# Defence Against Terrorism Review

**E-DATR**

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# Defence Against Terrorism Review
# E-DATR

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## CONTENT

*The Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR) is calling for papers for coming issues. The DATR focuses on terrorism and counterterrorism. All of the articles sent to DATR undergo a peer-review process before publication. For further information please contact datr@coedat.nato.int*

*Editor's Note*

Dear Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR) Readers,

The Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) proudly presents the 17th volume of DATR, which includes four articles covering the various dimensions of terrorism. While incorporating diverse study fields like migration, postcolonialism and biology into terrorism, this volume also brings a new perspective on counterterrorism in different geopolitical contexts such as China.

This issue starts with the article *Telemedicine Based Microfluidics Detection Approach for Biorisks.* It has been written by Dr. Atakan Konukbay, CBRN Product Management at HAVELSAN in Türkiye, and Prof. Ahmet Koluman, a professor in the Department of Biomedical Engineering at Pamukkale University. The article highlights the importance of biorisk across the world, especially the risk of cyber biocrimes and bioterrorism which utilise undetectable biological agents to threaten public health as well as security. In this respect, the authors suggest a kind of clinical treatment known as telemedicine combined with microfluidics to detect unseen threats of bioterrorism. This scientific suggestion enlarges the scope of the defence against terrorism and contributes significantly to further studies in the field.

*An Analysis of Daesh's Ideological Narrative* is the second article in the issue that sheds light on the concept of terrorism by addressing specifically one of the most brutal terrorist organizations, Daesh from the perspective of post-colonialism. Written by Ali Nihat Attila, who serves as a captain in the Turkish Armed Forces and who is currently a PhD candidate in International Relations at Hacettepe University, the article focuses on the ideological narratives of Daesh such as jihad and Salafism to erase the people under its control and create discourses of othering against subalterns in its so-called state. Selecting genocide as the case study, Attila draws attention to the constructed narratives and discourses of Daesh by analysing their propaganda tools in building a state in together with the colonial urge.

The third article written by Sevsu Önder, a PhD student at TOBB University of Economics and Technology, focuses on the implementation of counterterrorism along with approaches to terrorism and counterterrorism and chooses a specific country, China as a case study. In the article entitled *Counterterrorism in the People's Republic of China: A Critical Appraisal*, Önder discusses the counterterrorism policies and critically analyses China's implication of counterterrorism in Xinjiang region due to her exploitation of human rights. To this end, the article suggests that counterterrorism has many intersections other than terrorism like maintaining economic and political stability.

In the last article of the issue entitled *Terrorism and Migration: The Mutually Constitutive Relationship,* Emrah Ertaş discusses the impact of migration on terrorism and accordingly

on the construction of societies. As a Chief Master Sergeant in Turkish Air Force, Ertaş centres his argument on the possibility of immigrants inclusion into terrorist organizations because of diverse reasons such as economic and adaptation issues. This concern has gained importance, especially in our age due to mass immigrant activities around the world and some terrorist attacks in receiving countries' metropolitans like the USA. In this context, the article argues about the complex relationship between migration and terrorism by analysing the issue from the perspective of countries where migration regionally took shape.

And as a last word, we would like to express our regards to the valuable authors, distinguished referees, and our precious readers without whom this journal is not worth publishing. DATR always welcomes and encourages contributions from experts, civil and military officers as well as academicians to send us their valuable works on defence against terrorism.

Sincerely yours,

Uğur Güngör

Editor-in-Chief

# Telemedicine Based Microfluidics Detection Approach for Biorisks

*Atakan KONUKBAY[1]*
*Ahmet KOLUMAN[2]*

## Abstract

*The danger of being exposed to or releasing biological agents that can harm humans, animals, plants, or the environment is referred to as biorisk. Ilnesses that occur naturally, such as chronic and infectious diseases, that can impact humans, animals, plants, or the environment. The biological agent might be a naturally occurring or man-made bacteria, virus, insect, fungus, or toxin. The use of cyber technology to enable or perpetrate biocrimes is referred to as cyber biocrimes. Cyber biocrimes offer significant risks to public health, security, and stability because they may exploit weaknesses in both cyber and biological systems. Weapons of mass destruction like chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) war agents are global concern Biocrimes, which include the bioterrorism, can be difficult to be detected and investigated because they*

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*are not always recognized or reported, and they may use uncommon or modified biological agents that are difficult to identify or track. Microfluidics is the manipulation of tiny amounts of fluids in microscale channels or chambers. Microfluidics for biocrime detection are useful since they use less sample and reagent, lowering the cost and environmental effect of the analysis. Also, due to greater analytical speed and efficiency, which enables for faster diagnosis and reaction to biocrimes. Telemedicine refers to the use of technology to provide clinical treatment from a distance. Telemedicine employs electronic and communications technologies to communicate medical information when a patient and their doctor are not in the same room. It can range from as simple as texting medical care to as complex as remotely controlled surgery. Telemedicine can be combined with microfluidics to identify bioterrorism by allowing for remote and quick examination of biological agents or poisons that could be utilized as bioterrorism weapons. This review aims to trigger an awareness rising about the possible uses of microfluidics and telemedicine combination for detection of biorisks.*

***Keywords***

*Biorisks, Cyber-biorisks, Microfluidics, Telemedine, Detection*

## 1. Introduction

Biorisk refers to the risk of being exposed to or releasing biological agents that can harm humans, animals, plants, or the environment that includes naturally occurring illnesses, such as chronic and infectious diseases that can harm humans, animals, plants, or the environment. One type of man-made biorisk includes inadvertent or unintended discharge of biological agents from labs, biotechnology facilities, hospitals, farms, or other locations where biological materials are handled or housed. Another category of biorisk includes, deliberate use of biological agents and poisons, such as bioterrorism or biocrime, which involves the intentional release or dispersion of biological agents with the goal of causing harm or frightening a people or a country. Bioterorrism is a subgroup of weapons of mass destruction as known as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) war agents. These biorisk sources might provide varying levels of harm and necessitate various preventative

techniques.[3],[4],[5],[6]

For comprehension biorisk types should be identified and some terms should be highlighted. A biohazard is a biological substance or agent that poses a threat to the health of living organisms, primarily humans. This could include a sample of a microorganism, virus or toxin that can adversely affect human health. A biohazard could also be a substance harmful to other living beings. Bioaccident is an unintentional or accidental release of a biological agent that can cause harm to humans, animals, plants or the environment. This could happen due to human error, equipment failure, natural disaster or sabotage. Bioterrorism is a deliberate release of a biological agent as a weapon of terrorism. The aim is to cause illness, death, fear or disruption to a population or a country. The biological agent could be a bacteria, virus, insect, fungus or toxin that can be naturally occurring or human-modified.[7],[8],[9]

Biocrime is a type of crime that involves the use of a biological agent or toxin to harm or kill a single person or a small group of people. The motive for a biocrime is usually personal, such as revenge or extortion, rather than political, ideological, religious or other beliefs. Biocrime is different from bioterrorism, which aims to cause fear or disruption to a larger population or a country for achieving a political or social objective. Throughout history there have been many biorisk events. One example is the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which followers of the cult leader Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh contaminated salad bars with Salmonella Typhimurium bacteria in Oregon, USA, to influence the outcome of a local election. This resulted in 751 cases of food poisoning and no deaths. Another example is the 2001 anthrax attacks, in which letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores were mailed to several media outlets and two US senators, killing five people and infecting seventeen others. The FBI identified Bruce Ivins, a microbiologist working at a US Army biodefense laboratory, as the sole perpetrator, but he committed suicide before being formally

3   Anonymous (2010) World Health Organization. (2010). *Responsible life sciences research for global health security: A guidance document* (No. WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2010.2). World Health Organization.

4   Anonymous (2023a) Biorisk - Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biorisk. (Accessed 02 March 2023)

5   Anonymous (2023b) Biorisk Management - International Biosafety. https://internationalbiosafety.org/resources/biosafety-biosecurity/biorisk-management/.(Accessed 02 March 2023)

6   Gentilli, S. M., Potts, J. M., Clarkson, A. J., & Jacobi, H. B. (2016). An overview of the NIH biorisk management program. Applied Biosafety, 21(1), 26-33.

7   WHO (2010) World Health Organization. Responsible life sciences research for global health security: A guidance document (No. WHO/HSE/GAR/BDP/2010.2).

8   Richardt, A., Hülseweh, B., Niemeyer, B., & Sabath, F. (Eds.). (2013). CBRN protection: Managing the threat of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear weapons. John Wiley & Sons.

9   Kaszeta, D. J. (2014). CBRN and hazmat incidents at major public events: planning and response. John Wiley & Sons.

charged. His motive remains unclear. The ricin letters, in 2004which four letters containing ricin, a highly toxic protein derived from castor beans, were sent to the White House and the offices of three US senators. No one was harmed by the ricin, but one postal worker died of an unrelated illness. The sender claimed to be a truck driver protesting against new regulations, but was never identified.[10],[11],[12],[13]

Cyber biocrimes is a term that refers to the use of cyber technologies to facilitate or commit biocrimes. Cyber technologies include computers, networks, software, hardware, and other digital devices that can store, process, transmit, or manipulate data. Biocrimes are crimes that involve the use of a biological agent or toxin to harm or kill a single person or a small group of people. Some examples of biocrimes are; hacking into a laboratory or a biotechnology facility to steal, alter, or release biological agents or data or, creating or disseminating false or misleading information about biological agents or outbreaks to cause panic, confusion, or harm. But also, developing or modifying biological agents using online resources, such as databases, software, or tutorials is accepted as a cyber biocrime. Additionally, using online platforms, such as websites, forums, or social media, to recruit, train, or coordinate biocriminals. Cyber biocrimes pose serious threats to public health, security, and stability, as they can exploit the vulnerabilities of cyber systems and biological systems. Cyber biocrimes also present challenges for detection and investigation, as they can involve complex and diverse actors, methods, and motives. Therefore, cyber biocrimes require a multidisciplinary and collaborative approach among various stakeholders, such as law enforcement agencies, public health authorities, intelligence services, and international organizations.[14],[15],[16],[17]

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## 2. Detection and identification approach for biorisks

Terrorism is one of the most serious challenges to democracies' stability. Its political aims are to undermine public faith in governments and engender terror in society. Weapons of mass destruction like chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear war agents are emerging as the political balances changes globally. Detecting and investigating biocrimes can be challenging, as they may not be immediately recognized or reported, and may involve rare or modified biological agents that are difficult to identify or trace. First responders should follow proper safety protocols and collect samples from the suspected crime scene or victims, while maintaining a chain of custody and preserving the evidence. Following this step, laboratory personnel should perform rapid and accurate tests to identify and characterize the biological agent using different approaches. There are many methods for bioterrorist agent detection, depending on the type and characteristics of the agent. Some of the methods are:

- Biochemical methods: These methods use chemical reactions or properties of the agent to detect its presence. For example, some agents can be identified by their metabolic products, enzyme activities, or pH changes.
- Immunological methods: These methods use antibodies or antigens to detect the agent based on its specific interaction with the immune system. For example, some agents can be detected by using lateral flow immunoassays, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs), or immunofluorescence assays.
- Nucleic acid methods: These methods use DNA or RNA sequences to detect the agent based on its genetic information. For example, some agents can be detected by using polymerase chain reaction (PCR), nucleic acid hybridization, or nucleic acid microarrays.
- Bioluminescence methods: These methods use light-emitting molecules or organisms to detect the agent based on its ability to produce or interact with light. For example, some agents can be detected by using luciferase, firefly, or bacterial bioluminescence.
- Other methods: These methods use various novel technologies to detect the agent based on its physical, optical, electrical, or biological properties. For example, some agents can be detected by using aptamers, biochips,

evanescentwave biosensors, cantilevers, living cells, mass spectrometry, or metagenomics. These methods have different advantages and disadvantages in terms of sensitivity, specificity, speed, cost, and complexity. The choice of method depends on the purpose and context of detection.[18],[19],[20]

Epidemiologists should conduct surveillance and contact tracing to determine the source, mode and extent of transmission, and the risk of further spread of the biological agent. Besides this, microbial forensic experts should compare the biological agent with reference databases or collections, and use molecular techniques such as phylogenetics, population genetics or bioinformatics to infer its origin, evolution and possible modifications. Also law enforcement agencies should collaborate with public health authorities, intelligence services and international organizations to gather information and evidence that can link the biological agent to a suspect or a motive. And lastly, legal professionals should ensure that the evidence collected and analyzed is admissible and reliable in court, and that the rights of the accused and the victims are respected. These steps require a multidisciplinary approach and a strong coordination among different stakeholders, as well as adequate resources, training and standards for biocrime detection and investigation.[21],[22],[23]

There are many databases that can identify microorganisms or agents. Reference databases or collections for biological agents are online resources that contain information about the identity, characteristics, diversity and evolution of various microorganisms and toxins. They can be used to compare and analyze

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biological agents involved in biocrimes, and to infer their possible sources,origins or modifications. Some examples of reference databases or collections forbiological can be listed as.[24],[25],[26]

- NCBI databases: A collection of databases maintained by the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) that provide access to various types of biological data, such as nucleotide and protein sequences, genome assemblies, gene expression profiles, molecular pathways, 3-D structures and more.
- PubChem: A database of chemical information, including compounds, substances and bioassays, that can be used to study the structure, function and activity of biological agents and toxins.
- BioCollections: A database of museum, herbaria and other biorepository collections that can provide information about the geographic distribution, ecologicalniche and taxonomic classification of biological agents.
- Morphbank: An image repository that allows users to upload, annotate and share images of biological specimens, such as bacteria, fungi, plants and animals.
- VertNet: A portal that aggregates data from natural history collections around the world, focusing on vertebrate specimens that can be potential sources or hostsof biological agents.

Microfluidics for detection and identification of biorisks

Microfluidics is a technology that involves manipulating small volumes of fluids in microscale channels or chambers. Microfluidics can be used for biocrime detection by enabling rapid and sensitive analysis of biological agents or toxins in various samples, such as blood, saliva, food or water. Microfluidics for biocrime detection are handy by reduced sample and reagent consumption, which lowers the cost and environmental impact of the analysis. They also increase speed and efficiency of the analysis, which allows for faster diagnosis and response to biocrimes. Moreover, enhanced integration and automation of multiple steps of the analysis, such as sample preparation, amplification, detection and signal

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[25]  Anonymous (2023d) Biological Collections Databases, Tools, and Data Publication iDigBio. https://www.idigbio.org/content/biological-collections-databases. (Accessed 02 March 2023)
[26]  Anonymous (2023e) Biologicals - WHO. https://www.who.int/health-topics/biologicals. (Accessed 02 March 2023)

processing, reduces human error and contamination. This also improvesportability and flexibility of the devices, which enables on-site or point-of-care testing in various settings.[27,28,29,30,31]

Microfluidic based bioterrorism detection is a technology that uses microfluidic devices to perform rapid and sensitive analysis of biological agents or toxins that can be used as weapons of bioterrorism. Microfluidic devices are small chips that have microscale channels or chambers that can manipulate small volumes of fluids. Microfluidic devices can integrate multiple steps of the analysis, such as sample preparation, amplification, detection and signal processing, on a single platform. Microfluidic devices can also be coupled with smartphone cameras and image-based artificial intelligence to enable portable and automated bioterrorism detection. There are numerous advantages of microfluidic based bioterrorism detection. In one study, a microfluidic platform used antibody-coated microspheres to capture and detect *Staphylococcus aureus* by fluorescence labeling method. This device could detect *S. aureus* at a low concentration of  $1.5 \times 10\ 1$ CFU/µL within four minutes. In another study, a microfluidic device that uses magnetic beads to extract and purify nucleic acids from pathogenic microorganisms, such as bacteria and viruses, and then performed real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to amplify and detect the target sequences. The device could perform the whole process within 30 minutes. Another rapid detection system with a microfluidic device uses a silica gel film to adsorb nucleic acids from pathogenic microorganisms, such as anthrax and plague, and then performs loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP) to amplify and detect the target sequences. The device can perform the whole process within fifteen minutes. Another significant example is a smartphone-based platform used a microfluidic device to perform lateral flow immunoassay

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for detecting ricin toxin. The platform uses a smartphone camera to capture the images of the test strips and an image-based artificial intelligence algorithm to analyze the results. The platform can detect ricin toxin at a concentration of 0.5 ng/mL within fifteen minutes.[32],[33],[34],[35]

## 3. Telemedicine in aftermath of an event

Telemedicine is the use of information and communication technologies to provide health care services remotely. It can be useful for preventing, diagnosing, treating, and controlling diseases during infections and pandemics such as COVID-19. Use of telemedicine can reduce the risk of transmission of the virus by minimizing person-to-person contact. It can provide continuous care to the community, especially for vulnerable groups such as elderly people and those with chronic conditions. Also, it can reduce the strain on health care facilities and resources by avoiding unnecessary visits and hospitalizations and supports public health measures such as contact tracing, surveillance, and education. Some of the telemedicine services that can be used for infections, pandemics and biorisks are given below:

- Teletriage: The process of assessing the urgency and severity of patients' symptoms and directing them to the appropriate level of care.

- Telemonitoring: The use of devices or applications to measure and transmit patients' vital signs, symptoms, or behaviors to health care providers.

- Teleconsultation: The use of videoconferencing or phone calls to provide clinical advice, diagnosis, treatment, or follow-up to patients or other health care providers.

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- Teleeducation: The use of online platforms or media to provide health information, training, or support to patients or health care providers.[36],[37],[38]

Telemedicine is an important tool in caring for patients and health providers during infections and pandemics. However, it also faces some challenges such as technical issues, legal and ethical concerns, quality assurance, and reimbursement policies. Therefore, it is essential to have a clear framework and guidelines for implementing telemedicine services in different settings and situations. Telemedicine uses electronic and telecommunication technology to provide an exchange of medical information, despite a person and their doctor not being in the same room. It can be as simple as text messaging medical care to as advanced as remotely controlled surgery. Telemedicine can be coupled with microfluidics for bioterrorism detection by enabling remote and rapid analysis of biological agents or toxins that can be used as weapons of bioterrorism. Microfluidics is a technology that uses microscale devices to manipulate small volumes of fluids. Microfluidics can perform multiple steps of the analysis, such as sample preparation, amplification, detection and signal processing, on a single platform. Microfluidics can also be coupled with smartphone cameras and image-based artificial intelligence to enable portable and automated bioterrorism detection.[39],[40],[41],[42],[43],[44],[45]

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## 4. Conclusion

It can be said that there are numerous advantages of coupling telemedicine with microfluidics for bioterrorism detection. Firstly, reduces sample and reagent consumption, which lowers the cost and environmental impact of the analysis. Furthermore it offers, increased speed and efficiency of the analysis, which allows for faster diagnosis and response to bioterrorism incidents. Another advantage is, enhanced sensitivity and specificity of the analysis, which enables the detection of low levels and multiple types of biological agents or toxins. Additionally, it improves portability and flexibility of the devices, which enables on-site or point-of- care testing in various settings. It also increases accessibility and availability of the devices, which allows for reaching more people in remote or rural areas. Finally there is, improved communication and collaboration among different stakeholders, such as healthcare providers, public health authorities, intelligence services, and international organizations.

