations were conducted. Also, 75,480 foreign nationals, who were planning to go to conflict zones passing through Turkey, were barred from entering the country, after being detected by Turkish security units in coordination of intelligence agencies of other countries. Also, in the context of Risk Analysis Unit, Turkey carried out many intelligence operations against ISIS. No entry is another good domain which Turkey has stepped up together with border protection - before Syrian civil war, Turkey had a very liberal border policy but by now, Turkey has sealed the border with a portable wall. Global Coalition Against ISIS is another dynamic that Turkey is participating.

# The Future

- International terrorism is transforming
- Each state has multiple priority
- Global cooperation is still vital, but lack of common understanding undermine the CT

In terms of the future, it can be concluded that the international terrorism is transforming; each state has multiple priority; global cooperation is still vital, but lack of common understanding undermine the CT.

## Discussion

Prof. Dr. Haldun Yalçınkaya questioned whether ISIS is a tactical threat or a strategic threat. Turkey is in the first circle of spreading violence from Raqqa to the rest of the world and Turkey suffered between 2014-2016 from the storm of ISIS terrorism and lost more than 250 people and about 1000 people wounded during that period. If we discuss returnee issues and the possibility of a blowback effect in the future, one might expect that Turkey would be in the inner/first circle of spreading violence from Syria to the rest of the world and detaining over 12,000 FTFs. PKK is still number one threat but we should still be prudent to say that it is a tactical threat.

Assoc. Prof. Yeşiltaş pointed out that compared to Europe 2015/2016 it is not easy to argue that ISIS is a strategic threat to Turkey but in terms of radicalization Turkey now has a comprehensive strategy. Turkey learned in terms of fight against ISIS and return of FTFs to Turkey it has learned lessons. More than 1000 ISIS prisoners are detained in Turkey now and this of course, is a problem. More than 300 ISIS prisons under Turkey's control in Al-Bab and Jarablus. In terms of capacity of ISIS it is not easy to argue that ISIS is a strategic threat to Turkey but it does not mean that Turkey does not perceive ISIS as a threat.

Assoc. Prof. Özcan pointed out that in order to understand Daesh strategy against Turkey, we can separate some terms. For instance, silencing - until 2015, ISIS on was on a silence level and then it became to attack. But in 2015 it carried a war in Turkey and collected Turkish people's sympathy because according to Daesh, Turkish public hate the PKK and Daesh thought that if they attack such Marxist Leninist organization, it can increase Turkish public's sympathy. Then, they started to attack tourists in Turkey but Turkish people criticized this very much. After that, Daesh started to attack Turkish security forces but today, Daesh is again silent but Turkish police and intelligence are expanding its influence and increased its operation.



# “National Counterterrorism Policies & Crisis Management: the United States and the United Kingdom”

by. Stephanie Foggett

Ms. Foggett gave a comprehensive overview of the Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism from the U.S. and UK perspective.



## The Soufan Center

- Based in New York City, the Soufan Center (TSC) is a strategy center dedicated to serving as a resource and forum for research, analysis, and strategic dialogue related to global security issues and emergent threats.
- The Center produces independent, quality research and hosts proactive conversations in order to effectively equip thought leaders, policy makers, governments, bi- and multilateral institutions, media, and those in the non-profit and academic communities to engage in strategic security-related practices.
- Our work focuses on a broad range of complex security issues—from international and domestic terrorism, to humanitarian crisis analysis, to refugee and immigrant issues, and more.
- The Center was founded by Ali Soufan, a former FBI Special Agent.
- A key focus is on the nexus between security, human rights and humanitarian crises.



Ms. Foggett started her presentation with the introduction to the Soufan Center (TSC), which is based in New York City and is a strategy center dedicated to serving as a resource and forum for research, analysis, and strategic dialogue related to global security issues and emergent threats. The key focus of the centre is on the nexus between security, human rights and humanitarian crises.



## ISIS: Camps, Detention Centers & Prisons

- Monitoring the foreign fighter phenomenon since 2014.
- By our last count, over 40,000 foreign individuals from more than 110 countries travelled to join ISIS.
- Following the military defeat of this terrorist organization, what to do with the men, women and children who were affiliated with this group?
- The current situation presents a convergence between counter-terrorism and crisis management.
  - A successful military campaign by Coalition partners liberated IS territory.
  - But, now we find ourselves facing a humanitarian situation regarding ISIS populations, especially children and families.
  - Does this crisis situation create an incubator for the next generation of extremists and facilitate the group's resurgence?