This paper aims to summarize the approach for bioterrorist agent detection using microfluidics coupled with telemedicine. It is obvious that science and inventions change the approach to detection of weapons of mass destruction. Microfluidic systems, as summarized above, have a flexibility in applications with low volumes and they can be easily coupled with other technological devices. Telemedicine is another approach which eases the manipulation of contaminated victims with their technological devices. This is important due to numbers of people exposed and changing characters of weapons of mass destruction. It is obvious that studies and numbers of microfluidic based devices increases year by year. Biorisks' mitigation approach will include microfluidics in a very short time.

This review is designed to trigger awareness rising about combination of telemedicine with microfluidics for detection of biorisks. The subject is an emerging topic for bioterrorism detection and can be applied easily with a low cost. It should be taken into account that new technologies and new approaches should be applied and important for weapons of mass destruction detection.

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# An Analysis of Daesh's Ideological Narrative

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### Abstract

*Daesh emerged in an environment where civil wars destabilized the Middle East region and committed a vast number of crimes while conducting its attacks on different targets. Its violent acts made Daesh one of the most brutal terrorist organizations in recent history. This study aims to analyze the ideological narrative of Daesh that intended to consolidate its power with the help of the notions of jihad and salafism which were also considered as the main ideological instruments of the organization. This study also aims to contribute to the fields of International Relations (IR), International Security (IS), and terrorism studies. The research helps to fill a gap in the literature by arguing that Daesh's main ideological narratives are based not only on jihadism and salafism but also on the colonial instinct of its leaders to build a state. In order to understand Daesh's ideological narrative, this study seeks to identify the connections between the notions of jihad, Salafism, and genocide that are utilized to eradicate the oppressed communities in Daesh's sphere of control. Post-colonialism is selected as the main school of thought to analyze Daesh's ideology and the reasons for its violent acts against subaltern groups in Iraq and Syria. Daesh initially differentiated and then annihilated all the*

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*people in occupied territories by use of "us and them" discourse. To point up the ideology of Daesh leaders and how they applied the "othering" policy, this paper analyzes Dabiq and Rumiyah which were Daesh's main propaganda tools. The concept of genocide is selected as a case study among other atrocities committed by Daesh to substantiate the study's main argument.*

## 1. Introduction

Daesh[2] is accepted as one of the most brutal terrorist organizations in recent history. The absence of state authority in Iraq due to the Iraq War, the repercussions of the Arab Spring, and the civil war in Syria created a power vacuum in the Middle East. Therefore, Daesh attempted to fill the power vacuum and expanded through region in a short time. At its peak, Daesh controlled nearly 40% of Iraq and a third of Syria[3]. Daesh has terrorized not only the Middle East but also Europe, Africa, Asia, and the United States (US), and has committed many crimes worldwide. All kinds of media platforms and propaganda tools were effectively used to broadcast their violent acts to spread fear and recruit more members. The diversity of their targets and victims, the different types of violent acts that their militants committed, and their organizational structure, language, and ideology have been widely studied.[4] The main topic of this study is an analysis of Daesh's ideological narrative. The literature on the ideology of Daesh has been dominated by those who highlighted jihad and Salafism as the main ideologies and these studies suggested that the ideology was used as a tool for the acts of Daesh[5]. This study aims to contribute to the fields of International Relations (IR), International Security (IS), and Terrorism studies. The research helps to fill a gap in the literature by arguing that Daesh's

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[2]   In this paper, the term Daesh is refered to "Ad Davla Al Islamiya fil-Irak ve Eş Şam

[3]   Wilson Center, "*Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State",* (October 28, 2019) Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state.

[4]   Cole Bunzel (2015); Daniel L. Byman (2015); Lina Khatib (2015); William McCants (2015); Abbas Mossallanejad (2015); Charlie Winter (2015); International Crisis Group (2016); and Katarzyna Jasko et al. (2018).

[5]   Daniel L. Byman (2015); Steve Negus (2015); Jacob Olidort (2015); Jeff Sole (2016); and Ali Soufan (2019).

main ideological narratives are based not only on jihadism and Salafism but also on the colonial instinct of its leaders to build a state.

In the same way that colonizers did in the past, Daesh committed atrocities like genocide, mass murder, rape, deporting children, and women to concentration camps, etc. which fueled its efforts to strengthen the establishment of the declared state. Through the instruments of atrocities, Daesh annihilated the human rights of the people in occupied territories by oppressing and tyrannizing all the groups in Iraq and Syria. In addition , it aimed to change the identity, culture, and beliefs of people through the use of force. In order to understand Daesh's ideological narrative, this study seeks to identify connections between the notions of jihad, Salafism, and genocide that are utilized to eradicate the oppressed communities in Daesh's sphere of control and secure its declared state. The timeframe of the study is restricted to the period from 2013 to the present. The reason for this limitation is to have a closer look at the period of Daesh's emergence, rise, and expansion through Iraq and Syria. The study includes examples of mass violence, especially genocidal acts, committed by Daesh to illustrate and understand the ideology of Daesh.

The theoretical framework to discuss the cases is based on post-colonialism. The common assumption in IS and IR is to consider that colonialism belongs to history and ended with the African independence movement in the post-World War II. (WW2) era. The post-colonialist approach emerged as a challenge to these main assumptions of IR by revealing that colonialism does not belong to history, and it reveals itself in existing power relations both between states and within the structure of the international society[6]. Post-colonialism remarks on the voices of the subaltern[7], which do not have a place in the international system. It aims to raise their voice to show that they are not passive followers of the Western-centered system, and thus a natural part of this order. Primary and secondary sources will be the main data of this research. The primary sources consist of propaganda magazines of Daesh—Dabiq and Rumiyah—and the rhetoric of the leaders of

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[6]  Pınar Bilgin, "*What Does It Mean To Think Postcolonially About Security?*", *Redirecting Security From Feminism, 39:1*, (2021), p.2.

[7]  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "*Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*", in C. Nelson and L.  Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp.271–313.

Daesh. The secondary sources include academic articles, books, reports of the United Nations, think tanks, and newspapers[8]. The concept of genocide is selected as a case study among other atrocities committed by Daesh to substantiate the study's main argument. The emergence and rise of Daesh will be analyzed in short and the concepts of jihad and genocide will be introduced to explore Daesh's ideology and genocidal acts. Lastly, the concept of ideology will be defined and Daesh's narrative will be discussed with the help of findings from the analyses of Dabiq and Rumiyah, the genocidal practices of Daesh, and the use of the "us and them" dichotomy as Daesh's main discourse.

## 2. The Emergence and Rise of Daesh

Studies conducted on the emergence and rise of Daesh generally concur on the factors that led to the birth and growth of this violent terrorist group, which may be listed as the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the existence of authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, the Arab Spring and its repercussions on the region, poor efforts of the US in Iraq to build a new administration cadre based on Shia leaders and its policies to consolidate power in Iraq, and the Syrian civil war[9]. As a consequence of all these "catalyst events"[10], Daesh emerged as an Al-Qaeda (AQ)-affiliated terrorist organization in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In his youth, after he lost his father, Zarqawi became a street criminal and had an alcohol addiction[11]. To help Zarqawi out of these problems, his mother put him in religious studies classes where he was indoctrinated with Salafism, and in the last days of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he decided to fight as a mujahid in Afghanistan[12]. After the withdrawal of the USSR, Zarqawi stayed in Afghanistan

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[8]   For the concept of jihad: John L. Esposito (2002); David Cook (2009); Petter Nesser (2011); Daniel L. Byman (2017); and Colin P. Clarke (2018).
      For the concept of genocide: Leo Kuper (1981); Hinton (2002); Ben Kiernan (2003); Martin Shaw (2007); John Docker (2008); and Moses (2008).
      For the term of ideology: Mark Neocleous (1996); Jan Müller (1999); Megan K. McBride (2011); Jonathan Leader Maynard (2014); Diego Muro (2016); and Ranya Ahmad (2020).

[9]   Lina Khatib (2015); Abbas Mossallanejad (2015); William McCants (2015); Al Jazeera (2017); Katarzyna Jasko et al. (2018); and Wilson Center (2019).

[10]  Diego Muro, "What Does Radicalisation Look Like? Four visualisations of socialisation into violent extremism", Notes Internacionals, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), (2016), p.2.

[11]  Katarzyna Jaśko et.al., "ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology, Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives", (2021), p.5.

[12]  Al Jazeera, "*The Rise and Fall of ISIL Explained",* (2017), available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/6/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-isil-explained.

for a while to build networks, and in 1992, he started to work with his lecturer Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in Jordan which increased Zarqawi's adherence to Salafism.[13]

In 1994, Maqdisi and Zarqawi were arrested in Jordan while they were in preparation for a terrorist attack[14]. After both were freed from prison in 1999 because of general amnesty, Zarqawi met with the leader of AQ, Osama bin Laden, to receive support for his new operational group, but things did not go as planned for Zarqawi because bin Laden distanced himself from Zarqawi's aggressiveness and plans to kill some groups of Muslims, especially Shias[15]. Even though he got limited support from the AQ leader, he managed to expand the network in Afghanistan and left the country before the US intervention[16]. In 2003, he announced the establishment of the *'Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad in Iraq'* (*The Group of Unity and Jihad in Iraq*), the predecessor of Daesh and a former branch of Al-Qaeda[17]. Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike in June 2006, and Abu Ayyub al-Masri took over as the leader of the organization[18]. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, once a prisoner at a US jail in Iraq called Camp Bucca, became the group's new leader after Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi were killed by a US air campaign in 2011[19].

According to McCants, the leadership of Baghdadi was one of the cornerstones of Daesh, while the others were the civil war in Syria and Baghdadi's proclamation of the caliphate[20]. Baghdadi bolstered the fighting units and the organization's administrative staff as former Iraqi military personnel joined Daesh and rose through the ranks. Daesh organized escapes from large prisons in Iraq to recruit more trained and brutal terrorists[21]. Daesh exploited the sectarian policies of Nouri al-Maliki, the former prime

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[13]  Katarzyna Jaśko et.al*., ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology*, Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives, (2021), p.5.

[14]  Ibid.

[15]  Ibid.

[16]  Daniel L.Byman, "*Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets"*, Brookings Institute, (2015), Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/

[17]  Katarzyna Jaśko et.al*., "ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology,* Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives", (2021), p.6.

[18]  Ibid, p.9.

[19]  Ibid, p.10.

[20]  William McCants, "*The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State"*, (New York: Macmillan, 2015).

[21]  Al Jazeera, "*The Rise, and Fall of ISIL Explained"*, (2017), available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/6/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-isil-explained.

minister of Iraq, on the Sunni population to justify its attacks on Shias and their holy sites[22]. Moreover, Baghdadi expanded the sphere of influence of the organization towards Syria. In 2011, Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, a trusted lieutenant of AQ, was sent to Syria to organize like-minded people under the banner of the organization, however, he chose to establish his own organization called Jabhat al-Nusra[23].

The establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra intensified the grapple between AQ and Daesh. On the one hand, Zawahiri, the leader of AQ, thought that this was a good step for AQ because al-Joulani kept his dialogue with Zawahiri; on the other hand, Baghdadi did not welcome this situation and Daesh accelerated its efforts to get its territorial gain in Syria[24]. Baghdadi made attempts to subordinate Jabhat al-Nusra which it rejected. After clashes between AQ and Daesh, in February 2014, Zawahiri publicly renounced Baghdadi's organization, severing their association[25]. By 2014, Daesh had captured the oil-rich Syrian city of Deir Az Zor, Raqqa, and Mosul from Iraq and announced the formation of its state and caliphate[26]. For Daesh, the establishment of a caliphate was strategically necessary to boost its recruitment efforts and legitimize its position[27]. Also, it was a challenge against AQ as the only organization representing global jihad so far. According to Winter, the caliphate was the unique selling point of Daesh to create a "Utopian state" ruled by true Islam[28]. In addition to recruiting more militants into the organization, Daesh also attracted a large number of individuals to live in the so-called Islamic state. Daesh as a proclaimed state had different characteristics than other states, for instance, the common ground of its people was not their nation, race, or language but a unique understanding of the religion. It is stated in Dabiq that:

> "[I]n spite of the fact that they did not have any common nationality, ethnicity, language, or worldly interests, nor did they have any prior acquaintance!

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[22]  Ibid.

[23]  Ibid.

[24]  Daniel L.Byman, "*Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets",* The Brookings Institute, (2015), Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/.

[25]  Ibid.

[26]  Al Jazeera, "*The Rise, and Fall of ISIL Explained"*, (2017), available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/6/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-isil-explained.

[27]  Katarzyna Jaśko et.al., "*ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology,* Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives", (2021), p.17.

[28]  Charlie Winter, "*The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy"*, Quilliam Foundation, (2015), p.28.

This phenomenon is something that has never occurred in human history, except in the case of the Islamic State! And nothing like it will ever occur thereafter except in relation to it, and Allah knows best"[29].

## 3. The concepts of jihad, genocide, and ideology

In order to analyze how Daesh merged these concepts and developed its own ideology, this section of the study aims to introduce the three concepts of jihad, genocide, and ideology.

### 3.1. The concept of jihad

Jihad is a word that takes place in the Quran and refers to the *'Prophet Muhammad and his early companions'*. It means to struggle or strive in the way of God[30] and is defended as a means of protecting Muslims or regaining Muslim territory from non-Muslims[31]. The words, to struggle and to strive, are understood in violent and non-violent manners. The greater jihad is the non-violent and difficult one because it seeks to struggle against evil and devote oneself totally to following God's path, practicing what the Quran orders, and following the example of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah), however lesser jihad contains violence such as fighting against injustice and oppression, spreading, and defending Islam and, if necessary, armed struggle and holy war[32]. Cook categorizes the concept of jihad under three pillars: "jihad of the sword, jihad of the tongue, and jihad of the soul[33]". The jihad of the sword contains offensive and military terms to describe the enemy. In classical jihad, the line between enemy and friend was clear: only non-Muslim combatants were considered legitimate enemies, but this clear line disappeared and became more ambiguous with the emergence of new variants of jihad[34].

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[29] Dabiq Issue 3, Islamic State's. "*A Call to Hijra*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (July 2014), p. 5.

[30] John L. Esposito, *"What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam"*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 117.

[31] Daniel Byman, "Divisions Within the Global Jihad: A Primer", (2017), Available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/divisions-within-global-jihad-primer.

[32] John L. Esposito," *What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam*", (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 57-58.

[33] David Cook, "*Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an Ideology of Terrorism*, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions", (Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2009), pp. 178.

[34] Ibid.

Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian influential thinker in the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organization, who is arguably the most significant intellectual contributor to contemporary jihadism, urged a 'vanguard' of devoted followers to excommunicate the 'ignorant' (*jahili*) Egyptian government[35]. Qutb named the Egyptian regime as 'ignorant' because they adopted Western legal and social norms[36]. Although the prophet Muhammad ended a period of fighting with his words, "[W]e return from the lesser jihad [warfare] to the greater jihad"[37], the concept of lesser jihad has been internalized to legitimize all kinds of acts in contemporary jihadism[38]. Moreover, with the emergence of radical groups as a "transnational social movement" to confront the attacks of the West on the soil of Muslims[39], the understanding of contemporary jihad has been also transformed into global jihad[40].

The transformation of global jihad and the intensification of its brutality is categorized into four phases: In the first phase, the return of mujahideen who fought in Afghanistan to their homes, led to the creation of new networks in MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, and the Caucasus[41]. After the withdrawal of the Soviet units from Afghanistan, AQ was organized as an offspring of Salafism to direct former mujahadeen to the "far enemy"[42], i.e., the US, and this issue initiated the second phase[43]. The third phase was initiated by the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq after the 9/11 attacks, which encouraged a great number of Muslims to fight against the US. The last phase began with the emergence of Daesh, another Salafist jihadist terrorist organization[44].

[35]  Petter Nesser, "*Ideologies of Jihad in Europe*, Terrorism and Political Violence", 23:2, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2010.537587, (2011), p.174.

[36]  Ibid.

[37]  John L. Esposito, "*What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam*", (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 118.

[38]  David Cook, "*Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an Ideology of Terrorism*, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions", (Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2009), p. 177.

[39]  Colin P. Clarke*," The Future of the Global Jihadist Movement After the Collapse of the Caliphate"*, RAND Blog, (2018), Available at: https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/12/the-future-of-the-global-jihadist-movement-after-the.html.

[40]  David Cook, "*Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an Ideology of Terrorism*, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*", (Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2009), p. 182-184.

[41]  Crisis Group, "*Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Crisis Group Special Report*", (2016), p. 5.

[42]  Ibid.

[43]  Ibid.

[44]  Ibid, p.6.

Salafism is an extremist variant of Sunnism that basically focuses on the "purification of creed"[45] by rejecting conventional policies and obeying only the rule of God[46]. Islam, according to Salafists, is based solely on the prophet Muhammad's ideas and what his first three generations of Sunni followers upheld[47]. Abu Bakr Naji, who is accepted as the strategist of AQ and released his online book, "The Management of Savagery", in 2014, identifies the targets and tactics of the Salafi jihadi movement[48]. To restore 'apostate' Muslim countries under a caliphate, Naji outlines how to topple them and cause them to descend into savagery[49]. The title of the book refers to the management of the ensuing turmoil caused by the collapse of order[50]. He divides "The Management of Savagery" into three phases. In the first phase, the use of violence is required to create "regions of savagery"[51] and in the following phase, Sharia law is to be used to justify these cruelties in the minds of Muslims. He states that "[O]ne who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, deterrence, and massacring"[52]. In the final phase, a caliphate is to be formed to gather all the Sunni Muslims under one leadership.

Although the first two phases as articulated by Naji were initiated by AQ, Daesh was the organization that established a caliphate[53]. Daesh has had a definite purpose, namely the immediate formation of a caliphate, in contrast to AQ, a terrorist organization whose ultimate goal has been the constitution of an Islamic emirate in the Middle East at an unspecified time in the future[54]. AQ's main

[45] Jacob Olidort, "*What is Salafism*", Washington Institute, (2015), Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-salafism.

[46] Daniel Byman, "*Divisions Within the Global Jihad: A Primer*", (2017), Available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/divisions-within-global-jihad-primer.

[47] Jacob Olidort, "*What is Salafism*", Washington Institute, (2015), Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-salafism.

[48] Wright (2014) and Soufan (2019).

[49] Jeff Sole, "*Management Of Savagery – A Model For Establishing The Islamic State*", (2016), The Mackenzie Institute, Available at: https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2016/06/management-of-savagery-a-model-for-establishing-the-islamic-state/.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Lawrance Wright, "*ISIS's Savage Strategy in Iraq*", The New Yorker, (2014), Available at: https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/isiss-savage-strategy-in-iraq.

[52] Steve Nergus (2015) and Jeff Sole (2016)

[53] Ali Soufan, "*Geopolitics and Salafi-Jihadist Strategy*", Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 20, (2019), doi:10.1353/gia.2019.0026, p. 96.

[54] Lina Khatib, "*The Islamic State's Strategy: Lasting and Expanding*", Carnegie Middle East Center, (2015), p.6.

adversary has been the United States, which it regards as the source of all issues in the Middle East and aimed to replace the corrupted apostate regimes with pure Islamic ones[55]. AQ has claimed to have aimed to defend Muslim territories from Western occupying forces and has criticized the savagery of Daesh[56]. AQ views Shia Muslims as apostates but considers their execution to be excessive and harmful to the global jihadist effort[57]. Unlike AQ's "far enemy" strategy, Daesh adopted the "near enemy" approach, and so-called corrupted regimes, i.e. Syria and Iraq, in the Arab world became the Islamic State's main targets rather than the US[58]. Like his predecessors, Baghdadi advocated assaulting Shia and other religious minorities as well as other jihadist organizations in order to first purge the Islamic community[59]. The list of enemies of Daesh is not easy to understand and consists of a wide variety of actors including the Shia-led government in Iraq, the Alawite regime in Syria, Kurds, the US troops in Iraq, Turkmens, Yezidis, and other Sunni groups. Daesh views all regions outside the caliphate's borders as the lands of infidels (bilad al-kufr), which justifies its attacks against all of them[60].

These strategic variances can also be observed in the two parties' favored techniques[61]. AQ has generally preferred massive attacks on symbolic or important targets such as the 9/11 attacks which targeted the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in 1998[62]. The tactics used by Daesh are a direct result of the longstanding instabilities in Iraq and Syria and it aims to invade new territories or to protect its current possessions by using artillery, a great number of fighters, tanks, and MANPADS. Genocidal

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[55] Daniel L.Byman, "*Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets*", The Brookings Institute, (2015), Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/.

[56] Lawrence Wright, "*ISIS's Savage Strategy in Iraq*", The New Yorker, (2014), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/isiss-savage-strategy-in-iraq.

[57] Daniel L.Byman, "*Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets*", The Brookings Institute, (2015), Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Lina Khatib, "*The Islamic State's Strategy: Lasting and Expanding*", Carnegie Middle East Center, (2015), p.16.

[61] Daniel L.Byman, "*Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets*", The Brookings Institute, (2015), Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/.

[62] Ibid.

acts including mass killing, rape, and torture are just a few of the methods Daesh uses in the territory it governs to spread fear and "purify" the community, while it also offers basic services, which help it gain some local support[63]. Although AQ and Daesh are both classified as Salafi jihadi terrorist organizations, they differ in their brutality, organizational structure, and targets, making it impossible to assess Daesh's ideology just from a Salafi jihadist viewpoint. As a result of these divergences, Salafi jihadism remains insufficient in terms of explaining what kind of ideology drives Daesh to commit brutal acts. As such, the concept of genocide will be introduced to understand the colonial instinct of Daesh.

### 3.2. The Concept of Genocide

In his 1944 book "Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress," Raphael Lemkin introduced the term genocide[64]. Lemkin characterized genocide as being inherently colonial and he extensively considered the mechanisms of genocide in circumstances when the indigenous populations were typically outnumbered by the Europeans[65]. Lemkin saw genocide as a distinct kind of foreign occupation and invasion and established a close relationship between colonization and genocide[66]. Lemkin claims that:

> "[G]enocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population, which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor's own nationals."[67]

Thanks to the great efforts of Lemkin, The Genocide Convention was formed in 1948 by the United Nations (UN) to prevent genocide and punish the perpetrators. According to the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of*

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[63]  Ibid.

[64]  Raphael Lemkin, "*Axis rule in occupied Europ"e*, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International, 1944).

[65]  Anthony Dirk Moses, "*Empire, Colony, Genocide, Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History",* (New York, NY: Berghahn Book, 2008), p. 9.

[66]  Ibid.

[67]  John Docker, "*The Origins Of Violence: Religion, History and Genocide",* (London: Pluto Press, 2008), p. 2.

*Genocide Article 2*, "[G]enocide is defined as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- Killing members of the group;
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- Imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group;
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." [68]

Since the UN adopted *The Genocide Convention*, the frame of the concept continues to be the object at issue because topics such as politics and gender, or categories such as cultural genocide are not included in the convention and are not accepted as genocide. For instance, according to Lemkin, "the destruction of cultural symbols is genocide" and he claims that cultural genocide, an attack on a group's symbols, or violent disruption to religious or cultural activities generally comes before physical and biological genocide[69].

As a reaction to these exclusions in the Convention, Shaw offers a broader definition of genocide by describing it as "[a]ction in which armed power organizations treat civilian groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative social power by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom they regard as members of the groups"[70]. Kuper[71] explains genocide as: "The world is new; the concept is ancient". Kiernan[72] accepts the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC as the first genocide. Because such a statement would imply that genocide is primarily a recent phenomenon, Diamond argues against the idea that genocide is inherently state directed and further states that genocide between human populations most likely started millions of years

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[68] "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", available at https://www. un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20 Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf (accessed 14 June 2022).

[69] Anthony Dirk Moses, "Empire, Colony, Genocide, Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History", (New York, NY: Berghahn Book, 2008), p. 12.

[70] Martin Shaw, "*What is Genocide?*" (London: Polity, 2007), p. 155.

[71] Leo Kuper, "*Genocide: Its Political Use in The Twentieth Century*", (London: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 9.

[72] Ben Kiernan, "*The First Genocide: Carthage, 146 BC*", Diogenes (Vol. 203, Issue 3, 2003), pp. 1-2.

ago, when the human species was merely another large mammal[73]. Hinton defines genocide as an "othering" process, which redraws the boundaries of a fictitious society, is what distinguishes genocides from other crimes and aims to annihilate the "other" through the use of dehumanizing rhetoric[74]. Although genocide may utilize "terrorism, ethnic conflict, torture, oppression, and war", insofar as the aim to exterminate "the other" distinguishes genocide from these means theoretically[75].

Although significant improvements have been put into practice regarding the crime of genocide since WW2, it is still a problematic issue because it has been difficult to name the atrocities of rulers, governments, or non-state actors as genocide instantly and objectively. It has not been possible to have a special court that can observe, interrogate, and judge cases until the 2000s. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by its founding treaty, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 1998 to prosecute "the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, the crime of aggression, and war crimes"[76]. However, many states have not ratified the Convention or have not been party to the Rome Statue which may cause the emergence of new perpetrators. According to Hinton[77], the paradox of genocide is that the very state that is meant to stop it usually commits the atrocity, and the international community's phobia of "violating" its members' sovereignties causes international legal systems to break down.

While the genocide issue has been discussed in a state-oriented environment, non-state actors such as Daesh have committed numerous genocidal acts in different places. For instance, Daesh occupied many territories in a short time in Iraq and Syria and the people who were living in those provinces were displaced due to the risk of enslavement by Daesh militants. The victims of Daesh were Yazidis, Shias, Christians, Turkmens, and even Sunnis who had supported the Iraqi Shia government. Daesh did not hesitate to act barbarically against all these groups and to define them as infidels. The approach towards all its enemies is stated in Rumiyah as: "The Kafir's blood is

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[73] John Docker, "*The Origins Of Violence: Religion, History and Genocide",* (London: Pluto Press, 2008), p.29.

[74] Alexander Laban Hinton*, "Annihilating Difference, The Anthropology of Genocide"*, (London: University of California Press, 2002), p. 6.

[75] Ibid.

[76] The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner Online, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,* Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/ instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court.

[77] Ibid. p.27.

halal for you, so shed it"[78]. Moreover, Daesh's violent acts on women are based upon its interpretation of fuqaha (Islamic jurisprudence), and according to fuqaha, infidel women can be enslaved and can be asked to repent, otherwise, they will be killed[79]. After Daesh categorized the captured women and killed many elderly women, the women, and children were shared among Daesh terrorists based on the Sharia law[80]. One-fifth (khums) of the slaves were sent to Daesh authorities and the rest were taken by the terrorists as ghanima (booty)[81]. Daesh destroyed most of the occupied territories' population by killing, displacing, and taking captives. Daesh launched the slave trade and sell women and children in different places or give them as a gift to a third person. The younger boys were sent to recruitment camps for military exercises and indoctrination and Daesh renamed them with Islamic names[82].

In September 2017, the Security Council unanimously decided to request that the U.N. form an investigation team to trace the evidence of atrocities committed by Daesh in Iraq and Syria[83]. According to the head of the UN investigation team, Karim Khan, Daesh made and released a video that was a clear and public provocation to commit genocide against Shias[84]. Khan further stated that Daesh applied a "convert or die" plan to all Yazidis[112] and it was reported that more than 10.000 Yazidis had been killed or kidnapped[85]. According to a report by the Genocide Network[86], Daesh committed these genocidal acts against Yazidis:

- "[T]he capture of civilians and the brutal separation of men, women and children,

- <u>Mass killings</u> of men and forced conversions to Islam,

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[78] Rumiyah Issue 1, Islamic State's, "*Rumiyah*," Al Hayat Media Centre, (2016), p.34.

[79] Dabiq Issue 4, Islamic State's, "*The Failed Crusade*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (August 2014), p. 15.

[80] Rosa Duarte-Herrera and Clara Ifsits, "*Genocide against Yazidis. Austria's obligation to prosecute and punish returning ISIS fighters under international and national law*", University of Vienna Law Review, Vol. 1, (2017), p.6.

[81] Dabiq Issue 4, Islamic State's. "*The Failed Crusade*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (August 2014), p. 15.

[82] Dabiq Issue 4, Islamic State's. "*The Failed Crusade*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (August 2014), p. 7.

[83] Daily Sabah, "*Daesh committed genocide against Yazidis in Iraq, UN probe says*", (2021), Available at: https:// www.dailysabah.com/politics/daesh-committed-genocide-against-yazidis-in-iraq-un-probe-says/news.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Daily Sabah, "*First study on Yazidi genocide by Daesh reveals human tragedy*", (2017), Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2017/05/11/first-study-on-yazidi-genocide-by-daesh-revealshuman-tragedy.

[86] The Genocide Network is established by the Council of the EU in 2002 to to ensure close cooperation between the national authorities in investigating and prosecuting the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

- Conscription of children between eight and eighteen years of age to participate in the hostilities, as well as their forced conversions to Islam, and

- An organized system of sexual violence against women and girls such as rape, forced marriages, human trafficking for sexual purposes, body inspections, and forced birth control"[87].

## 3.3. Ideology and its Link with Terrorism

Ideology is simply defined by Ahmed as follows: "[I]deology is the lens through which one sees and interprets one's surroundings"[88]. Maynard defines ideology from a broader perspective: "[A]n ideology is a distinctive system of normative, semantic, and/or reputedly factual ideas, typically shared by members of groups or societies, which underpins their understandings of their political world and shapes their political behavior."[89] Moreover, ideology is considered as a required feature for state-building to generate and then pursue national interests. Formerly, ideology was studied in the context of sociology, but the field of study has expanded and emerged with political ideology. Carl Schmitt, a German political theorist under the German Reich, studied political ideology and his findings have been examined by numerous scholars[90]. Neocleous analyzes the political ideology of Schmitt, which differentiated itself from other political schools of thought, especially liberalism and Marxism. Neocleous[91] argues that Schmitt supported the existence of a fascist state rather than states driven by other ideologies and used fascist-governed Italy as a model for his conceptualization of a state. Firstly, in this conceptualization, Schmitt distinguishes between friend and enemy and then states that the phase of struggle against enemies should be commenced[92]. War inherently appears as the main instrument of this struggle. Schmitt highlights the link between total war and a totalitarian state and

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[87] The Genocide Network, "*The prosecution at national level of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)",* (2017), pp. 5-6, Available at: https://www. eurojust.europa.eu/publication/prosecution-national-level-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-sgbvcommitted-islamic.

[88] Ranya Ahmed, "*How Ideology Influences Terror",* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020), p.10.

[89] Jonathan Leader Maynard, "*Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Mass Atrocities, Terrorism and Political Violence*", Vol.26, No:5, (2014), pp. 821-841.

[90] Mark Neocleous (1996) and Jan Müller (1999)

[91] Mark Neocleous, "*Friend or enemy? Reading Schmitt politically*", Radical Philosophy 79 (Sept/Oct 1996), p. 18.

[92] Ibid, p.14.

claims that the concept of a total enemy defines the meaning of total war[93]. According to Müller's findings on Schmitt's political ideology, Schmitt underlines the importance of some higher concepts such as God, the world, and humanity[94]. It cannot be said that Daesh leaders directly adopted Schmitt's ideology but there are some similarities between Schmitt's image of a fascist state and Daesh's policies. For instance, Daesh has made a sharp distinction between friend and enemy and initiated a total war against its total enemy, the infidels. Also, Daesh has utilized higher concepts such as God and the world under the umbrella of jihad to legitimize their policies and acts.

Moreover, scholars have analyzed the link between ideology and terrorism. For instance, McBride,[95] while studying the relationship between terrorist ideologies and the logic of terrorism, has come to the conclusion that terrorist ideology has been used as a meaning-giving construct to increase fear and anxiety among people including its followers, which reinforces its original ideology and religions, and the concept of war has been used as a powerful core construct which eases the creation of an identity for a terrorist organization such as AQ and Daesh. McBride has also utilized the science of psychology to explain the effect of fear and anxiety and has developed the concept of Terror Management Theory (TMT) that explicates emotions like fear of death and existential anxiety as a natural consequence of human consciousness[96]. She has explained the relation between mortality and ideology as follows: "In simpler language, people defend their ideologies when reminded of their mortality"[97].

Although there is no consensus on ideology's role in terrorism as a driver, many scholars have studied the impact of ideology on violent acts by terrorist organizations. According to Muro, "People, not ideologies, are violent"[98]. In the case of Daesh, the Shias were disliked by Zarqawi, who saw them as traitors and unbelievers[99]. He accepted the Shias as "an enemy within" and described

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[93]   Ibid, p.18.

[94]   Jan Müller, "*Carl Schmitt's method: Between Ideology, Demonology and Myth*", Journal of Political Ideologies, (Vol.4, No:1, 1999). pp. 61-85.

[95]   Megan K. McBride, "*The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety, the Search for Meaning, and Terrorist Ideologies, Terrorism and Political Violence*", (Vol.23, No.4, 2011), pp. 561-566.

[96]   Ibid, p. 562.

[97]   Ibid, p. 563.

[98]   Diego Muro, "*What Does Radicalisation Look Like? Four visualisations of socialisation into violent extremism*", Notes Internacionals, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), (2016), p.2.

[99]   Katarzyna Jaśko et.al., "*ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology*, Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives", (2021), p.7.

them as "the enemy outside," a threat much worse than the Crusaders[100]. Holbrook and Horgan claim that ideology is not the only instrument that generates and strengthens terrorist organizations, but it is rather part of the environment that shapes different participants of these organizations, such as a cadre of leaders, militants, and sympathizers to different degrees[101].

## 4. Findings on Dabiq and Rumiyah

Daesh as a former AQ-affiliated group and then an independent organization utilized the idea of so-called Islamic purity and the dichotomy of us and them[102]. The main differences between AQ and Daesh are their different types of enemies and the establishment of a caliphate. AQ declared war against a so-called Zionist-Crusader alliance[103], whereas Daesh broadened its definition of enemies. As mentioned before, Daesh has claimed that it is implementing an accurate and pure version of Islam, while those that do not follow this version are the followers of a corrupted system. As such, it designates those *as murtad (convert), kafirin (faithless) and mushrik (someone who practices shirk)* in Dabiq and Rumiyah. Baghdadi overtly expressed the expansionist goals of Daesh by naming the organization with an overarching title and by proclaiming himself as the Caliph. Baghdadi aimed to build a *khilafah (caliphate)* to be the so-called leader of the entire Ummah in four phases: initially, *hijrah (departure and emigration),* which would not cease as long as there was jihad, which meant a call to invite all Muslims to the land of Daesh. This was crucial to creating the next phase*, jama'ah (great community).* The third phase was to destabilize *taghut (worship other than Allah),* and the final phase was *tamkin (territorial and administrative control)*[104]. Amirul-Mu'minin, one of the former spokesmen of Daesh, underscored the importance of hijrah as:

> "[T]herefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis… The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing

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[100]  Ibid.

[101]  Donald Holbrook and John Horgan, "*Terrorism and Ideology: Cracking the Nut*, Perspectives on Terrorism", (Vol.13, No.6, 2019), pp. 2-15.

[102]  Kenneth Payne, "*Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror*", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (Vol.32, No.2, 2009), p. 111.

[103]  Ibid.

[104]  Dabiq Issue 1, Islamic State's. "*Khilafah Declared*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (June 2014), p.36.

hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory".[105]

But who were these Muslims? Did Daesh accept all Muslims as subjects of its so-called state? The emergence and existence of Daesh actualized the hijrah from *dārul-kufr (land of disbelief)* to *dārul-islām (land of Islam),* waged war (jihad) against so-called crusaders, the *Nusayriyyah (Nusayri)*, the *rāfidah (rejectors),* and the *murtadd (apostate)* regimes and their armies, and allowed living by the Sharia law.[106] The interdependency of jihad, hijrah, and jama'ah is explained in different issues of Dabiq: "[t]here is no life without jihad and there is no jihad without hijrah"[107] and jama'ah implements the command of Allah until the destruction of all Crusaders, disbelievers, mushriks, and murtadds, by performing jihad[108]. According to Daesh sources, the holy mission which is the promise of Allah, and Islam, the "true religion", will be superior over so-called false religions, with the help of the *jama'ah of Muslims (the caliphate)* and their *imām (the caliph),* and Daesh will always exist, "[e]ven if all the Christians, Jews, mushriks, and apostates despise such. And it will continue to spread to all corners of the Earth"[109].

Moreover, Daesh criticized and did not accept the statement "Islam is the religion of peace"[110]. According to Daesh, this discourse was invented by the West to make the Muslims pacifists build perpetual peace with the kufr and the kafirin[111]. This is why Daesh has the slogan "Islam is the religion of the sword"[112]. As a result, Daesh waged a large-scale jihad against all its enemies at the same time and described how to execute this war: "Wage jihad against the mushrikin with your wealth, your souls, and your tongues"[113].

According to Daesh, all mushriks do not deserve to survive in the world because of their defects and beliefs. Daesh questioned the existence of all enemies and demanded all its militants to use violence with the words of Allah, and it is stated in Dabiq that:

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[105]  Dabiq Issue 1, Islamic State's. "*Khilafah Declared*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (June 2014), p.11.

[106]  Dabiq Issue 7, Islamic State's. "*From Hypocrisy to Apostasy*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (January 2015), p.62.

[107]  Dabiq Issue 3, Islamic State's. "*A Call to Hijra*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (July 2014), p.31.

[108]  Dabiq Issue 1, Islamic State's." *Khilafah Declared*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (June 2014), p.36.