Ms. Foggett highlighted that there are two trans-national counterterrorism threats in focus: **Salafi-Jihadism and far-right/white supremacy extremism**. Both threats are mentioned in the most recent U.S. and UK counter-terrorism strategy documents. But how do each of these terrorist threats converge with crisis management? The Soufan Centre has been monitoring the foreign fighter phenomenon since 2014. By the last count, over 40,000 foreign individuals from more than 110 countries travelled to join ISIS. Following the military defeat of this terrorist organization, **what to do with the men, women and children who were affiliated with this group?** As such, the current situation presents a convergence between counterterrorism and crisis management. A successful military campaign by Coalition partners liberated IS territory. However, now we find ourselves facing a humanitarian situation regarding ISIS populations, especially children and families. **Does this crisis situation create an incubator for the next generation of extremists and facilitate the group's resurgence?**



## History repeating itself?

- In al-Hol camp, two-thirds of the approx. 70,000 detainees are under the age of twelve.
- The Red Cross describes conditions as “apocalyptic” – malnutrition, hypothermia, trauma.
- Extremist indoctrination is rife. Yet, Western governments refuse to take their nationals back, even children. Some have revoked citizenships.
- The squalor of the camps and the lack of just treatment, especially for children, fuels the Salafi-jihadist narrative of grievance and revenge that has proven so potent in recruiting followers.
- **Are these conditions we created conducive to the spread of terrorism? Will these conditions form the core of a future resurgence?**
- **Role for NATO?**
  - Awareness of the threat
  - Battlefield evidence --> support due process, fair trials and prosecutions
  - Intelligence sharing
  - Training & capacity building

Open Letter from National Security Professionals to Western Governments:  
Unless We Act Now, the Islamic State Will Rise Again

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3

Is the history repeating itself? In al-Hol camp, two-thirds of the approximately 70,000 detainees are under the age of twelve. Extremist indoctrination is rife and these camps are a fertile ground for new insurgencies. With the fall of Baghouz in February 2019, most Western governments are hesitant to repatriate their citizens. Some countries have revoked their citizenships. The squalor of the camps and the lack of just treatment, especially for children, fuels the Salafi-jihadist narrative of grievance and revenge that has proven so potent in recruiting followers. Are these conditions we created conducive to the spread of terrorism? Will these conditions form the core of a future resurgence? **What is the role for NATO?** This can be a good case study for NATO and can be looked in terms of awareness of the threat; battlefield evidence (support due process, fair trials and prosecutions); intelligence sharing as well as training and capacity building.



## White Supremacy Extremism

- White supremacy extremism (WSE) is a transnational challenge; but largely viewed as a domestic terrorism threat.
- Transnational WSE groups generally not designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S. In 2016, National Action became first extreme right-wing group proscribed as a terrorist organization in the UK.
- 17,000 foreigners from 50 countries, including the U.S. and UK, have gone to fight in Ukraine on both sides of the conflict.
- Important similarities and particular ways Jihadists and WSE groups feed off of each other, including: the utility and cycle of violence; use of the internet; propaganda; recruitment; financing; and the transnational nature of the networks.
- International efforts to combat WSE lacking. More resources are needed to understand WSE and curb its rise. Governments should review their terrorism laws to ensure that they are sufficiently updated to prosecute individuals who carry out acts of domestic terror.
- Military veterans often in WSE ranks.



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Also, a growing threat is **far-right extremism** which is often considered as domestic terrorism threat but it is a transnational challenge. Moreover, there are lots of similarities with Jihadis. Interestingly, some supremacists are former military members. Ukraine has been an interesting theater of white supremacists. Early December 2019, members of Ukrainian far-right groups were photographed at protests in Hong Kong. These groups likely traveled to Hong Kong to learn from anti-government protests, riots, and resistance to use such experience at home, even though they were not invited to join these otherwise legitimate political protest movements. Protesters in Hong Kong have widely rejected the presence of Ukrainian fascists that could taint their legitimate political protest movement. White supremacists chatter online and in manifestos often refers to ‘accelerationism’, which aims to bring about the collapse of Western society by sowing chaos and exploiting crises. As such, their narratives appeal to a sense of urgency. Again, a **role for NATO** can be in terms of **awareness of the threat; intelligence sharing; training and capacity building.**