[109]  Dabiq Issue 5, Islamic State's, "*Remaining and Expanding*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (October 2014), pp. 3-33.

[110]  Dabiq Issue 7, Islamic State's. "From Hypocrisy to Apostasy", Al Hayat Media Centre, (January 2015), p.20.

[111]  Ibid.

[112]  Dabiq Issue 7, Islamic State's, "*From Hypocrisy to Apostasy*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (January 2015), p.20.

[113]  Rumiyah Issue 1, Islamic State's, "*Rumiyah*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (2016), p.18.

"[A]nd when the sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrikīn wherever you find them, and capture them, and besiege them, and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful [At-Tawbah: 5]"[114].

## 5. The Genocidal Practices of Daesh

Daesh occupied many territories in a short time in Iraq and Syria and the people who were living in those provinces were displaced due to the risk of enslavement by Daesh militants. The victims of Daesh were Yazidis, Shias, Christians, Turkmens, and even Sunnis who had supported the Iraqi Shia government. Daesh did not hesitate to act barbarically against all these groups and to define them as infidels. The approach towards all its enemies is stated in Rumiyah as: "The Kafir's blood is halal for you, so shed it"[115]. Moreover, Daesh's violent acts on women are based upon its interpretation of fuqaha (Islamic jurisprudence), and according to fuqaha, infidel women can be enslaved and can be asked to repent, otherwise, they will be killed[116]. After Daesh categorized the captured women and killed many elderly women, the women, and children were shared among Daesh terrorists based on the Sharia law[117]. One-fifth (khums) of the slaves were sent to Daesh authorities and the rest were taken by the terrorists as ghanima (booty)[118]. Daesh destroyed most of the occupied territories' population by killing, displacing, and taking captives. Daesh launched the slave trade and sell women and children in different places or give them as a gift to a third person. The younger boys were sent to recruitment camps for military exercises and indoctrination and Daesh renamed them with Islamic names[119].

In September 2017, the Security Council unanimously decided to request that the U.N. form an investigation team to trace the evidence of atrocities committed by Daesh in Iraq and Syria[120]. According to the head of the UN investigation

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[114] Dabiq Issue 4, Islamic State's, "*The Failed Crusade*", Al Hayat Media Centre. (August 2014), p. 14.

[115] Rumiyah Issue 1, Islamic State's, "*Rumiyah*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (2016), p.34.

[116] Dabiq Issue 4, Islamic State's, "*The Failed Crusade*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (August 2014), p. 15.

[117] Rosa Duarte-Herrera and Clara Ifsits, "*Genocide against Yazidis. Austria's obligation to prosecute and punish returning ISIS fighters under international and national law*", University of Vienna Law Review, Vol. 1, (2017), p.6.

[118] Dabiq Issue 4, Islamic State's. "*The Failed Crusade*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (August 2014), p. 15.

[119] Dabiq Issue 4, Islamic State's. "*The Failed Crusade*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (August 2014), p. 7.

[120] Daily Sabah, "*Daesh committed genocide against Yazidis in Iraq, UN probe says*", (2021), Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/daesh-committed-genocide-against-yazidis-in-iraq-un-probe-says/news.

team, Karim Khan, Daesh made and released a video that was a clear and public provocation to commit genocide against Shias[121]. Khan further stated that Daesh applied a "convert or die" plan to all Yazidis[122] and it was reported that more than 10.000 Yazidis had been killed or kidnapped[123]. According to a report by the Genocide Network[124], Daesh committed these genocidal acts against Yazidis:

- "[T]he capture of civilians and the brutal separation of men, women and children,
- Mass killings of men and forced conversions to Islam,
- Conscription of children between eight and eighteen years of age to participate in the hostilities, as well as their forced conversions to Islam, and
- An organized system of sexual violence against women and girls such as rape, forced marriages, human trafficking for sexual purposes, body inspections, and forced birth control"[125].

## 6. Use of "Us and Them" Dichotomy

The Sykes-Picot agreement is considered as having an impact on the emergence of Daesh[126] and the organization has not recognized the nation-states in the region, which were established through agreements involving Western colonizers. According to Daesh, nationalism, a concept invented by the West, needed to be destroyed because the sole truth was Islam and nationalism divided and pacified the Ummah with the help of the Sykes-Picot agreement[127]. Daesh attempted to draw its borders by occupation, violent acts, jihad, and hijrah. To understand the impacts of Daesh's acts on the world, it would be better to analyze Edward Said's book, Orientalism. Said, one of the leading post-colonialist scholars, criticized the Western-constructed perception of the East or Orient because the East/Orient

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[121]  Ibid.

[122]  Ibid.

[123]  Daily Sabah, "*First study on Yazidi genocide by Daesh reveals human tragedy",* (2017), Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2017/05/11/first-study-on-yazidi-genocide-by-daesh-reveals-human-tragedy.

[124]  The Genocide Network is established by the Council of the EU in 2002 to to ensure close cooperation between the national authorities in investigating and prosecuting the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

[125]  The Genocide Network, "*The prosecution at national level of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)",* (2017), pp. 5-6, Available at: https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/publication/prosecution-national-level-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-sgbv-committed-islamic.

[126]  Dabiq Issue 4, Islamic State's. "*The Failed Crusade",* Al Hayat Media Centre, (August 2014), p. 18.

[127]  Although the West has been rearticulated in different ways and times, here it can be accepted as the signatory states of the Sykes-Picot agreement: France and Great Britain.

had always been narrated as the third world, barbarian and sex addict. With this narrative, according to Said, the West aimed to legitimize its superiority over the East and to civilize the East[128]. This study suggests that, because of its tactics, genocidal acts, and discourses, Daesh managed to be an example of how Western scholars have narrated the Third World or East/Orient, as explained by Said.

Moreover, there are some similarities between the ideology of Daesh and the West's efforts of legitimatizing colonialism. At first, colonialism was accepted as an occupation in ancient times which both had the notions of assimilation and exploitation. According to Moses, colonialism is the transformation of the occupied societies in accordance with the rules of colonizers which erase their historical background and cultural heritages[129]. Colonizers accepted and used colonial acts as a right of civilized communities and a tool for civilizing the Third World and tried to lead all humanity[130]. Daesh declared itself as the accurate practitioner of Islam and, in addition to this, from its perspective, Daesh was the sole power that could lead and persuade everyone to follow its way, which was why it initialized the never-ending war, of jihad. Daesh occupied not only major cities in Iraq and Syria but also oil-rich territories to exploit the region economically to cash on and prevent the oil trade of local people. Moreover, Daesh has divided all people in the world basically into two groups, subjects of Daesh (us) and them, which helps to create an identity. Daesh constructed an identity that reflects "us" as good, true believers, the sole authority which wants to control and lead all Muslims as it is perceived by Daesh, and "them" are "the allies of Satan, the Crusaders, the Jews, the enemies of Islam and the Secularists to nominate Jewish Christian and other apostates as the antagonist position"[131]. According to Daesh, others shall select one of the camps, and in the event of being a part of "others", they would be punished by Daesh. Zarqawi says:

"[S]o we warn the tribes, that any tribe or party or assembly whose involvement and collaboration with the crusaders and their apostate agents are confirmed, then by He who sent Muhammad with the truth, we will target them just as we target the crusaders, and we will eradicate and distinguish them, for there are only two camps: the camp

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[128] Edward Said, *"Orientalism",* (London: Penguin, 1977), p.167.

[129] Anthony Dirk Moses, "*Empire, Colony, Genocide, Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History"*, (New York, NY: Berghahn Book, 2008), p.22.

[130] Jules Harmand*, "Methods of Colonial Rule"*, (Editions Paris Brest, 2009), p. 56.

[131] Ali Badeen Mohammed Al-Rikaby and Tengku Sepora Tengku Mahadi, "*The significance of the discursive strategies in al-Baghdadi's and al-Zawahiri's hortatory speeches"*, Journal of Language and Politics, (Vol. 17, No. 6, 2018), pp. 9-10.

of truth and its followers, and the camp of falsehood and its factions.

So, choose to be from one of the two camps."[132]

Daesh asks "them" to accept their corruption and convert their beliefs to a Daesh-version of Islam. Though, even if others/them accept Islam, they will never rise to the same level as Daesh militants. This is similar to the case of black people's efforts to reach the level of white men in Frantz Fannon's book, "Black Skin White Masks", in which Fannon states that, according to the colonizer, local people are the symbol of paltriness that's why they deserve humiliation[133]. Scorn and humiliation are the most used weapon of the colonizer because even the poorest colonizer thinks itself superior to colonized[134] and Daesh has utilized both methods, scorn, and humiliation, not only on people of occupied territories but also on every people and any believer except its followers and militants. Slavery and sexual violence have been the tools of humiliation for Daesh.

According to Lemkin, "genocide was a special form of foreign conquest and occupation" and there are two phases of genocide: first, "the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group"[135] and then, "the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor"[136]. Lemkin emphasizes the importance of the national pattern, which is the culture of a nation, thereby he accepts the destruction of cultural symbols as genocide[137]. The most effective way of destroying a group's culture is slavery, which causes them to forget their identities and memories. Daesh demolished nearly all the tombs, shrines, and mausoleums in occupied territories to destroy the cultural heritage of these communities. Daesh has published photos of demolished places in Dabiq as a propaganda tool to spread fear throughout the world[138]. Daesh implemented its plan systematically to delete the national patterns of the "other" to change their identities. To accomplish its goal, Daesh oppressed all the people in the occupied territories to select their camps[139]. The intention of colonists is another important element to understand the connections between colonialism

[132] Hamoud Almousa, "*Islamic State and the Others*", Available at: https://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/?p=1289. (accessed 12 June 2022).

[133] Frantz Fannon, "*The Wretched of The Earth*", (London: Pluto Press, 1986), p.2.

[134] Albert Memmi, "*The Colonizer and the Colonized*", (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1991), p. 8.

[135] Anthony Dirk Moses, "Empire, Colony, Genocide, Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History", (New York, NY: Berghahn Book, 2008), p. 10.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Ibid, p. 12.

[138] Dabiq Issue 8, Islamic State's, "*Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa*", Al Hayat Media Centre, (March 2015), p. 22.

[139] Hamoud Almousa, "*Islamic State and the Others*", available at: https://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/?p=1289. (accessed 12 June 2022).

and genocidal or violent acts. For instance, in the Spanish conquest of America, the manifestation of the Spanish Crown shows the genocidal intention of the campaign: "If you do not ['recognize the Church and his Majesty the king as your rulers'], we will war on you, take your wives and children away, dispose of your property and harm you as much as we can 'as to vassals who will not obey and refuse to receive their lord"[140]. This study finds out that what Daesh did against all people of "them" in occupied territories is a true copy of the manifestation of the Spanish Crown[141].

## 7. Conclusion

Daesh has proven itself as one of the most violent terrorist organizations in world history. Daesh, the perpetrator of these grave crimes, has a savage ideology, and used method of subjugation while committing crimes. The main reason for the selected school of thought, post-colonialism, was its scope, which made it possible to analyze the genocidal acts carried out by Daesh and subaltern groups which were victims of these acts. The overall structure of this paper is focused on the insufficiency of the concept of jihad, which is widely claimed as the main ideology that steered the decisions of Daesh. Research suggests that the colonial instinct of Daesh's leaders is the dominant instrument that shaped the ideology of Daesh and resulted in genocidal acts. This study presented the differences between the AQ and Daesh in the tactics, acts, the discourses of leaders and the selected enemies with the help of existing literature to substantiate the insufficiency of Salafi jihadism as the main ideology of Daesh. Research presented the colonial instinct of Daesh leaders to establish the caliphate, rule all Sunnis under its banner and occupy more territories. Although invasion and occupation might be enough to understand the degree of the colonial nature of Daesh, the concept of genocide is introduced as a case study to show how Daesh emerged in the 21st century with an ancient ideology. In the case of Daesh's brutality, it differentiated, oppressed, tortured, enslaved, and annihilated nearly all subaltern groups including Christians, Shias, Yazidis, and Turkmens in occupied territories, and committed terrorist attacks in different parts of the world. After Daesh emerged as a reaction to the nation-state order in the Middle East generated by the Sykes-Picot agreemen and strengthened by the environment in Iraq in post-US intervention in Iraq, the Arab Spring, Maliki's Shia-based policies, and the Syrian civil war, Daesh utilized all the tactics of Western colonizers: occupation, assimilation,

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[140] Anthony Dirk Moses, "*Empire, Colony, Genocide, Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History",* (New York, NY: Berghahn Book, 2008), pp. 17-18.

[141] Ibid.

humiliation, and exploitation. Daesh did not manage to triumph in its version of jihad, but it managed to be an issue to get rid of in a short time. Its destructive impacts on people in the occupied territories caused indescribable grief because of their violent acts, sex slavery, rape, torture, and indoctrination.

There is no doubt that Daesh carried out mass violence and genocidal acts to destroy all the people in the occupied territories as part of its ideological approach of "us and them". The "us and them" approach generated anger and alienation among its followers which was necessary for Daesh to gain more support and to be more violent. The ideology of Daesh feeds its violence and its violence strengthens its ideology. It can be said that the relationship between Daesh's ideology and violence is an interwoven one. This study suggests that Daesh used the tactics of colonizers as an invader by annihilating the human rights of the people in occupied territories by oppressing and tyrannizing. Because of this discourse and the use of Salafi jihad as a tool to justify its acts, Daesh has committed genocidal acts in occupied territories. This study presented the gravest results of the othering process and how Daesh constructed its "us and them" narrative with the help of findings from Dabiq and Rumiyah. Dabiq and Rumiyah, which were once used as propaganda tools by Daesh, gave pieces of evidence to support the colonial instinct of its leaders as a propelling instrument for their ideology and acts. The importance of the caliphate is related to the concept of jihad and the reasons for the establishment of a caliphate by Daesh are also explained to substantiate their efforts to consolidate more power, i.e. accelerating the invasions and occupations and ruling the occupied territories.

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## Counterterrorism in the People's Republic of China:
## A Critical Appraisal

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### Abstract

*Counterterrorism is predominantly carried out by states and based on their assessments on the determinants of terrorism. Counterterrorism policies have been categorized by mainstream approaches as the long term measures to improve structural conditions that constitutes the root causes of terrorism, short and medium term legal, military, and policing measures to deter terrorist actions and to defend the state. However, the state-centeredness in mainstream approaches allows terrorism to be taken as objective or given reality and this may lead to human rights violations using excessive force in the case of states exploit their primary role in counterterrorism. The policies that People Republic of China (PRC) has implemented in Xinjiang region since the early 2000s exemplifies this type of exploitation. The serious human rights violations resulting from these policies reveal the importance of adopting critical approaches that address terrorism as a social construction and prioritize normativity in counterterrorism. Accordingly, the aims of this paper are threefold. The first is to review approaches on terrorism and to introduce relevant counterterrorism policies. The second is to analyze the PRC's counterterrorism policies in depth within the framework presented by*

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\*    The information and views expressed in this article are solely those of the author's and may not represent the opinions and policies of NATO, COE-DAT, NATO member countries or the institutions with which the author/s is affiliated.

*approaches on terrorism. The third is to argue the necessity of critical approach in terrorism in terms of the implications of PRC's counterterrorism policies.*

**Keywords:** *terrorism, counterterrorism, the PRC, human rights, critical approach*

## 1. Introduction

Terrorism is a global phenomenon that has far reaching consequences for both states and societies. The need for security and the prevention of terrorist attacks has prompted states to implement various measures to combat terrorism such as surveillance, intelligence gathering and even military actions. However, the effects of such state centered strategies in counterterrorism often come under scrutiny since they have a potential to lead human rights violations and exacerbate the underlying social and political factors that contribute to terrorism. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in critical approaches that consider state and society aspects counterterrorism measures and seek to develop normative framework for terrorism studies.

The objective of this study is to review the literature on terrorism and counterterrorism and assess the applicability of critical approaches to counterterrorism through an examination of the PRC's counterterrorism policies. By doing so, this article aims to make several contributions to the literature on terrorism studies. Firstly, it emphasizes the potential drawbacks of state-centered approaches to counterterrorism which can lead to serious human rights violations. Additionally, it examines in-depth the case of the PRC's counterterrorism policies in the Xinjiang region and provides valuable insights into the implications of such policies. Finally, it recommends the application of critical approaches to terrorism studies since they can provide a normative understanding of terrorism and prevent the misuse of state power in the name of counterterrorism.

All the materials used in this study were compiled from open sources including books, articles from scientific journals, and research reports, official documents such as laws, regulations, white papers, press releases, international agreements. However, the major methodological challenge was obtaining official translations of certain government documents. This challenge was addressed by using unofficial translations to analyze the missing documents.

The first section of the study provides a brief overview of major terrorism approaches in a theoretical framework and introduces counterterrorism strategies that align with the relevant approach. In the second section, The PRC's counterterrorism strategies are analyzed within the framework introduced in the first section. Finally, the conclusion section discusses the critical implications of the PRC case on terrorism and counterterrorism. The research is particularly significant given the removal of ETIM's terrorist organization status, which has been under question[2] and the sanctions imposed on the PRC by the US, Canada, the UK, and the EU.[3]

## 2. Major Approaches to Terrorism and Counterterrorism

The main principle for creating effective counterterrorism strategy is to gain a comprehensive understanding of and implement effective measures while avoiding counterproductive policies.[4] The general outlook of terrorism studies points to the need for studies that tackle with the sources of terrorism from a theoretical perspective and propose compatible counterterrorism policies. Theoretical approaches to terrorism are roughly divided into mainstream and critical studies depending on the ontological, epistemological, normative stances and the position of the state. However, in this study, Pisou's typology, which categorizes terror studies deterministic, intentional, and relational, is utilized in order to locate and understand agency and structure in terrorism.[5]

### 2.1. Deterministic Approach

The deterministic or root cause approach links terrorism to identifiable factors and emphasizes the influence of systemic factors on individual behavior. These factors can be cultural, political, or social, and terror occurs, when necessary conditions are met, regardless of the actor preferences.[6]

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[2] Exploring the Nature of Uighur Nationalism: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists? Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 111th Congress, (2009).

[3] US Removes Shadowy Group from Terror List Blamed by China for Attacks, The Guardian (6 November 2020), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/06/us-removes-shadowy-group-from-terror-list-blamed-by-china-for-attacks (accessed 20 April 2022)

[4] Funda Hisarlıoğlu and Haldun Yalçınkaya, Conceptual Framework: Counterterrorism and Good Practices, Good Practices in Counterterrorism 1 (2021), p.18.

[5] "Introduction" in Theories of Terrorism: An Introduction (Daniela Pisoiu and Sandra Hain eds, Routledge, 2018), p.2.

[6] "Studying Terrorism" in Theories of Terrorism: An Introduction (Daniela Pisoiu and Sandra Hain eds, Routledge, 2018), pp. 44-45.

The basic principles of this approach were put forward by Gurr in the early period of terrorism studies. According to Gurr, political violence is a reaction to specific conditions. The discrepancy between people's expectations and capabilities creates discontent and this directs people to aggressive actions. This phenomenon, named as relative deprivation, is determined by cultural, political, and social conditions.[7] Based on the relative deprivation, Gurr suggested that terrorism studies should focus on structural, social, and individual causes that generate terrorism rather than the common characteristics of terrorist acts.[8]

The deterministic approach to terrorism points to the requirement of developing long-term solutions to eliminate root causes in counterterrorism. Its goal is to improve or terminate the structural conditions that create an environment suitable for terrorism rather than just implementing short-term preventive measures. While its scope may vary depending on the context, addressing the root causes of terrorism broadly focuses on socio-economic development, democratization, improving social justice, promoting the rule of law, ensuring transparency, and conflict resolution.[9]

### 2.2. Intentional Approach

The intentional approach, which labeled under rational choice models in criminology, emphasizes the independent decision-making capacity of actor.[10] Deterministic approach degrades criminals into a passive figures who controlled by external forces, while rational choice model treats crime as an economic transaction or occupational choice resulting from rational calculation.[11] Drawing from these, Horgan argues that terrorism is primarily a behavioral phenomenon, and it is not scientifically sound to associate terrorist behavior with psychological abnormalities or personality traits, solely based on its violent nature. Terrorists just like the rest of us, are normal individuals.[12] Crenshaw asserts that terrorism is a purposeful decision made by actors to achieve political goals. To determine the likelihood of

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[7]    Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton University Press, 1970), p.317.

[8]    Ted Robert Gurr, "Emprical Research and State Terrorism" in Current Perspectives on International Terrorism (Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl eds, Palgrave Macmillan, 1988), pp. 117,143.

[9]    Asta Maskaliūnaitė, "Counter-terrorism", in Theories of Terrorism: An Introduction (Daniela Pisoiu and Sandra Hain eds, Routledge, 2018), p.185.

[10]    "Studying Terrorism", pp. 45-46.

[11]    Ronald V. Clarke and Derek B. Cornish, "Modeling Offenders' Decisions: A Framework for Research and Policy", Crime and Justice, 6 (1985), pp.148,156.

[12]    John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (Routledge, 2005), pp. 54-72.

terrorist acts, it is required to calculate the benefits and costs of the attempt. In this sense, terrorist acts are mostly performed when the benefit is significant, the cost of the attempt is low, and the probability of success is high. Regardless of how unrealistic the ideology behind terrorism is, terrorist acts should be evaluated in consideration of the capabilities and expectations of the terrorists.[13]

Rational choice model highlights the need for short and medium term strategies to efficiently counter terrorism. Two options are available for states: defense and deterrence and inducing individuals to abandon terror groups. The primary aim of defense and deterrence strategies is to create unfavorable conditions for carrying out terrorist acts by raising the costs of such actions. Deterrence strategies include penalties like imprisonment and legal measures, as well as retaliatory actions like military strikes and specialized operations. Conversely, defense measures comprise both passive measures to protect potential targets and active measures that involve the preemptive and preventive use of force. Legislative regulations can be enacted to decrease the appeal of terrorism and encourage alternative actions by decreasing prison terms, instituting early release programs, and providing amnesty programs.[14]

### 2.3. Relational Approach

Relational approach considers terrorism as a product of interactions between terrorist agents and states, rather than focusing on agency or structure. In this approach, terrorism is explained as a process. Most of the studies take its sources from social movement research; however, critical terrorism studies are also labelled under relational approach.[15]

The concept of contentious politics from social movement research defines terrorism as a strategy or tactic utilized by individuals, groups, and networks to make claims and engage in political struggles[16], where "at least one government is involved as a claimant, an object of or party to claims".[17]Addressing terrorism as part of contentious politics points to the role of the policymakers in counterterrorism. Policy makers set agendas, define terrorism, and establish measures, either in

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[13]  Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism in Inside Terrorist Organizations" (David Rapaport eds, Colombia University Press, 1988), pp.13-15.

[14]  Maskaliūnaitė, "Counter-terrorism" p.187.

[15]  "Studying Terrorism", pp.46-47.

[16]  Charles Tilly, "Terror, Terrorism Terrorists", Sociological Theory, 22(1) (2004), pp. 5-6.

[17]  Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, (Cambridge University Press,2001), p.5.

private or by providing public support. The discourse surrounding counterterrorism such as statements, enactments and remarks is utilized to mobilize the masses. This whole process is named as 'performative power'. According to that, the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures depends on how they are carried out, rather than their scope. High performative power does not correspond to the effective counterterrorism policy, rather indicates high visibility of the strategies. Over-representation and exaggeration of terrorism can have adverse effects, while a low level of performative power can neutralize terrorism.[18]

As the name suggests, critical terrorism studies (CTS) express criticisms to mainstream terrorism research, particularly with regards to problem solving course, state-centeredness, the causes and nature of terrorism, and appropriate responses. Critical terrorism studies argues that knowledge about terrorism is produced within a certain socio-cultural context and cannot be completely objective and neutral. To properly understand and analyze terrorism, it is essential to reveal the underlying purposes of knowledge production and recognize how it is socially constructed. Therefore, CTS emphasizes the need to deconstruct dominant interpretations and uncover the underlying social dynamics at play in terrorism.[19]

Two trends are observable in CTS. The first trend criticizes mainstream approaches and expands the scope of terrorism by introducing the concept of state terrorism.[20] According to these studies, state terrorism refers to the use or threat of violence by state agents or their authorized personnel to achieve political or economic goals, to intimidate or frighten a wider audience.[21] This includes financial and military support provided by states to repressive governments or terrorist groups. State terrorism is widely accepted as the financial and military support of states to repressive governments or to terrorist groups. However, systematic violence under the guise of counterterrorism measures such as torture and murder, perpetrated by state security forces or private companies to ensure submission can also be considered as state terrorism by CTS.[22]

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[18]  Beatrice de Graaf and Bob de Graaf, "Bringing Politics Back in: The Introduction of the 'Performative Power' of Counterterrorism", Critical Studies on Terrorism 3(2), (2010), p.267-273.

[19]  Richard Jackson, "The Core Commitment of Critical Terrorism Studies", European Political Science 6 (2007), pp.2-3.

[20]  Lee Jarvis, "The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies", Security Dialogue 40(1), (2009), p.16.

[21]  Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting, "Introduction: Terrorism, State, and the Study of Political Terror", in Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting eds, Routledge, 2010),p.3.

[22]  Ruth Blakeley, "Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies", European Political Science 6 (2007), pp.231-233.

Second trend, often labeled constructivist rather than critical, seeks to challenge conventional understandings of terrorism by examining how it is constructed, represented, and performed in discourse.[23] This line of research emphasizes that terrorism is a product of discourse, with its meaning and purpose shaped by it, rather than objective knowledge about terrorists. Thus, comprehending terrorism requires an understanding of the discourse that surrounds it.[24]

The first trend in CTS points to a normative direction in counter terrorism. It suggests that preventing terrorism involves recognizing its subjectivity and incorporating the terrorist perspective in the analysis.[25] Counterterrorism principles should question existing assumptions and embrace the concept of emancipation, which holds that any form of violence fosters more violence.[26] In other words, counterterrorism practices should not solely aim to ensure state security, but also to extend security to all of humanity. In the short run, counterterrorism measures should adopt non-violence as a principle, avoid overreaction and military response, remain within the legal boundaries, and utilize the framework offered by the international organizations In the long run, counterterrorism strategies should focus on abandoning violent strategies such as massive drone strikes or targeted killings, facilitating fair trials, keeping negotiation and dialogue channels open, transferring the counterterrorism funds to strengthening of civil society, limiting the arms trade, and imposing sanctions on countries that fund terrorism and commit human rights violations.[27]

The second trend considers counterterrorism as a discursive practice and emphasizes the analysis of the language used in foreign and security discourse embodied in laws, communiques, or addresses. This approach allows for an understanding of how counterterrorism policies are established in different cultural settings and how terrorism is rendered as a vital threat to the existence of states rather than a criminal act itself. It questions how the dichotomy of good and evil is constructed in terrorism and highlights the role of discourse in justifying counterterrorism policies.[28]

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[23]   Jarvis, "The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies", p.18.

[24]   Rainer Hülsse and Alexander Spencer, "The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist Turn", Security Dialogue 39(6) (2008), pp.574-576.

[25]   Sondre Lindahl, "A CTS Model of Counterterrorism", Critical Studies on Terrorism 10(3) (2017), p. 527.

[26]   Harmonie Toros and Jeroen Gunning, "Exploring a Critical Theory Approach to Terrorism Studies" in Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, (Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning eds, Routledge, 2009), p.94.

[27]   Lindohl, "A CTS Model of Counterterrorism", pp.528-532.

[28]   Maskaliūnaitė, "Counter-terrorism", pp.192-193.

The conceptual difference between mainstream approaches and CTS is significant for the PRC's counterterrorism strategies, particularly as it seeks to legitimize historically repressive policies in conjunction with the Global War on Terrorism post-9/11.

## 3. Counterterrorism in the People's Republic of China
### 3.1. Roots of the Terrorism

Terrorism in PRC is mainly concentrated in Xinjiang, where efforts to integrate the region have been met with resistance. Officially named as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Xinjiang became the frontier of China in the 18th century and has faced internal revolts and external interventions until the beginning of the 20th century. The region briefly hosted independent East Turkestan Republic, but the PRC's policies to assimilate the region began in 1949 with the arrival of the People's Liberation Army.[29]

Xinjiang, an autonomous region of the PRC since 1955, consists of thirteen different ethnic groups. About three quarters of the population were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese constituted a relatively small fraction of the XUAR. PRC faced challenges in exerting political control over this non-Han and overwhelmingly Muslim population. To overcome the challenges, the PRC administration adopted strategies including coopting or eliminating of elites, settling Han population to the region, forming production and construction corps, controlling Islamic clergy by regulating the judicial and educative functions of Islamic institutions and redistributing their properties of these during 1950s and 1960s.[30]

In the late 1960s, policies were implemented along with the Cultural Revolution, to eradicate old culture and customs of non-Han minorities. Non-Han cultural practices, such as ceremonies, costumes, dance, and music were prohibited as backward, and educational and religious facilities of Islam were transformed for other purposes. In autonomous regions, non-Han political elites were regarded as counter-revolutionary, accused of treason  being and sentenced. Anti-Islamic and anti-Turkic state propaganda accompanied such practices. While anti-Chinese tendencies composed Uyghur revolts, Soviet intervention and support to Xinjiang was evident due to the other ethnic groups in the region such as Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Russian, Tatar, Tajik and Uzbek.[31]

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[29]   Michael E. Clarke, Xinjiang and the Chinese Rise in Central Asia (Routledge, 2011), pp. 11-37.
[30]   Clarke, pp.44-49
[31]   James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (Colombia University Press, 2007), pp. 271-276.

Starting in the late 1970s, Deng Xioping's leadership marked a shift away from the Cultural Revolution's suppression of non-Han cultures and traditions and signaled a move towards policies that respected minority rights and promoted cultural diversity. The Constitution prohibited discrimination and supported economic and cultural development in minority regions. It also affirmed the freedom of minorities to use their own language, culture, and customs, and allowed autonomous regions to establish self-government organs.[32] During the 1980s, Uyghurs in Xinjiang expressed their discontent through street protests and armed separatist groups, partly due to the revival of religious institutions. Islam served as a unifying factor for Uyghurs, who were primarily suffered from poor living conditions and mistreatment.[33]

During the 1990s, faced violent incidents attributed to religious separatism, including an attack by an armed Uyghur group in April 1990 to establish the East Turkestan Republic.[34] In response, the PRC introduced regulations to limit administrative and judicial features of religious institutions between 1990 and 1991.[35] For the PRC, if one pillar of separatism was the religion, the other one was undoubtedly the foreign influence. Sino-Soviet relations and the PRC's policies towards Kazakh and Kyrgyz minorities in autonomous regions played a decisive role in Soviet support of Xinjiang separatist movements. In addition to that, states in Central Asia provided a safe haven for Uyghur nationalists, leading to the formation of Uyghur diaspora and political activism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the growth of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism became an expanding security concern for the PRC as a multi-ethnic state.[36]

PRC's approach towards Uyghur separatism changed after the September 11 attacks and the Global War on Terror. The PRC government began calling it terrorism and implemented pertinent counterterrorism measures. Before this, white paper published in 2000 only briefly mentioned terrorism as a threat to international security.[37]

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[32]  Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Article 4.

[33]  Millward, p.282.

[34]  Michael Clarke, China'a War on Terrorism: Confronting the Dilemmas of the 'Internal-External' Security Nexus in  Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions (eds Michael Clarke, Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 24.

[35]  Clarke, Xinjiang and the Chinese Rise in Central Asia, p.104.

[36]  Clarke, China's War on Terrorism, p.22.

[37]  China's National Defense in 2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2004), at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/ljzg/zfbps/t127412.htm.(Accessed 25 March 2022).

### 3.2. Counterterrorism Policies after 9/11

In January 2002, the Information Office of the State Council released a document identifying 'East Turkistan forces' as terrorist agents responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents between 1990 and 2000, under the influence of separatism, extremism, and international terrorism. The PRC government cracked down the East Turkestan terrorism to protect the lives and property of various ethnic groups, ensure stability and security in Xinjiang and surrounding regions and promote modernization. Strict counterterrorism measures targeted only a small group of criminals directly involved in terrorist acts, with the majority of those being 'educated and helped' to steer them towards the 'true path'. The PRC stated that its counterterrorism measures did not target particular ethnic group and carried out within a legal framework, also opposed double standards in counterterrorism by emphasizing that East Turkestan terrorism could have repercussions for both the PRC and the global community.[38]

In general terms, the PRC's counterterrorism efforts encompass both domestic and international levels. Domestically, they target socio-cultural and economic factors of radicalization, employ  policing strategies to prevent terrorism, and enact relevant legislation. Internationally, two notable aspects emerge: The PRC, seek to raise awareness of international community by constructing Uyghur separatism as terrorism and by linking it to the global terrorist networks, while also pursued bilateral and bilateral and multilateral arrangements particularly with Central Asian states.[39]

### 3.2.1 International level

In 2003, the Ministry of Public Security published a document that reduced the terrorist elements, known as the East Turkestan forces, to specific organizations and individuals. The document named three organizations - the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC), and the East Turkestan Information Center (ETIC) - and stated their close connections with Al Qaeda and Taliban.[40] The PRC aimed to ensure international recognition

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[38]  "East Turkistan" Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Umpunity, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN (2002), at http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zt/fk/200201/t20020121_8413909.htm (accessed 26 March 2022)

[39]  Michael Clarke, "Introduction: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China", in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions (eds Michael Clarke, Oxford University Press, 2018), pp.4-5.

[40]  "China Seeks Cooperation Worldwide to Fight "East Turkistan" Terrorists",  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2003), at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cegv/eng/zt/zgfk/t89062.htm. (accessed 2 April 2022).

of East Turkestan terrorism by linking Uyghur separatism to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, justify its own counterterrorism strategies and gain support from the US and the United Nations by leveraging concerns over Islamic extremism.[41] The PRC's efforts were reciprocated with the US government's designation of ETIM as a terrorist organization in 2002 and the detention of 22 Uyghurs in Guantanamo Bay.[42] The UN, on the other hand, has designated ETIM as a terrorist organization, which seeks to establish independent East Turkestan state within PRC in the same year. In addition, it is confirmed that ETIM is linked to Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the members of the organization are involved in violent acts in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, and PRC and that use Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as a transit route for transferring its fighters to PRC.[43]

In the early 2000s, the PRC intensified its counterterrorism efforts through Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) was established in 2001 as a permanent body under the SCO to enhance cooperation among SCO members in combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism. RATS promotes information exchange, counterterrorism exercises and operations, awareness-raising events, and cooperation with other international organizations.[44] The Concept of Cooperation aims to develop a common anti-terrorism approach, covering legal, political, social, economic, and propagandistic measures. With the Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Against Terrorism, the extent of terrorist acts was designated, and jurisdictional rights of the members states were acknowledged. PRC considers SCO as a means of protecting its interests in Central Asia, by facilitating the support of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, which have borders with Xinjiang and host Uyghur groups. The SCO framework served to weaken the influence of the Uyghur separatists and facilitate their extradition.[45]

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[41]   Clarke, Xinjiang and the Chinese Rise in Central Asia, p.156.

[42]   Exploring the Nature of Uighur Nationalism, 111th Congress.

[43]   "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement", United Nations Security Council, at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/eastern-turkistan-islamic-movement (accessed 2 April 2022).

[44]   Agreement on Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, at http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/ (accessed 3 April 2022)

[45]   Michael Clarke, China's War on Terrorism, p.34.

### *3.2.2. Domestic Level*

The PRC's domestic counterterrorism measures have a hybrid character that reflects the integrationist policies towards Xinjiang. Defense and deterrence measures to prevent terrorist acts, as well as social and cultural assimilationist policies to eliminate the root causes of separatism, extremism, and terrorism, which are known as 'the three evils', are implemented. Policies to eliminate root causes and attack prevention were accompanied by comprehensive legislations.

Since the 1950s, the PRC has aimed to assimilate Uyghur population in Xinjiang and integrate the region into China through resettlement policies. The Han population, which was around 5% in the 1950s, has risen to around 40% by 2001 as part of integrationist agenda.[46] The 2009 Urumqi revolt, which led to the death of over 100 Han civilians, was caused by discrimination resulting from resettlement policies, harsh working conditions, and strict state pressure on religious practices. The Urumqi riots highlighted the ineffectiveness of security forces and prompted the first phase of the Strike Hard anti-terror campaign, which involved deploying 14,000 People's Armed Police (PAP) to Xinjiang, increasing the number of Special Police Units (SPUs) and doubling security-related personnel recruitment in the region.[47]

Since 2011, there has been a rise in terrorist attacks in multiple regions of PRC, which have been attributed to the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), the successor organization of ETIM. As a result of the increase in the attacks on state targets, the Chinese government initiated the second phase of the Strike Hard campaign by implementing 'one village one policeman' strategy in every village in Xinjiang. This strategy aims to create an informal and mobilized police sub-network, where one police officer recruits three assistant police who are deprived of law enforcement rights.[48]

After the 2014 Kunming knife attack, the PRC government to launch a nationwide-'People's War on Terror' campaign by drawing a similarity between terrorist attacks in PRC and 9/11. This campaign aimed to strict establish control over the non-Han minority in Xinjiang, particularly the Uyghurs, by means of extreme surveillance, internment and forced labor. As part of this effort, the third phase of the Strike Hard campaign introduced increased number of security forces and the employment

[46]   China Statistical Yearbook 2001, National Bureau of Statistics of China, at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB2001e/ml/indexE.htm (accessed 4 April 2022).

[47]   Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, "Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State", China Brief 17(4) (2017), p.22.