## Conclusion

- **Must build upon lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq and other recent conflicts and recognize that successful military campaigns are often followed by serious post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian challenges – sometimes even leaving behind ideal conditions for the resurgence of the threat that was just militarily defeated.**
  - “Daesh and Al Qa’ida have woven the war in Syria, and the wider humanitarian crisis, into their core narratives, propagating a sense of injustice that presents the action or inaction of international actors as part of a wider and ongoing religious conflict between the West and Sunni Islam.” ~ **CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism**
  - “Unless we counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment, we will be fighting a never-ending battle against terrorism in the homeland, overseas, and online.” ~ **the United States’ National Strategy for Counterterrorism**
- **There has been a significant focus on Salafi-Jihadism; but, we should not lose focus of far-right/white supremacy extremism. From a crisis management perspective, this ideology seeks ‘Chaos, Crisis, Acceleration’ and hopes to foment conflict in the West to bring about its vision of how society should look.**

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In conclusion, we must build upon lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq and other recent conflicts and recognize that **successful military campaigns are often followed by serious post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian challenges** - sometimes even leaving behind ideal conditions for the resurgence of the threat that was just militarily defeated. In regard to the UK, "Daesh and Al Qaida have woven the war in Syria, and the wider humanitarian crisis, into their core narratives, propagating a sense of injustice that presents the action or inaction of international actors as part of a wider and ongoing religious conflict between the West and Sunni Islam" (The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism). In regard to the USA, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism have pointed out that "Unless we counter terrorist radicalization and recruitment, we will be fighting a never-ending battle against terrorism in the homeland, overseas, and online". There has been a significant focus on Salafi-Jihadism; but, we should not lose focus of far-right/white supremacy extremism. From a crisis management perspective, the ideology seeks "Chaos, Crisis, Acceleration" and hopes to foment conflict in the West to bring about its vision of how society should look.

### Discussion

Assoc. Prof. Yeşiltaş pointed out that in Syria, ISIS prisons have been under the control of the YPG/PYD and it has fueled with bribery and corruption. Moreover, the YPG/PYD have released some ISIS prisoners on purpose while Turkey captured more than 300 of these prisoners. Return of the FTFs is a big challenge for Turkey - we should start solving this problem. Dr. Ashraf highlighted the issue of drone strikes and drones dropping weapons. We should look into the comparison of drones and effectiveness. Our awareness in right wing extremism has increased but we need to educate ourselves more. We could compare white extremism with other groups and see what has been done within NATO in terms of right wing supremacism - intelligence area can easily be infiltrated. Assoc. Prof. Ruger questioned what are the foreign aspects of terrorism? Normally, we would not expect Turkey to care about the Charlottesville far right incident in the USA because this is more like FBI's incident.

Ms. Foggett further pointed out that white supremacists use music, memes and try to meet under normal activities and circumstances, keeping a low profile but white supremacists are not that different from jihadi terrorists. In USA, the domestic legislation covers white supremacists and they can be prosecuted. Maj. Maull further questioned the relationship of white supremacists in Ukraine and pointed out that the USA does not quite understand the PKK/YPG fight because USA does not have the same fight. Ms. Foggett elaborated that in Ukraine, fascism and nationalism is closely linked which contributes to the growth of white supremacism (anti-semitism books, glorification of Nazis). As such, neo-Nazis cannot normally go to a conflict zone and Ukraine provides space for that. Also, foreigners join the PKK/YPG but most foreigners in Ukraine do not care about the conflict but see it as a good point of learning and expanding.

The participants agreed that **the perception matters**. Prof. Dr. Aydınlı stressed that NATO's priorities partially belong to the past - state challenges are evolving and are alive. NATO is not perfectly cut out for Syria, for instance. It is first Turkey's problem, then USA's problem and then NATO's issue. We have to train each other and see the bigger picture. Lt. Magnussen questioned how can NATO react faster? There is always an issue of crime vs. domestic terrorism. For instance, in Norway, domestic terrorism is dealt by the police. Norway does not ask help from NATO in this and would not expect NATO to be the first responder in this but indeed, consensus is needed. NATO responds based on request, hence, terrorism is not likely to be NATO's issue as such.