[48]   Zenz and Leibold, p. 23.

of surveillance techniques such as CCTV cameras, mobile Internet technologies and big data analytics.[49] Actions such as the use of VPN, downloading WhatsApp, possession of digital religious content, visiting a foreign website were identified as 'pre-crimes'. Since the PRC government lacked the capacity to monitor or deter the use of these technologies, private companies were hired to police cyberspace. Companies like Megvii, whose main investor was Alibaba, developed algorithms to counter domestic terrorist threats by monitoring calls, emails, chats, language use, and online shopping records.[50] Facial recognition algorithms developed by these companies were also used in over 200 million public and private cameras installed as part of the PRC's massive surveillance scheme, which has been implemented since 2003 through various programs such as Safe Cities, Golden Shield, Smart Cities and Sharp Eyes.[51]

Under the auspices of tragic increase in state surveillance capabilities, the latest phase of the Strike Hard campaign introduced bulletproof and mobile 'convenience police stations' in Xinjiang to provide 'zero distance' policing in 2016.[52] The issuing People's Convenience Card, as known as *bianminka* and checkpoints was intensified to control the movements of the Muslim Kazakh and Uyghur populations in Xinjiang since only non-rural born Uyghurs are eligible to pass through the checkpoints without travel restrictions.[53] A mobile application called Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) facilitated the surveillance by aggregating the personal information of individuals and suspicious activity lists. IJOP, contains the location data of the cell phones, ID numbers and vehicle information of residents, and allows crosscheck these information with data compiled from CCTV cameras, Wi-Fi connections and security checkpoints.[54] The allegation is that the PRC conducted surveillance on the entire population of Xinjiang and detained approximately 1.5 million people, including Kazakhs and Uyghur Muslims, some of whom were accused of committing

[49]   Ye Hui, "Nation-Building as Epistemic Violence", in Xinjiang Year Zero (Darren Byler, Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere eds, ANU Press, 2022), p.19.

[50]   Darren Byler, In the Camps: China's High-Tech Penal Colony (Colombia Global reports, 2021), chap.7, para.2-3.

[51]   Dave Gershgorn, "China's 'Sharp Eyes' Program Aims to Surveil 100% of Public Space", Georgetown University CSET (2 March 2021) at  https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/chinas-sharp-eyes-program-aims-to-surveil-100-of-public-space/

[52]   Zenz and Leibold, "Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State", p.25.

[53]   Xinjiang Documentation Project: Glossary, The University of British Colombia, at https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/glossary/ (accessed 4 April 2022).

[54]    "China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App", Human Rights Watch (2019), p. 2, at https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass (accessed 7 April 2022).

'pre-crimes'. These detainees were sent to detention centers established by the PRC government. Inside these centers, the detainees are constantly monitored by cameras, their speeches are recorded, and they are subjected to continuous political broadcasts in Chinese. The guards in the centers use electric batons for discipline, and the detainees are compelled to sing the Chinese national anthem or patriotic songs in order to receive basic necessities.[55]

It is suggested that government-subsidized factory complexes near the detention centers were integrated into the detention system by utilizing forced labor.[56] Within these factories, there are two groups of workers: some are former detainees who are allowed to leave the factory premises after their work hours, while others are detainees serving their sentences.[57] Furthermore, after 2017, the Xinjiang Aid program facilitated labor transfers to regions outside Xinjiang. Under this program, Uyghurs were forcibly contracted to work in these factories for a specific duration. After their work hours, they were subjected to patriotic training and prohibited from practicing their religion. Additionally, they were isolated from their families during their employment in these factories.[58]

Detention center system constitutes Chinese version of the preventive policing system applied in Europe and the USA and became the vital component of PRC's post-2016 policing paradigm- prevention through pre-emptive strike.[59]

### 3.3. Campaigns to Eliminate Root Causes of Terrorism

Preventive counterterrorism policies characterized by intense surveillance, detention and forced labor, were accompanied by series of social campaigns mainly targeted the Muslim Uyghur and Kazakh population. The main purposes of these campaigns are ensuring state regulation on religious and cultural expression, domestic environment, family structure, and daily life in Xinjiang in order to prevent religious extremism and terrorism.

One of the earlier efforts to transform Uyghur lifestyle was Project Beauty launched in 2011. The Project aimed to modernize the appearance of Uyghur woman by discouraging the use of ethnic and Islamic clothing. This effort expanded

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[55]   Byler, In the Camps, chap. 4, para. 14-22

[56]   Natan Ruser, Exploring Xinjiang's Detention System (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020), p.3.

[57]   Byler, In the Camps, chap.5, para. 27-29.

[58]   Vicky Xiuzhong Xu et al., Uyghurs for Sale: 'Re-education', Forced Labour, and Surveillance Beyond Xinjiang (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020), pp. 3-4.

[59]   Xu, p.69.

with the Three News campaign in 2017, targeted to modernize and beautify Uyghur lifestyle in three core areas – structure, culture, and order. The Beatifying Spaces Program was implemented as part of the campaign to regulate 'backward' lifestyle, ethnic and religious symbols at Uyghur houses through redesigning the houses of low-income families, disabled individuals and individuals suffer from difficulties.[60] The Sinicization of traditional Uyghur outlook continued, with the government prohibiting 'strange clothing' and promoting the opening of beauty parlors. Uyghur women were forced to attend to cosmetology and hairdressing courses in reeducation centers to build a career in beauty treatment.[61]

The PRC government, on the one hand has promoted projects to regulate Uyghur lifestyle, on the other hand developed strategies to expand extreme surveillance into Uyghur private life. In 2014, the PRC launched Becoming Family to survey and inspect Islamic beliefs and practices, and to promote Chinese values through home visits, interviews and encouraging Kazakh and Uyghur villagers to hand over forbidden items such as written religiously extremist materials. The campaign included a national flag day photo event. In 2018, a similar campaign 'Four togethers and four gifts' was introduced to the families and relatives of Uyghur and Kazakh detainees.[62]

The PRC's policies also aimed to foster patriotism among Uyghur population. With the campaign announced in 2017, Communist Party launched a war against people who speak Uyghur language in public. According to the campaign, speaking Chinese is the minimum requirement for patriotism and Uyghurs who did not speak Chinese in public should be named as 'two-faced'. As part of the campaign, two-faced intellectual and party members were arrested and sent to re-education centers for Chinese language training. The basic rationale behind the campaign is to prevent religious extremism, to civilize and Sinicize Uyghurs by making them to adopt the Chinese traditional culture.[63]

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60  Timothy Grose, "If You Don't Know How, Just Learn: Chinese Housing and the Transformation of Uyghur Domestic Space", Ethnic and Racial Studies, 44(11) (2021), pp. 2059-2060.

61  Timothy Grose, "Beautifying Uyghur Bodies: Fashion, Modernity, and State Power in Tarim Basin", University of Westminster The Contemporary China Centre Blog (2019), at https://blog.westminster.ac.uk/contemporarychina/beautifying-uyghur-bodies-fashion-modernity-and-state-power-in-the-tarim-basin-2/ (accessed 8 April 2022)

62  Xinjiang Documentation Project:The 'Four Togethers' and 'Three Gifts' Handbook, The University of British Colombia, at https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/chinese-sources/cadre-materials/the-four-togethers-and-three-gifts-handbook/ (accessed 7 April 2022)

63  Darren Byler, "The Patriotism of Not Speaking Uyghur", Ohio State University MLCL Resource Center (2018), at https://u.osu.edu/mclc/2019/01/03/patriotism-of-not-speaking-uyghur/ (9 April 2022)

### *3.4. Counterterrorism Legislations*

The PRC has established a legislative framework for its counterterrorism strategies through the implementation of Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China (CTL). As the first anti-terrorism law of the PRC, CTL complies with the state policies implemented before the law became operational and acknowledges that the state shall take all kinds of measures to address root causes of terrorism. In this regard, wearing costumes and carrying symbols that advocating terrorism are included in the list of acts with terrorist nature in article 3, and violence, or discrimination by distorting the religious doctrine recognized as actions that constitute the ideological basis of terrorism in article 4. CTL emphasizes education throughout its text by introducing the vocational educational institutions, which are formed to raise awareness and provide education for individuals in the fight against terrorism. The law regulates the 'education' of individuals who are prompted or coerced to extremist activity or terrorism, and their 'settlement' of convicts after serving their sentence, depending on the social danger they pose. [64]

Although the CTL is a comprehensive law, it does not cover all aspects of PRC's counterterrorism policies. Other laws, including Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China regulates crime, punishment and other measures taken by the PRC government regarding activities that fall under the scope of terrorism. The Criminal Law, provides a detailed list of terrorist activities subject to the punishment for endangering national security with the 2015 amendment: preparing hazardous tools to conduct terrorist activities, organizing training or plan for terrorist activities, taking part in terrorist activities, contacting with foreign terrorist organizations or individuals, possessing and disseminating extremist materials, undermining the enforcement of national laws, forcing others to wear symbols or dresses that advocates terrorism and extremism in public places. Sentences for these crimes and other crimes that endanger public safety are designated as imprisonment, criminal detention and surveillance, while their durations are specified under the relevant sections of the law.[65]

The Cybersecurity Law prohibits the use of internet infrastructure by activities that advocate terrorism and extremism. Service providers are required to obtain personal information of users including the ID data and share it with government organs when necessary to prevent activities jeopardizing network security. The law also holds

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64   The Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 29-30.
65   The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 120.

service providers responsible from analyzing, reporting, and monitoring the network security data, blocking the flow of illegal content, and terminating services.[66]

Besides the national legislations, regional legislations also issued for Xinjiang to deter or eliminate extremism, which is often associated with religion, by regulating religious practices, symbols, and clothing.[67] The XUAR Regulation on Religious Affairs of 2014 amended to prohibit practicing religion in public places, interference of religion in judiciary activities, funerals and weddings, viewing and disseminating jihad videos, wearing clothes and symbols that are associated with religious extremism and terrorism.[68] Additionally, in 2015, a regulation was enacted banning women from wearing burqas in public places in the capital of XUAR, Urumqi.[69] XUAR Regulation on De-Extremification  prescribed behavioral correction and education to stop religious interference in legal and civil formalities, extending the concept of halal to items other than food, choosing fanatic religious name, downloading, and spreading extremist content, wearing clothes and growing beards that cover the face, rejecting national education.[70]

## 4. Political and Economic Implications of the PRC's Counterterrorism Policies

Using repressive tactics in response to terrorism has inflicted political costs and can undermine democratic institutions such as the rule of law and the protection of human rights. Laws enacted to respond terrorism may restrict civil liberties by granting security forces sweeping powers of surveillance, search, and detention of suspects. States that follow repressive practices in counterterrorism may be accused of losing their moral high ground and lose their sympathy in the presence of international community.[71] In the PRC case, the use of force has self-fulfilling outcomes, and the international community is divided over the human rights

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[66]  The Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 28-29.

[67]  White Paper on the Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang,  The State Council of the People's Republic of China (2019), at http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm (accessed 10 April 2022)

[68]  Cui Jia, Curbs on Religious Extremism Beefed Up in Xinjiang, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (2014), at http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2014/11/29/content_281475016846596.htm (accessed 10 April 2022)

[69]  "Xinjiang Approves Burqa Ban", The State Council of the People's Republic of China (2015), at  http://english.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/01/11/content_281475037502240.htm (accessed 10 April 2022)

[70]  Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification 2017, Article 9-14.

[71]  See, Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, (Routledge, 2006), pp. 90-91 and Charles Townsend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.123-126.

allegations. The report by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) to the UN Human Rights Council is critical in consolidating this division. According to this report, ethnic Uyghur, and Muslim minorities, numbering close to a million, are held in 're-education' centers without any charge or trial, subjected to mass surveillance, biometric data collection, education, and travel restrictions. CERD recommended that the PRC stop arbitrary detention, ethnic-profiling, illegal data collection, and provide information on individuals held in detention centers, including their crimes and rights, and the facilities' humanitarian conditions.[72]

The PRC denies allegations of arbitrary detention and forced labor, and responded unsatisfactorily to the CERD report by claiming that there were no extra-legal and extra-judicial detentions in Xinjiang and that citizens from all ethnic groups were equal before the law. The government maintains that these detention centers are education and training centers for terrorism suspects and convicts, providing free vocational education and skills training to help individuals overcome employment difficulties. 'Graduates' of these centers acquire information on civil rights, obligations, and the constitution, as well as skills such as garment making, food processing, hairdressing, car repairing, and rug wearing.[73] More than 40 countries, including EU members, Türkiye, Japan, New Zealand, and the US, acknowledged the existence of the detention centers and human rights violations in Xinjiang, and demanded PRC's compliance to CERD recommendations. On the contrary, 69 countries from Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and Asia opposed 'unfounded allegations' against PRC and stated that there should be no interference in PRC's internal affairs under the guise of human rights.[74]

The policy implementations pursued by the PRC government in Xinjiang raise concerns not only regarding human rights and international law but also present challenges for NATO in various aspects, including alliance relations, technology, infrastructure investments, and conflicting shared values. [75] A critical examination of the PRC's counterterrorism policies holds significant political and economic

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[72]   Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourteenth to Seventeenth Periodic Reports of China, (19 September 2018), pp. 7-8.

[73]   "White Paper on Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang", The State Council of the People's Republic of China (2019),   at   http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201908/17/content_WS5d57573cc6d0c6695ff7ed6c. html#:~:text=The%20vocational%20education%20and%20training,influence%20of%20religious%20 extremist%20teachings (accessed 7 April 2022).

[74]   "Joint Statement of 69 Countries at the Interactive Dialogue on High Commissioner 's Annual Report at the 47th Session of the Human Rights Council",  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2021), at https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegv/eng/dbdt/t1886467.htm (accessed 23 April 2022)

[75]   2022 Strategic Concept NATO (2022), at https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/ (accessed 27 September 2022)

implications for NATO and its member states, particularly in light of NATO's new strategic concept introduced at the 2022 Madrid Summit. The Concept places a strong emphasis on human security and civilian protection, underscoring NATO's commitment to adopting a civilian-centered security approach. Although human security approach covers the operations in the NATO's area of responsibility, it illustrates that the Alliance has not been indifferent to civilian-centered security approach in general. Considered in a broader context, the emphasis on human security reaffirms the shared values of allies regarding civilian protection and openness to cooperation channels with other international actors who share the same values. However, the question of whether the PRC falls within this category has recently become a focal point on NATO's agenda. Notably, the PRC was not mentioned in any NATO policy document until the London Declaration in 2019, which acknowledged that the PRC's growing influence presents both opportunities and challenges for the Allies.[76] The 2022 Strategic Concept formally recognized the PRC as a full-fledged competitor on NATO's agenda, citing concerns about its coercive policies, opposition to NATO values and the rule-based international order, and the impact of its global technological and economic advancements on the security interests of NATO member states.[77]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was introduced in 2013 by Xi Jinping, constitutes the framework of these initiatives of the PRC. Beyond economic integration, BRI is driven by geopolitical concerns aiming to connect Europe, Asia and Africa by sea and land routes, with the participation of 19 member countries of NATO.[78] While BRI, includes state owned banks and enterprises as investors, targets economically vulnerable allies, it has raised doubts about the PRC's geopolitical vision in more developed countries such as the US, Canada, the UK, Germany, and France. These developed countries that also compose the G7, proposed Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative under the leadership of the USA in June 2021 as a value driven and transparent project alternative to BRI.[79] In these

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[76] Transcript: 'China is coming closer to us' – Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's Secretary General, *Financial Times* (18 October 2021), at https://www.ft.com/content/cf8c6d06-ff81-42d5-a81e-c56f2b3533c2 (accessed 26 September 2022)

[77] 2022 Strategic Concept

[78] These countries are listed officially as follows: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia Turkey. See, Christoph Nedopil, "Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)", Green Finance & Development Center, FISF Fudan University (2022), at https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/.

[79] Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership, White House (12 June 2021), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/ (accessed 28 September 2022)

circumstances, it appears that BRI has the potential to create an economic and political dichotomy among the allies.

The PRC's repressive policies in Xinjiang relate to the future of BRI due to the geopolitical position of the region. Xinjiang, which has long land borders with Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Mongolia, India, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Mongolia, serves as a starting point to the three of the six economic corridors projected for BRI: the New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELBEC), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor (CCAWEC). Region opens to Russia and then to Europe via NELBEC, to Pakistan and Arabian Sea via CPEC, and to Central Asian states and Turkey via CCAWEC.[80] Projects to build regional transportation center, trade logistics center, financial center and regional medical center in Xinjiang have also been officially announced by the regional government due to the geographical position, ground, underground and human resources of the region.[81] Considering the technological outlook of the detention centers and forced labor practices, the Xinjiang region plays a critical role in the PRC's economic development, technological advancements and infrastructure investments.

## 4. Conclusion

The situation in the PRC underscores the limitations of mainstream approaches in understanding and addressing terrorism due to due to their objective and problem solving perspective. The lack of international consensus and the existence of a national legal framework have perpetuated human rights violations and distorted common sense in the context of counterterrorism. As demonstrated by the PRC case, adopting a critical approach is imperative in counterterrorism research. Such an approach discovers how terrorism is constructed through discourse, reveals how social issues in Xinjiang are framed as terrorism to exploit the international environment, and how repressive legal and administrative measures are justified under the pretext of counterterrorism.

The Critical approach, with its focus on the security of individuals and non-violent solutions, provides a normative basis for researching terrorism. This approach enables a comprehensive examination of the PRC's actions, moving beyond viewing

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[80]   Shafei Moiz Hali, Xinjiang and Its Potential for the Belt and Road Initiative, Presentation in Webinar on the topic "The Success of China's Policy Against Extremism in Xinjiang"(20 August 2020).

[81]   Zhang Ruinan and May Houston, Delegation From Xinjiang Visits US, China Daily (2017) at https://global. chinadaily.com.cn/a/201710/31/WS5a0d050ba31061a738407d39.html (accessed 30 September 2020)

the country solely as a target of terrorism to understanding it as a repressive actor. It also offers a well-defined international legal framework that encourages the PRC to adopt more humane policies. Additionally, the critical approach outlines courses of action for the international community to achieve normativity in counterterrorism, including the imposition of sanctions, fostering cooperation, empowering civil society, engaging in dialogue, and promoting negotiation.

The PRC's counterterrorism strategies in the region appear to be motivated not only by addressing security concerns but also by a broader aim of maintaining stability and control in Xinjiang. The PRC government perceives any potential threat to its authority and stability in Xinjiang as a challenge to its overall control over the region, which is essential for the success of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI is seen as a crucial component of the PRC's global economic and political vision, with the goal of enhancing economic cooperation, expanding influence, and securing access to vital resources and markets. The success of the BRI depends on maintaining stable and compliant territories along its routes, and Xinjiang, being a strategic crossroad for many BRI projects, holds significant importance in this regard.