### Daily Recap

The participants concluded the first day with some main points and take aways. Prof. Dr. Yalçinkaya pointed out that Al Hol camp and its children could be a threat for the rest of us that could also lead to the transfer of some training activities to our countries. Lt. Magnussen highlighted that CT could be compared to collective defense - then NATO would come into play. NATO needs some time to adopt. Dr. Ashraf concluded that we may think of conflict resolution in the beginning of crisis situation but now USA is negotiating with the Taliban, at first it did not think about it. We may end up negotiating with Daesh too. In terms of Turkey's dronification strategy, this could be a quick adaptation for NATO.

## Day II

10 December 2019

*Rapporteur: Cemre Aysel*

**9.00 - 9.40**

### **“NATO Military Strategic Planning in Relation to Threat from Terrorism”**

*by Ltc. Nils Magnussen*

NATO Crisis Respond System (NCRS) provides the alliance with a structure to respond the crises. It is described in NCRS Manual which is owned by every nation of the alliance. The NATO Crisis Response System provides a guide to aid decision-making considering political, military and civil perspectives. It is designed to save time and bring better coherence to the decision-making process under the situation respond is required.

NATO Crisis Response Process includes six phases: indication and warning, assessment, response option and development, planning, execution and lastly transition. While these phases are flexible, for example it is possible to go back to assessment after the execution of the respond, the relevant committee that is assigned decides on the decision-making process. NATO, also, offers parallel interaction between units during the process of planning, enhancing connectivity.

In Chapter V of the NATO Crisis Respond System Manual, the options for a response are specified. These are preventive options to prevent all threats to the alliance. NATO nation under threat may ask for improved information sharing and intelligence, cooperation and coordination among themselves. Also, it can seek diplomatic options from out of NATO countries to provide immediate assistance to the country under threat. It can also increase its preparedness to the threat and military forces.

There is also the Military Committee Concept for Counter-Terrorism that is approved by NAC in December 2015. It relies on three key principles: compliance with international law, support to allies and non-duplication and complementarity. Although support to allies is a key principle, individual NATO members are primarily responsible for the civilians and territories. Its role is in three main areas; namely awareness, capabilities and engagement. From this perspective, member nations can share practices that are relevant in terms of CT. It also supports the international collaboration through direct assistance or capability development.

NATO Comprehensive Action Plan is, also, taken to enhance NATO's role in the international community's fight against terrorism. However, it has higher classification level, leading to not much knowledge about it in the public. Yet, Operation Sea Guardian can be given as an example of an ongoing NATO Operation partly focuses on Counter-Terrorism as one of its aims is to “deter and counter terrorism and enhance capacity building.”

There is potential NATO activity within NATO Nations' territory. Although the attacks will be handled by the national levels, the nation can also ask other nations for capacity. It can also trigger Article 4 and Article 5 which the former refers to the consultation to other nations by the nation under threat and the latter refers to the collective self-defense of the alliance members. The support from other nations can be tailored to the situation; the support could be pre or post attack. NATO support should be focus on civil-military relations; enhancing emergency services, law enforcement agencies. The phases of NCRS can be activated to respond the attack. There is also potential NATO out of area activity, mission or operation against terrorism. First, this needs a legal basis and NAC approval. Here, NATO could support nations who cannot deal with the situation on its own. It also can be used against the states harboring terrorists.

To conclude, any potential requirement for NATO support will be handled through NATO Crisis Respond System. The procedure in planning through NCRS is highly complex interdependent procedure which requires collaboration and cooperation both among nations and units in NATO. Any NATO activity within NATO will need a legal basis, invitation from the host state. In same manner, any NATO activity out of NATO area will need a legal basis, invitation from the host state.

## Discussion

Although there are other plans NATO works on about CT, they are not yet executable. They have to be tailored to the situation. There is work going on to secure all NATO area, to have a comprehensive plan.

What is done in operational headquarters in NATO is the assessment of environment and threat. First, they analyze the situation and then decide what will be the response to the situation. There are many sides of the situations where opposite parts benefits from the outcome. At headquarters, the beneficial thing for NATO takes the top priority.

NATO's current system against CT is based on Article V. If the crisis is inside of NATO border and the scenario is Article V, Article V can be triggered. However, as it will be in host nation's border, the host nation will have its own regulations. Thus, NATO is not required to bring itself for the operation.

NATO looks at the ownership of the threat. NATO works with Ministry of Defense and generally, Ministry of Interior deals with the terrorist attacks. Ministry of Defense has to ask to Ministry of Interior to have NATO soldiers on the soil. Until the Ministry of Defense controls the problem, NATO has nothing to do with the problem.

After ISIS, first time in history a terrorist organization controlled a territory. What happens after such a phenomenon? NATO Crisis Respond System, in principle, will also be used for that kind of problems; it will be tailored to the situation. Although some measures will be taken, the process of NCRS is not needed to change. NATO sees the problem, joins forces to look at military options and come up with a solution. Thus, the process works.

NATO was formed as an alliance and developed additional measures. Russia is not an ally but there is a high level of cooperation. Prior to 2014, building a bridge to Russia was one of the purposes. However, with the annexation of Crimea, the relation has changed. Until 2014, there was many Russian officers in HQ but after 2014, they declined in number. Yet, there should be the possibility of cooperation in the future.

“Global Solutions for the Effective Management of Future Terrorist Activities”

by Dr. Mohammed Afzal Ashraf

United Nations Counter Terrorism Directorate provide strategic leadership on UN’s Counter Terrorism (CT) efforts. It enhances coordination and coherence to ensure implementation of 4 pillars of UN Global CT strategies.

### UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy



Adopted by consensus in 2006

These are addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of UN and, ensuring human rights and the rule of law. However, there emerges many failures on tactical level as Ashraf emphasizes that the operation diverts from its purpose and civilians get killed. It leads to another crisis.



- **What:** Informal, apolitical, multilateral CT platform
  - launched 22 September 2011
- **Aim:** Develop strategic, long-term approach to CT and PVE ideologies that underpin it
- **Mission:** Diminish terrorist recruitment and increase countries’ **civilian** capabilities for dealing with terrorist threats within their borders and regions

Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) is an informal, apolitical, multilateral CT platform that was launched in 2011. Its aim is to develop approaches to CT and find the reasons underlying their ideologies. Its mission is to decrease terrorist recruitment and activities of terrorism. Thus, it aims to be ahead of the possible attack and tries to learn the motivation of terrorists and the reasons of their recruitment. UN is GCTF's primary partner. It is unofficial vehicle for UN's CT strategies. It addresses a variety of topics including response to foreign terrorist fighters or returnees of them, human rights compliance during CT activities, education and role of families in recruitment, supporting the victims after the attack.




There are also other major supporting organizations such as Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), Hedayah and The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law. GCERF is a global fund dedicated to preventing violence extremism (PVE). It connects local communities to global resources. It provides funding and reinforces the UN Plan of Action for PVE. Hedayah serves as a Center of Excellence. It is an essential partner in the development and implementation of Good Practices for Education. Apart from other organizations mentioned above, it manages the return of the terrorist based in other countries. The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law is based in Malta. It supports GTCF through development and implementation of good practices and other initiatives with criminal justice practitioners and experts. It also gives recommendations relating to contributions by parliamentarians in developing and effective response to terrorism. It trains judges and prosecutors to address terrorism-related activities within rule of law.





## Sidebar – Interviewing ISIS Prisoners in Kyrgyz Jails

**These organizations could provide a working ground for NATO.** Dr. Ashraf emphasizes that organizations such as NATO and COE-DAT are more state centric and focus on short term effects of the terrorist acts, that are crisis response. It creates a disparity in civil-military resources as the focus shifts on the military. However, GCTF is more society centered and provides more long-term solutions to the crisis as it assumes terrorism self-generated. He gives a personal experience through which he gained funding from Hedayah and provided UN with an informal output through interviewing ISIS prisoners in Kyrgyz jails. He also underlines that these types of experiences are relevant to COE-DAT as the four pillars of COE-DAT is similar to these organizations' purposes.



After talking about all these organizations, Dr. Ashraf suggests a few ways to link the organizations. He, first and foremost, supports the transformation of the causes which lead to the perpetual crisis of terrorism.

In order to achieve that, GCTF could provide research, knowledge, long-term sustainable solutions. These could be used to prevent the terrorism. UN could provide political leadership, legal framework, coordination and capacity building. NATO could pursue these organizations to overcome with the problem of terrorism.