The alignment between the PRC's counterterrorism strategies and the BRI suggests that the government is willing to use coercive measures to ensure stability and control in Xinjiang, even at the expense of human rights and international criticism. The implications of these policies reach far beyond Xinjiang and have broader consequences for the PRC's relations with other countries, especially NATO allies, who are increasingly concerned about the impact of these policies on global security, economic ties, and shared values. As the debate continues regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the PRC's counterterrorism practices, it becomes essential for the international community to address the complex interplay between security concerns, economic interests, and human rights considerations. Balancing the need for security with respect for human rights and international legal norms remains a significant challenge, but it is crucial for fostering stable and sustainable global relations. NATO and its allies must carefully assess the implications of the PRC's actions in Xinjiang and consider how their engagements with the PRC can be guided by principles of promoting human rights, peaceful cooperation, and shared values while addressing legitimate security concerns. Only through such a balanced approach can the international community work towards a more secure world order.

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# Terrorism And Migration:
# The Mutually Constitutive Relationship

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## Abstract

*Migration is a major social phenomenon in terms of its effects and consequences that people have experienced throughout the ages. These effects and results can be striking, which can change the geography and structure of societies. Likewise, terrorism emerges as a social problem in terms of its effects and consequences. These two important issues also affect each other inevitably. These mutual interactions between terrorism and immigration include; immigrants' participation in terrorist organizations due to the adaptation problems in the host country and infiltration of terrorist groups into the host country by getting involved in migration movements. The migration environment is also a source of funding for terrorism, through human trafficking, migrant smuggling and organ smuggling, and a human resource for terrorist organizations. Security concerns that arose due to migration over the years increased their influence after the second half of the 20th century, and as a result of the terrorist attacks in some countries that received migration, they were replaced by migration-terror concerns. These concerns have caused*

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*some states to change their immigration policies, which is another effect of the terror-migration relationship. This article examines the relationship between migration and terrorism in terms of the country/region where the migration started, the country where the migration ended, and immigrants.*

***Keywords***

*Migration, emigration, human traficking, migrant smuggling, host country.*

## 1. Introduction

Migration and terrorism are two important issues that have an international dimension in terms of their effects and consequences. Migration, which gained momentum for various reasons at the end of the Second World War and the relationship of terrorism, which increased its impact towards the end of the 20th century and its effects on each other are important not only because it affects the region and time in which they occur, but also because of its potential effect on the entire world even beyond its time.

Migration is a social phenomenon that is almost as old as human history and powerful enough to change the history of the world according to its size and duration. Migration movements vary throughout places and dates as well as their causes and types. Considering these reasons as their own will and against their will allow us to better understand immigration. Forced migration constitutes the overwhelming majority of the phenomenon of migration and is the part that interests us. Due to reasons experienced at every stage of history, such as  famines, seasonal difficulties, wars, political and religious unrest, and terrorism, people had to leave the lands they were born in, leave behind their movable and immovable properties, relatives and memories, and went to other lands. The world has experienced many migrations (such as the migration of tribes) and some of these experienced migrations have been effective enough to change the world or history. Those that have not been effective enough to change the world or history, were at least effective enough to change the region or the continent they were in. The reason why the effects of migration movements are so important is that they affect both the migrating societies, and the communities of the host lands which receive the immigration. These mutual interactions have also brought about security problems. The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States triggered a climate of distrust and prejudice over

the phenomenon of immigration, which began to be seen as a security issue.[2] This environment of prejudice and distrust, which began especially in some western societies, was soon used as a political argument, migration and terrorism were associated with the most authoritative mouths and turned into election material. Thus, the association of migration and terrorism, which has become a policy issue in the society as of the natural flow of the process, has resulted in the shaping of legal regulations. While this environment created as a result of migration constitutes one side of the coin, on the other hand, the migrate environment created as a result of terrorism constitutes the other side of the coin. Because of the actions taken by terrorist organizations, people may be forced to emigrate to save the lives of themselves and their families, and this migration movement may turn into a mass migration movement depending on the magnitude and severity of terrorist acts. The mass migration movement that has formed can cause a number of effects (security, a source of finance and personnel for terrorist organizations, the spread of terrorism by hiding in the migration movement of terrorist organization elements) on migrating people, the source country where the migration began, in the transit country and in the destination country. Although these effects and consequences that would occur are wide and long term and can affect the entire world, a number of problems can be encountered when fighting terrorism and migration. These problems include the inability to make a common definition of terrorism, the inability of countries to make the necessary legal arrangements in the fight against mass migration and terrorism, the lack of coordination and cooperation between countries and international institutions, unwillingness to share intelligence, etc.

In this article, the interrelationship between migration and terrorism is analyzed by utilizing some books, articles and theses on migration and terrorism. Is there a strong direct relationship between terrorism and migration? Does terrorism trigger migration, does the environment created by migration create a favorable environment for terrorism? In order to answer these questions, the article is structured as follows: First, the definitions of migration and terrorism are made, then the effects of migration on terrorism in the historical process are mentioned, aimed to better understand the effects of the mentioned migration on terrorism both in the context of the host country and the source country. It is also aimed at

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[2]   Andrew C. FORRESTER, Benjamin POWELL, Alex NOWRASTESH & Michelangelo LANDGRAVE, "Do Immigrants Import Terrorism", in; Cato Working Paper – Cato Institute, No;56, p; 12, 2019.

better understand the effects of terrorism on migration by mentioning the financial environment created as a result of migration and its importance for terrorism. Finally, the effects of terrorism on the phenomenon of migration and the resulting migration policies will be mentioned.

## 2. Definition of Migration

Although the reasons for migration vary, many migrations can be caused by necessity. Economic imperatives underlie the motivations of even a person who migrates without any pressure to provide a better economic future for their family. Migration varies according to its reasons, as well as its size. Migration is a very comprehensive issue when it is considered in terms of its types. For example, "internal migration" when it occurs within a country, "external migration" when it occurs across borders, "regular migration" when it occurs within the framework of legal rules, and "irregular migration" when it is outside the legal frameworks. "Refugee migration" occurs as a result of disagreement or conflict with the political authority or regime in the country in which they reside.

However, since the relationship between migration and terrorism will be discussed in this study, the types of migration will not be mentioned further. The subject of this article, rather than the types of migration, is migration movements caused by terrorism that have a substantial mass, the terror environment as a result of migration movements, and the security concerns created as a result of these events.

Although it is significant enough to affect geographies, societies and generations after its formation, the concept of migration, which almost begins with the process of human existence is quite simple according to Çağlar's definition. Çağlar defines migration as "Migration is the displacement of people over a geography, the movement of individuals or social clusters from one place to another."[3] However, reducing the definition of the concept of migration to such a simple level may make it difficult for us to understand migration and the relationship between migration and terrorism.

The definition of migration on the official website of the European Union is given as: " In the global context, movement of a person either across an international

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[3]   Türken ÇAĞLAR, "Göç Çalışmaları İçin Kavramsal Bir Çerçeve", in; Toros Üniversitesi İİSBF Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Volume;5, Issue; 8, p; 30, 2018.

border (international migration), or within a state (internal migration) for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate."[4]

When we look at the definition of migration more comprehensively, the definition of migration according to the United Nations refugee convention of 1951 is "in or out movement of (groups of) people from one place to a usually distant other location, with the intention to settle at the destination, temporary or permanently. This process can be voluntary or forced, regular or irregular, within one country or across international borders."[5] As can be understood from such a broad definition, the phenomenon of migration has the capacity to cause enormous effects in social, individual, psychological, economic and many other areas.

### 3. Definition of Terrorism

Although many countries, institutions and organizations do not differ much on the basis of terrorism, the definitions of terrorism differ. Cultural, regional and religious differences and the fact that states act in line with their interests are some of the reasons why a common definition of terrorism cannot be made. These differences can weaken the hand of countries and non-state institutions in the struggle against terrorism. These differences can also be problematic in dealing with other terrorism-related issues. Since the different definition of terrorism can bring a different perspective to terrorist incidents, how can one decide a mass migration movement being caused by terrorism or by the actions of freedom fighters? That is why a common definition of terrorism should be a priority for tackling terrorism and many of the problems (such as immigration and financial resources from immigration) stemming from terrorism.

Terrorism can take many forms (domestic terrorism, foreign terrorism, state terrorism, etc.), have many factors (religious, economic, political, etc.), many methods and, as a result, many different objectives. If we look from the point of view of the states or institutions that will define terrorism, it is very difficult to find a common denominator because each state and institution has different positions,

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[4]   https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossary/glossary/migration_en

[5]   Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for counter-Terrorism", in; ICCT Research Paper, no; 4, p; 14, 2016.

values, interests and interpretations. As mentioned above, every organization and every state naturally has different definitions of terrorism. Because of these uncertainties, the definition of terrorism by the United Nations, which should be binding on states, gains importance.

Although the United Nations has not adopted a common definition of terrorism covering all nations in legal terms, it defined terrorism as "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes"[6] in its Resolution 49/60 of 1994. But the United Nations expanded this inadequate definition of terrorism 10 years later. According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004, terrorism is defined as "criminal acts, including those committed against civilians, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or to take hostages, to create a state of terror in the population at large or in a group of persons or specific individuals, to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to take or refrain from taking any action".[7]

NATO defines terrorism also as "The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives."[8]

## 4. Historical Development of Migration Trends and Their Effects on Terrorism

Throughout history, migrations have had the potential to cause changes in states, empires, geographies, demographic structure and many other areas. For instance, the migration of tribes around 375 AD played a major role in shaping today's Europe 1700 years ago. With the developments in the maritime field, the discovery of new continents (North and South America and Australia) and migration to these new worlds began to shape today's world 600 years ago. At the same time, mass migrations have been influential in the development of colonialism and industrialization and, as

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[6]   Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism", Printed at United Nations, Geneva, Fact Sheet No; 32, p; 5, 2008.

[7]   Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism", Printed at United Nations, Geneva, Fact Sheet No; 32, p; 5-6, 2008.

[8]    NATO defines terrorism in the AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, Edition 2019.

a result, in the formation of the capitalist world market in the last 500 years.[9]

In the early 20th century, approximately 33 million out of 1.7 billion people lived as immigrants, and this figure is estimated to have reached 175 million in the world population of 6 billion in 2000. These figures do not take into account displaced people within the same country.[10] It is estimated that the number of international migrants is more than 270 million in 2019.[11] Transboundary movements of people have shaped states and societies from time immemorial (such as the migration of tribes that shaped the borders of Europe and the migration to the Americas, which formed the society of the Americas), but the distinguishing features of human movements in recent years are their global scope, centrality in local and international politics, and enormous economic and social consequences.[12] Globalization, which has been making itself felt since the last quarter of the 20th century, especially as a result of the cold war gradually losing its effect, has caused the concept of migration to gain a new dimension. Due to the extraordinary developments in communication and transportation, the increase in trade around the world, the tourism boom due to the abundance of capital, and the increase in the willingness of immigrants to pay for the country they want to go to, globalization has produced new trends and patterns of migration where human mobility exhibits more fluidity, circularity and ongoing transnational practices.[13] In addition, during this period, an important source of labor of industrialized states was made up of immigrants. Thanks to this labor force created by immigrants, developed states have made significant economic breakthroughs.

However, over time, immigration began to be seen as a security issue and became a political issue. As a matter of fact, a striking example of its becoming a political issue is the sentence used by Hungarian Prime Minister Victor ORBAN in a speech he made in March 2017. The Hungarian Prime Minister used the following sentence about immigration in his speech; "We are still under attack… Migration is the Trojan wooden horse of terrorism. The people that came to us don't want to live according to our culture and customs but according to their own at European

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[9]  Stephen CASTLES & Mark J. MILLER, "The Age of Migration", Guilford Publications, New York, p; 5, 1993.

[10]  Niclaus STEINER, Robert MANSON & Anna HAYES, "Migration and Insecurity", Routledge Publications, United Kingdom p; 127, 2013.

[11]  World Migration Report 2020, "Migration and Migrants: A Global Overview", in; IOM, Publisher; International Organization for Migration, Geneva, Switzerland, p; 19, 2020.

[12]  Ibid

[13]  Ibid

standards of living."[14] The turning point in the view of immigration and immigrants as a security problem and increasing xenophobia can be seen as the World Trade Center Towers (New York) and Pentagon (Washington) attacks on September 9, 2001 (9/11) in the United States. The rise in these negative feelings (xenophobia, hostility towards members of other religions and etc.) coincided with negative views on immigration in the United States as well as in other Western Countries.[15] Of course, there were negative thoughts about immigration and immigrants before the events of 9/11, but these thoughts were not comparable to those after the events of 9/11.

## 5. Effects of Migration on Terrorism

While many people focus on migrants and what happens in the destination country, they ignore the illegal forces trying to fill the gap created in the country that has been abandoned as a result of migration. However, migration affects both the immigrants, host country and source country.[16] So seeing that the effects of migration are multilateral rather than unilateral will provide a better understanding of the migration problem. In this part of the article, will discuss all parties affected by migration, the financial and personnel resources of terrorist organizations from the environment created as a result of migration, the relationship of migration with terrorism in the potential host country, the meaning and possible consequences of the vacuum created in the origin country/ region for terrorist organizations where the migration started.

### 5.1. In the host country

It is a matter of curiosity whether the immigrants can adapt to the culture of the region they go to when the migrations occur massively and suddenly. Other than these uncertainties there is also the possibility that terrorists can cross international borders by hiding among immigrants who carry out in these migrations, which have a mass size.[17] This question mark and the possibility of terrorists entering

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[14]  Enzo NUSSIO, "The consequences of terrorism on migration attitudes across Europe", in; Political Geography, Volume 75, p; 1, 2019.

[15]  Marc HELBLİNG & Daniel MEİERRİEKS, "Terrorism and Migration: An Overview", in; British Journal of Political Science, p; 10, 2020.

[16]  Stephen CASTLES & Mark J. MILLER, "The Age of Migration", Guilford Publications, New York, p; 11, 1993.

[17]  Rey KOSLOWSKI, "Immigration, Crime and Terrorism, Oxford Handbook on International Migration", Oxford University Press, New York, p; 1, 2012.

their country among the immigrants may lead to the formation of rumors in the host society and, as a result, the beginning of unrest. This atmosphere of restlessness turns into prejudices, prejudices into thoughts, thoughts into emotions, emotions into behaviors, behaviors into characters, and characters into destiny. Thus, thoughts that start with prejudices can lead to results that will shape the destiny of that society.

From the point of view of the country/region to be visited as a result of migration, situations may arise where people of this region may naturally be uncomfortable. Due to the fact that immigrants and host country people have different cultures and backgrounds, the people of the guest country may feel that their comfortable and established life may be destroyed by the immigrant who do not follow the rules of their country.[18] In addition to these prejudices formed by the indigenous community about immigrants, issues such as economic competition and unemployment, the product of this competition, a fierce race over limited resources can lead to a tense environment, as well as fuel hatred and lead to conflict. As a result of all these possibilities, especially after the events of 9/11, because of discrimination and Islamophobia, it is possible for immigrants to lose trust in the security institution, fuel radicalization and ultimately affect policies.[19]

However, it should not be forgotten that one of the reasons for joining terrorist organizations among immigrants is the adaptation problem they experience in the host country. For these reasons, the formation of the above-mentioned environment of hatred, authority and social exclusion will make the individual feel lonely. As David J. WHITTAKER stated in his book "The Terrorism Reader"; "One of the common characteristics of the psychologically motivated terrorist is the pronounced need to belong to a group".[20] The individual who wants to feel belonging to a group do not follow to return to the social environment with which he has cultural ties, since he/she cannot integrate into the society from which he/she is excluded. For example; some immigrants' children in the West confronted intercultural problems and because they were experiencing a problem integrating into the society they lived in, they chose the people they took as examples not from the society they lived in, but from the religious extremists, and many of them

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18  Gary Alan FINE & Bill ELLIS, "The Global Grapevıne", Oxford University Press, New York, p; 80, 2010.

19  Enzo NUSSIO, "The consequences of terrorism on migration attitudes across Europe, in; Political Geography Volume 75", p; 2, 2019.

20  David J. WHITTAKER, "The Terrorism Reader", Routledge Publications, United Kingdom, p; 20, 2003.

became warriors in Syria.[21] Of course, not every immigrant will react immediately or afterwards to these negative attitudes (prejudice, exclusion, hatred, etc.) they encounter in the society they live in. For example, highly skilled and more educated immigrants may be less likely to join terrorist organizations as they are more likely to integrate into the society in a potential host country.[22] Besides high-skilled immigrants have little risk of engaging in terrorist activities there is no evidence that shows that first-generation immigrants are prone to insubordinate or violent messages.[23] For this reason, some people argue that the focus should be on the next generation, that is, the children of immigrants who were born and raised in host country and have the potential to join terrorist organizations, rather than incoming immigrants.[24]

At the same time, young people may be more likely to join terrorist groups than older people. In their book "Strategic Responses to Crime", Guzman and Das stated that "Florez and Miller (2007), in interviews with many terrorist organization members, found that many of them were left-wing children and young adults when they joined the organization."[25] Again, in the same book, Guzman and Das stated that the PKK terrorist organization especially aimed at young people, "Most of the recruits were under 21 years of age. Only 26.2 % were between the ages of 21 to 29, while only 4.2 % were over 30 years of age".[26] So if second-generation immigrants, whether real or assumed, feel the perception of discrimination, they may become extremist in response and come into contact with terrorist groups in forefather lands. Discrimination against minorities has the potential to be associated with increased terrorist activity.[27] Immigrants under the age of 18 make up more than half of the refuge camps. Considering that young immigrants are more vulnerable to the propaganda of terrorist organizations, it is obvious that such camps offer a unique opportunity to

[21]  Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for counter-Terrorism", in; ICCT Research Paper, no;4, p; 4, 2016.

[22]  Marc HELBLİNG & Daniel MEİERRİEKS, "Terrorism and Migration: An Overview", in; British Journal of Political Science, p; 6, 2020.

[23]  Ibid p.4

[24]  Suna Gülfer IHLAMUR-ÖNER, "Delinking the Migration-Terrorism Nexus: Strategies for the De-Securitization of Migration", in; Autumn-Winter 2019, Volume; 24, Issue; 2, p; 199, 2019.

[25]  Melchor De GUZMAN, Aiedeo Mintie DAS & Dilip K. DAS, "Strategic Responses to Crime", CRC Publications, Boca Raton / Florida, p; 103, 2012.

[26]  Ibid p.103

[27]  Andrew C. FORRESTER, Benjamin POWELL, Alex NOWRASTESH & Michelangelo LANDGRAVE, "Do Immigrants Import Terrorism", in; Cato Working Paper – Cato Institute, No; 56, p; 4, 2019.

recruit for terrorist organizations. For example, according to press reports, one of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks on the Nairobi Serena Westgate shopping mall was a refugee from the Kakuma camp (on September 21, 2013).[28] Because many young men are desperately waiting for years in refugee camps since they cannot find education and employment, it is more attractive to join the terrorist organisations.

Ultimately, every society can see people who have immigrated to their own country as "others". Integration into the host society is important in order to reduce the influence of "others" in the society and to eliminate this tension, and to prevent the reasons for joining the terrorist organization because of exclusion, examples of which are given above.