To conclude, terrorism crises are continuation of political and military crisis. This is the prominent idea that should be in mind when one thinks about terrorism. It is needed to start Crisis Management with Crisis Resolution Strategy. The aim should be “solving”, not “managing”. Finally, the allocation of responsibility and resource between civil and military should be changed as Dr. Ashraf believes that the military is not effective in building a country.

### **Discussion**

GCTF is a new kind of international organization. They came together and discuss without necessarily reaching a decision.

It is hard to integrate GCTF’s experience to NATO as there is two side to the thinking process; political and military sides. In political side, the decision can be altered in a minute as the political leaders are entrepreneurs. However, GCTF is a good political arena. As the other planning processes of other organizations fail, it can provide tailoring to the problems.

**NATO is good at what it does, but it can improve.** In Iraq, there are many pre-ISIS prisoners, but the world still overloads Iraq with more prisoners. Nobody knows if they have enough capability. Thus, what NATO can do is to provide these countries with much needed infrastructure.

10.30 - 12.00

“NATO CT implementations and National CT strategies”

by Assoc. Prof. William Ruger

US' grand strategy could affect both NATO and the world as Mr. Ruger likens the US to an elephant with 600 kg. in terrorism. That is why US grand strategy deserves a particular attention. US is going through a serious conversation about its role in world. This conversation will have an impact on all countries in NATO. There are some points to be taken into consideration about this conversation. First, the national security strategy that President Trump came up with. Second is that even before President Trump, Obama talked about pivot to Asia. Also, the researchers when they examine millennials, find much different view about what US' role in world politics should be. As these people get older, they will play more important roles in politics and given how it is known that ideas are get locked very young, these ideas will remain in the habitat for a long time not because they are young but also, they felt the effects of Iraq and Syria. There is also a strong push from different people from different institutions that gathered in realism approach. There are new think tanks related to realist school that are expanding the conversation about grand strategy.

All these different variables lead to three possible scenarios for the future. One is that despite President Trump and despite some of these things talked above, US stays the course. Whether it is that the deep state has prevailed, or the consensus hold, or the nature of the world decided that US primacy must be maintained. What is meant by primacy is US' leadership, foreign deployment, big military budgets and active value promotion such as democracy. If the US continues with the primacy, what does it mean for NATO and CT? The world would continue to do what it is doing now. We would continue to manage the crisis. There are also critics of primacy. They argue that US footprint, if it continues the way it is, increases terrorist activities in response to US efforts. There will be more demand side for the supply to regions to manage these terrorist activities and NATO will be considered a key partner. Thus, if the primacy continues, one will see the same, **but one will have to adapt to the new challenges.** Terrorism has also a timing element which means in some cases, it is not necessarily *sui generis*, but it is going to be also reactive in part. There if one could have a perfect ability to predict, one could prevent it before it happens.

The second possible scenario is pivot to Asia. If US decides to pursue pivot to Asia, this means that Middle East will be less important, and US will exercise some strategic prudence to avoid commitment and buck passing to others. This would mean NATO would be less important in US conversation. Thus, one idea about the pivot to Asia would mean for European countries and NATO that they will have more responsibility for crisis management but with less of US in the lead. Just like what Obama said about Libya but then did not really carry out. While the US focuses on Asia, Washington sees China as the biggest challenger. However, from Mr Ruger's civilian perspective, it is Russia, more because the optics of saying that it is China is problematic. Even the people who discuss great power competition realize that Russia is not at the same level as China is. If the US pivots, there will be smaller footprint of US in terms of counterterrorism because it would shift from Middle East where the most of terrorist activities have been happening for the last couple of years to Asia. That would leave European countries with bigger responsibilities to deal with counterterrorism.

The third possible scenario is that US embraces strategic restraint, pursuing more Washingtonian politics. As George Washington put in, US would have two pillar rules; non-entanglement, particularly in Eastern hemisphere, and non-interventionism. It would not pivot to Asia but rather pivot to its domestic challenges in terms of infrastructure, debts. If that happens, then Europe would be incentivized to develop a common security and defense policy. So, what happens in eastern hemisphere would have to be dealt by US current partners. Each country would have serious influence in world politics so it would look like a return to 19<sup>th</sup> century global politics. In terms of crisis management and CT, some think if the US pursues strategic restraint, terrorism will go down as their autopsy of terrorism is related to American aggressive footprint. There are other people who worry if US does so, there will be greater terrorism as there will be a space for terrorists to organize themselves to engage in greater terrorist attacks. However, what it would mean for US is that it would become less a target and that might put more pressure to other countries in Middle East where US mitigate some responsibilities for local governments' failures. Once the responsibility will not fall upon US, there will be new problems for these countries. That could mean some worrying activities in Middle East. It also would mean that intelligence for counterterrorism must be robust as NATO or US would not have

foreign deployment in the field, they would not be shaving things in the ground and thus, they are going to need to be much more anticipating.

To conclude, these different grand strategy contexts will have different meaning for CT policies. Some of these grand strategies will mean greater terrorist activities. Since the world is auto piloted for 30 years, **if some is going to change the international system, one has to think about all of the countries and international institutions.**

### Discussion

US is going through a time of reflection about foreign policy strategies. The zeitgeist is changing; millennials are more inclined to favor primacy, and this affects Washington. However, there should be caution regarding the turning of the tide. It would not be official without a candidate in US that openly supports the turn of tide about these three possible scenarios.

The countries need to embed CT with the grand strategy of US. How one articulate what is a crisis or not loosely depends on the grand strategy.

After 9/11, NATO provoked Article V. However, there was a warrant that the support of NATO would take place if the attack came outside of US. This demonstrates clearly that NATO does not have to obey the wishes of US. Thus, US grand strategy does not need to change NATO.

Although US and its partners actively engaged in challenges of Middle East, nothing has changed. There should be rethinking about the way world works. There should be thinking about the framing of events as CNN effect has clearly shown that framing leads public opinion.

The transparency also should be taken into account. Although US is known to spread democracy, actually a few countries embraced democracy. In Iraq, Secretary Defense thought that there was nothing more to be achieved and thus, US could divert its attention from Iraq to Afghanistan.

One thing was constantly repeated throughout the conference; that is physical security. It affects how we perceive terrorism. However, a full effort to counter terrorism is not feasible as what kind of risk is acceptable is not known. Also, how do we decide good cost-benefit analysis? According to whom?

Dealing with terrorism is not a new phenomenon. However, the people still are not able to learn how to live with each other. **Thus, in the process of dealing with terrorism, the authorities should look at normalizing; the society cannot be always in the crisis mood.**

Terrorist organizations are faster than governments as they don't have to follow rules. Governments have different motivations and once the motivation shifts, they change the course they follow.

We should focus on more social reasons of terrorism such as distribution of wealth, social equality. We should examine the role of military as with every new person dead, we are seeding a new grievance. **We should think about how we can change the education, environment and this should be the main issue of NATO.**

Respond to terrorism can involve some unintended consequences. We should recognize the danger of hubris of humankind. As an example, Mujahideen in Afghanistan can be given. Therefore, we have to consider that our actions can change the consequences.

## Key Findings

There are two keywords of the seminar: crisis management and terrorism. What are the new aspects of terrorism and crisis management? How do we manage these two keywords to NATO's agenda and bring it under the same umbrella? With this seminar, the participants addressed if there were any gaps in crisis management within NATO with new ways of terrorism. As such, one of the intentions of the seminar was to seek for recommendations, answers and comments for a better crisis management response. In a nutshell, the participants admitted the Crisis Management System of NATO is robust and to some extent is formidable. However, with this seminar and other activities of COE DAT, it is possible the NATO HQ and planning departments would be informed.

Having stated that, without any result to change the crisis management system of NATO the seminar resulted in some key findings for recent and possibly future trends both in terrorism and counter terrorism, as follow. Yet, one should not neglect the minutes, presented above, because of the fact that there are more than key findings presented below.

- It is the potential of falling into the terrorism trap and becoming part of a perpetual crisis that constitutes the hidden greater crisis that has to be managed in CT. Management of the protracted crisis cycle is the biggest part of crisis management. Awareness of this whole phenomenon and potential, as a nation/country, and government, is the starting point of the preemption. Preemption is a critical part of the larger crisis management. It needs to be stressed that no response is not an option.

Real terrorism starts after the terrorist attack (response matters). Weak party is always looking for a response.

- A convergence between counter-terrorism and crisis management is especially evident following military campaigns. Building upon lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflicts, we can see that successful military campaigns are often followed by serious post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian challenges – oftentimes even leaving behind ideal conditions for the resurgence of the threat that was just militarily defeated. A prime example today is how Coalition partners liberated former IS territory; but, now the international community finds itself facing a humanitarian situation with serious security and counter-terrorism implications because of the situation in camps, detention centers and prisons. There has also been a significant focus on Salafi-Jihadism; but, we should not lose focus of far-right and white supremacy extremism. From a crisis management perspective, this ideology seeks 'Chaos, Crisis, Acceleration' and hopes to foment conflict and exploit crises in the West to help bring about its vision of how society should look.

We should not overlook far-right extremism.

- The key to counter terrorism is to convince terrorists that they are better off politically doing anything other than terrorism. If we want to understand the future of militant groups, we have to look which terrorist groups are following the rules for rebels, as explained in details above. So far, this framework has helped to predict and has been applied from Syria to Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories and Libya, even in the USA.

Terrorist manifestos are dangerous - we have to be aware.

- People have started to use the Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, Social Media, to their benefit. Undoubtedly, these could indeed be exploited by terrorist groups, too. Terrorism and CT is just a threshold issue - when you rise up the threshold, they rise up even more - it is a vicious circle. Technology is not a solution but it is going to be a doctrinal work, technology will be another domain to fight terrorism and find new ways to deal with it. One should note that, in addition to these technological developments and their adaptation, we also need sociologists, economists, psychologists, political scientists to understand what is really going on and analyze this data - all of NATO members should do this.

We need more hybrid solutions for predicting the terrorist threats.

- International terrorism is transforming; each state has multiple priority; global cooperation is still vital, but lack of common understanding undermine the CT. For example, in terms of Turkey's dronification strategy, this could be quickly adapted for NATO.

- Terrorism crises are continuation of political and military crisis. This is the prominent idea that should be in mind when one thinks about terrorism. It is needed to start Crisis Management with Crisis Resolution Strategy. The aim should be "solving", not "managing". Finally, the allocation of responsibility and resource between civil and military should be changed as the military would not effective in building a country.

- Different grand strategy contexts will have different meaning for CT policies. That some of the grand strategies might result in greater terrorist activities would be a case.

Respond to terrorism can involve some unintended consequences. We should recognize the danger of hubris of humankind. As an example, Mujahideen in Afghanistan can be given. Therefore, we have to consider that our actions can change the consequences.

- GCTF is a new kind of international organization. They came together and discuss without necessarily reaching a decision. It is hard to integrate GCTF's experience to NATO as there is two side to the thinking process; political and military sides. In political side, the decision can be altered in a minute as the political leaders are entrepreneurs. However, GCTF is a good political arena. As the other planning processes of other organizations fail, it can provide tailoring to the problems.

- What to do with the new generation of ISIS fighters in Syria? After ISIS, first time in history a terrorist organization controlled a territory. What happens after such a phenomenon? NATO Crisis Respond System, in principle, will also be used for that kind of problems; it will be tailored to the situation. Although some measures will be taken, the process of NCRS is not needed to change. NATO sees the problem, joins forces to look at military options and come up with a solution. Thus, the process works.

## **Recommendations**

The main intention of the seminar was to seek for recommendations, answers and comments for a better crisis management response. At the end of the seminar, the participants admitted the Crisis Management System of NATO is robust and to some extent it is formidable. However, with publishing this report, it is possible the NATO HQ and planning departments would be informed about recent trends of terrorism as well as counter terrorism and thereby their possible effects to NATO Crisis Management System.

Moreover, we recommend to keep regularly organizing the seminar entitled “Crisis Management in Terrorism” to serve strategic thinkers, academic scholars, strategic planners, senior managers, and practitioners responsible for developing and implementing Crisis Management in Terrorism plans, policies, procedures, and related activities.

The recommended seminar would keep focusing on recent trends of terrorism as well as their effects to crisis management for counter terrorism. Subsequently, the regular seminar activity would pave a way to establish a forum to discuss the possible effects of recent terrorism and counter terrorism trends for the formidable above-mentioned system of NATO.

Having stated the recommendations, we are sincerely grateful to COEDAT and its leadership for providing us the seminar. I would like to thank the staff of COE DAT to plan the seminar a year before and I do believe with assessing our recommendations, if it is applicable, they are going to plan the recommended seminar in following years.

Respectfully

Prof.Dr.Haldun Yalçinkaya