"Integration, which is called the process in which immigrants are accepted as a part of the society both as individuals and as a group"[29], should not be seen as assimilation, on the contrary. If this integration is to be successful it should be considered as a process where they will not be excluded while living their customs and perhaps their customs will be respected. As a result of their integrated education, immigrants who have overcome the adaptation problem will quickly, adapt to the society and individuals in which they live, adopt and obey the rules of that society and will not look like the "others" coming from outside and will be adopted. Thanks to this adoption, they will be able to communicate with people better, and they will have the opportunity to express themselves.

As a result of this whole process, they will make many friends in the social and public sphere where they live, work, study, and these friends will respect those people, those immigrant, regardless their religious background. However people are afraid of what they do not know, what they do not recognize. At the end of this integration process, there may be participation in terrorist organizations due to the failure of integration and the social alienation of some people, which is why this process is important.[30]

In order to prevent this failure and to minimize the problems that may occur, programs, seminars, trainings, etc. can help migrating societies to be integrated

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[28] Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for counter-Terrorism", in; ICCT Research Paper, no; 4, p; 35, 2016.

[29] Türken ÇAĞLAR, "Göç Çalışmaları İçin Kavramsal Bir Çerçeve", in; Toros Üniversitesi İİSBF Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Volume; 5, Issue; 8, p; 43, 2018.

[30] Rey KOSLOWSKI, "Immigration, Crime and Terrorism, Oxford Handbook on International Migration", Oxford University Press, New York, p; 1, 2012.

into the host society. It should be known that it applies to every community of immigrants regardless of any cultural, political or religious background. As a matter of fact, according to the article by Vincenzo BOVE (referred to in the title of a newspaper) "Voto Immigrati, Fini apre a Veltroni: 'Ma non garantisce integrazione'" ("Immigrant vote, Fini opens up to Veltroni: 'But doesn't guarantee integration'") the cultural differences of the Romanians that migrated into Italy and the need for their integration into the Italian society are mentioned.[31]

Among the people who went to the targeted area as a result of mass migration, there may be members of terrorist organizations or those who sympathize with terrorist organizations. In addition to these people, there may be later participation in a terrorist organization or terrorist activities in the country/region settled as a result of migration, even though they are not related to any terrorist organization. The biggest motivation and trigger of individuals who later joined terrorist organizations is the strong emotional and social ties with the people with whom they made friends in the host country, the strong sense of social belonging that comes from being a member of a common community, and the strengthening of loyalty because of social solidarity. For example, the Hamburg Cell, a group of religious motivated extremists who became active in the September 11 attacks, consisted of an expatriate student body gathered around Mohammed bin Nasser Belfas, who lived in Germany for nearly two decades.[32] However, considering the devastating consequences of terrorist activities, this motivation alone will not be enough to make individuals engage in these activities that will affect him/her and his/her family. This process is a long process that can affect the decision of persuasion and participation, and coming from the same social environment is not sufficient to participate in these activities. Terrorist do not become terrorists overnight. This event requires a process ranging from alienation to occasional opposition and protest before becoming a terrorist.[33] This process, which has certain operational stages, can be prevented with effective intelligence, and it may enable the organization to be deciphered.

It should not be forgotten that terrorism is not only a problem of the region in which it operates, but of the whole world. Since terrorism and the sad consequences

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[31] Leila Simona TALANI, "Globalisation, Migration, and the Future of Europe", Routledge Publications, New York, p; 109, 2012.

[32] Vincenzo BOVE & Tobias BÖHMELT, "Does the immigration induce terrorizm", Article in the Journal Politics, Volume; 78, Number; 2, p; 580, 2016.

[33] Randy BORUM, "Psychology of Terrorism", Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications, Florida, p; 27, 2004.

that will occur as a result are the problems of the whole world, it is important that all states cooperate with intelligence and not hide information from each other in this cooperation. As Jamal R. NASAR stated in his book of Globalization & Terrorism; "Our world today is similar to a ship on the high seas. On this global ship, there are people who live in first class cabins, other in second, some in third and many way at the bottom in fourth-class cabins.Regardless of where we live, we need to be concerned about the well-being of those in the lower cabins.If we allow those cabins to rust and leak, the whole ship will sink".[34]

For example, DAESH in Iraq and Syria are not only a problem for the region where they are operating, but also a problem for the whole world. Considering that the effects of terrorist incidents are a problem of the world, it is an inevitable necessity for all states to cooperate in economic, military and intelligence sharing in the face of this problem. States that are unwilling to cooperate in the above-mentioned issues today may have to cooperate later on, with bitter experience and at great cost.

### 5.2. In the source country

The issues that are experienced in the host country at the end of the migration and that need to be resolved are the issues that are on the visible side of the coin we mentioned above and that most people experience. The other, and perhaps the more dangerous side of the event, is the danger that terrorist organizations will dominate the central government because of the present authority vacuum in the country from which the people forced to migrate by terrorism are forced to leave. If there is a vacuum of authority and security in the country as a result of migration, it is a fact that many members of terrorist organizations flock to this country. Fragile, delicate or powerless states have been associated with terrorism for some time[35] and the increase in the effectiveness of terrorist organizations in these regions is a concern not only for that region . Considering that terrorism has global effects and elements, it is an undeniable fact that the whole world has a problem. The strengthening of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, where the state authority was weak, and its terrorist attacks carried out in the United States are the most striking examples of the global scale of the situation. Another example of filling the authority vacuum by terrorist organizations is the 2nd Gulf Operation; because of United States invasion of Iraq, millions of

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[34]  Jamal R. NASAR, "Globalızatıon & Terrorısm", Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, First Edition, p; 20, 2005.
[35]  Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism" in; ICCT Research Paper, no; 4, p; 22, 2016.

refugees were forced to leave the country. However, the issue to worry about was not those who migrated, but those who came from outside. Because many members of terrorist organizations in nearby countries flocked to the weakened state with the aim of "making Iraq the new center of their jihad".[36]

As can be seen, the gap in state authority and security weakness would result in terrorist organizations filling this gap. As a result, more people participate in the migration movement, the necessary environment is created for terrorist organizations to gain personnel and material income, and it increases the possibility of them taking action worldwide by financing their supporters in other parts of the world. In order to eliminate this great danger, central governments and weak states that are not related to these organizations should be strengthened in regions where terrorist organizations are active, logistical and material and technical support should be provided, military training should be given and local people should organize against terrorist organizations. These supports should be given not only by neighboring states, but also by states and institutions all over the world (UN, EU, NATO etc.). It has been experienced with bitter outcomes that the costs of this support will be considerably lower than the costs that will arise considering the terrorist problems that we will face in the future.

### 6. The Financial Environment Created as a Result of Migration

Another aspect of the relationship between migration and terrorism is the fact that terrorist organizations make gains because of these human movements. When people flee from illegal acts of terrorist organizations where they live, their possessions can be looted.[37] This event is just one of the ways that terrorist organizations benefit financially from the migration movements that result from the terrorist environment. In addition, the demand that arises as a result of people's desire to pay money to immigrate with the instinct of protecting themselves and their families in the environment of terrorism presents a unique opportunity for the financing of terrorist organizations. Thus, the money paid to smugglers by people who want to escape from the terror zone constitutes another financial source that fills the coffers of terrorist organizations. For example, Daesh controls about 260 km of the Mediterranean coastline in Libya Sitra, and some evidence shows that human smugglers operating in the region have to share some of their income with terrorist

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[36]  Tiffiany O. HOWARD, "The Tragedy of Failure", PSI reports, Published by Praeger, Connecticut, p; 80, 2010.

[37]  Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for counter-Terrorism" in; ICCT Research Paper, p; 27, 2016.

organizations.[38] in other words, some of the money paid to human smugglers by immigrants who want to pass through this 260 km area under the control of terrorist organizations goes to the safe of the terrorist organizations that hold this coastline.

Terrorist organizations use human trafficking as well as migrant smuggling to obtain financing. In the 'Palermo Convention' prepared by the United Nations, it is stated that human trafficking is an international crime defined as an organization crime (December 2000).[39] People, who have to emigrate, are vulnerable to both migrant smugglers and other similar groups and face abuse and exploitation by these and similar organisations.[40] Therefore, while people fleeing the chaos created by terrorist organizations want to become immigrants, they become vulnerable people who fall into the trap of these organizations and turn into victims of human trafficking. Organ trafficking is another source of financing for terrorist organizations that make big money from both migrant smuggling and human trafficking (resulting in the abuse of women and children). Immigrants are one of the most vulnerable populations for organ trade. Immigrants, who are vulnerable on the migration route, are exposed to abuse and exploitation by smugglers and opportunists, and this vulnerability continues in host regions.[41] Illicit organ trafficking is a lucrative industry with an estimated annual turnover of $1.5 billion, and human traffickers are increasingly targeting vulnerable migrants and refugees in camps.[42] Unfortunately, there is always the risk of people who migrate in the vacuum of state authority and in a place, they are not familiar with, falling into the networks of terrorist organizations/smugglers and losing their organs, and this risk is a source of finance for terrorist organizations.

According to the United Nations, the estimated total global revenue from smuggling is $10 billion.[43] It is clearly seen that migration paves the way for various financial means for terrorist organizations and the relationship between migration and financing of terrorist organizations.

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[38] Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for counter-Terrorism" in; ICCT Research Paper, p; 27, 2016.

[39] Gökhan TELATAR & Umut KEDİKLİ, "Uluslararası Göç ve Güvenlik, Journal of Eurasian Inquiries", Avrasya İnceleme Dergisi, Volume; 9, Issue; 2, p; 312, 2020.

[40] Bilgin BİRLİKSEVEN, "Struggling with the Financing of Terrorism: Inadequate International Cooperation in Human Trafficking", in Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR), Volume; 12, p; 12, 2019.

[41] Juan GONZALES, İgnacio GARİJO & Alfonso SANCHEZ, "International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, Organ Trafficking and Migration: A Bibliometric Analysis of an Untold Story", International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, p; 2, 2020.

[42] https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/16458/migrant-increasingly-victims-of-organ-trafficking-book-reveals. (accessed: 14.04.2022)

[43] Rey KOSLOWSKI, "Immigration, Crime and Terrorism, Oxford Handbook on International Migration", Oxford University Press, New York, p; 14, 2012.

Terrorist organizations not only earn money through these illegal ways. Thanks to their networks and ties with organizations related to migrant smuggling and human trafficking, they also tuck in their own personnel into the target country through these means. For example, the investigation into the Madrid bombing has found reports showing that Ansar al-Islam, an al-Qaeda-linked group, engaged in human trafficking and document fraud in order to smuggle its members into countries like Spain and Iraq and finance terrorist acts.[44] One of the ways to fight terrorist organizations is to cut off the sources of money and personnel. This shows us how important migration prevention efforts are to cut of the financial and personnel resources of terrorist organizations.

However, does the described so far show that there is a strong link between those who immigrated and terrorism? There are an estimated over 250 million migrants in the world but this is rather small in comparison with the billions of border crossings by tourists, students, business people and commuters who travel internationally for stays of less than a year. The United Nations Tourism Organization international travel statistics report estimated 924 million foreign tourists in 2008, which included leisure, business, travel and visiting friends and relatives. When these tourists return to their countries, the total number of travelers is approximately 1,850 million people. When the number of these people traveling as tourists in 2008 is compared with the number of immigrants, it will be seen how low the number of immigrants is. Considering that of the 19 hijackers who carried out the 9/11 attack, 17 entered the country with a tourist visa, 1 with a work visa, and 1 with a student visa,[45] it can be said that the relationship is not as big as the politicians say, and that immigrants are chosen as the scapegoat. According to the testimony of ICSR (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation) Director in London, Peter Neumann, 600,000 Iraqis and Syrians came to Germany in 2015 and only 17 of them were investigated on suspicion of terrorism.[46] Likewise, the Immigration Policy Institute's analysis indicated that out of the 745,000 refugees who were resettled in the United States between September 11 and the end of

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[44]   Rey KOSLOWSKI, "Immigration, Crime and Terrorism, Oxford Handbook on International Migration", Oxford University Press, New York, p; 21, 2012.

[45]   Rey KOSLOWSKI, "Immigration, Crime and Terrorism, Oxford Handbook on International Migration", Oxford University Press, New York, p; 18, 2012.

[46]   Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for counter-Terrorism" in; ICCT Research Paper, p; 45-46, 2016.

2015, only three were arrested on terrorism charges.[47] As for Somali refugees in the United States, only 36 of the 85,000 people were suspected of terrorism or ties to terrorism. These numbers, which are less than 2 per thousand, are important as they show that fears about "refugee terrorists" are largely unfounded.[48] In the light of the above data, we can see that there is not much of a relationship between immigrants and terrorism, contrary to popular belief.

**Table 1:** The Countries with The Largest Number of Migrants and Overall Terrorism Index Score

| S/N | COUNTRY | IMMIGRANTS | % OF POPULATION | TERRORISM INDEX RANK | TERRORISM INDEX SCORE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | United States | 50.632.836 | 15.28% | 28 | 4.961 |
| 2 | Germany | 15.762.457 | 18.81% | 33 | 4.729 |
| 3 | Saudi Arabia | 13.454.842 | 38.65% | 54 | 3.11 |
| 4 | Russia | 11.636.911 | 7.97% | 44 | 4.219 |
| 5 | United Kingdom | 9.359.587 | 13.79% | 31 | 4.77 |
| 6 | United Arab Emirates | 8.716.332 | 88.13% | 93** | 0 |
| 7 | France | 8.524.876 | 13.06% | 35 | 4.562 |
| 8 | Canada | 8.049.323 | 21.33% | 48 | 3.882 |
| 9 | Australia | 7.685.860 | 30.14% | 60 | 2.438 |
| 10 | Spain | 6.842.202 | 14.63% | 55 | 2.861 |
| 11 | Italy | 6.386.998 | 10.56% | 50 | 3.687 |
| 12 | Türkiye | 6.052.652 | 7.18% | 23 | 5.651 |
| 13 | Ukraine | 4.997.387 | 11.43% | 62 | 2.304 |
| 14 | India | 4.878.704 | 0.35% | 12 | 7.432 |
| 15 | Kazakhstan | 3.732.073 | 19.88% | 93** | 0 |

\*   This chart has been prepared by the author of the article with information taken from official sites World Population Review (https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/immigration-by-country) and Vision of Humanity (https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/) (accessed: 05.05.2022).

\*\*  The fact that the terrorism Index rank is 93 in both countries is because the scores in both countries are zero.

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[47]  World Migration Report 2018, "Migration, Violent Extremism and Social Exclusion", in; IOM, Publisher; International Organization for Migration, Geneva, Switzerland, p; 9, 2018.

[48]  Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for counter-Terrorism" in; ICCT Research Paper, p; 44-45, 2016.

At the same time, as can be seen in the chart, the first 15 countries with the highest number of immigrants in the world (the chart showing the number of immigrants in the country and how many of these immigrants make up the population) and the terrorism index rankings and scores of these countries are indicated on alignment of them. When the chart is examined, it is seen that the Terrorism index rankings and scores of the first 15 countries with the highest number of immigrants are far behind. In fact, there are two countries (India and Türkiye) that are in the top 25 in the terrorism index ranking, and India, which has the highest terrorism index score in this chart, is the country with the least percentage amount of immigrants among these countries. United Arab Emirates, which has the highest number of immigrants in terms of population, is at the bottom with 93 Terrorism Index and 0 Terrorism Index Score. Despite the fact that these countries have higher immigrants numerically and in percentage compared to their population, the fact that they are far behind in terms of terrorism index and score shows that there is a weak relationship between immigrants and terrorist activities in the countries they live in. Contrary to what is thought, according to the chart we can say that the relationship between immigrants and terrorism in the potential host country as a result of immigration is not as clear or less clear than is believed.

However, we cannot conclude that there is no relationship between migration and terrorism, even if relationship between immigrants and terrorism in the host country is less than is believed. Although nevertheless the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were tourists who were legally entitled to enter and exit with a visa, they were people who arrived in time as immigrants to the country of their citizenship (Hamburg Cell). The possibility of terrorist organization members entering the target country by mixing with immigrants as a result of migration, the possibility of many environments created as a result of migration being a source of finance for terrorist organizations, the possibility of second and third generation immigrants to be members of terrorist organizations, and many more direct relationships show the direct effect of migration on terrorism. The hiding of two of the terrorists who participated in the 13 November Paris attacks among refugees from Syria is an example of the infiltration of immigrants, which is one of the methods used by terrorists to reach the target country.[49] Another migration-

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[49]  Elena NİNO ALBA, "Is there any relationship between immigration and terrorism? Critical analysis from Human Rights perspective. Europe: security for or against the displaced?" European Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation Academic Year, Global Campus Europe (EMA) theses, p; 23, 2017/2018.

terrorism relationship is the risk of terrorist organizations to gain financial benefits from the uncertainty resulting from migration and to recruit staff. Moreover, if we look at the relationship between migration and terrorism from a wider perspective other than the relationship between host country and migrant, and if we focus on the source country due to terrorism, we can see in the example of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan that the takeover of the administration by terrorist organizations in this country would cause problems in the future all over the world. Considering the cost of terrorist organizations taking over a country/region and its consequences, it will be less costly to take the necessary precautions before this event occurs and to prevent this negative situation by helping friends and allies countrys who will fight terrorist organizations in that region. Contrary to popular belief, as it can be seen, although the relationship between immigrants and terrorist organizations is less, there there is still a relationship between migration and terrorism. For these reasons, all possible measures should be taken at the highest level, and all necessary efforts, controls and observations should be made continuously to prevent terrorist organizations from benefiting from the environment created by immigration.

## 7. Effects of Terrorism on Migration

"Kill one, frighten ten thousand". The Chinese proverb is perhaps one of the most effective sentence that can describe terrorism in five words. However, there is no common definition of a phenomenon that can be explained so simply, and each state/institution has made its own definition. For these reason definitions of terrorism vary widely and are usually inadequate.[50] Why is there not a common definition of terrorism, which is a humanitarian problem that concerns the whole world and that all states must agree on in terms of its social consequences?

Among the reasons for this, we can count cultural, regional and belief differences, states acting in line with their interests and many other reasons. Differences in the definition of terrorism show itself when it weakens the hand of countries and non-state institutions in the fight against terrorism. In this part of the study, we will discuss the effects of terrorism on immigration and immigration policies.

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[50] Rex A. HUDSON, "Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists", Published by Lyons Press, Connecticut, US, p; 18, 2002.

Indiscriminate violent acts of terrorism cause impulse of people to fear for their lives and to emigrate from the terror zone.[51] That's why there are many factors which especially include terrorist attacks that involve violence and target civilians leading to forced human mobility.[52] Although it is a difficult decision, it is a necessity to leave behind the places where they were born, they grew up, and everything they own, thinking about the life of themselves and their family. Fear of terrorist attacks will be the main contributing factor, as they affect citizens' sense of imminent danger and fear, rather than proximity to terrorist attacks.[53] For example, In the 1970s, millions of people lost their lives due to the brutality of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia[54] and it is estimated that tens of thousands of people had to emigrate. Many people were killed and 8 million people had to experience international migration due to the terrorist acts carried out by the DAESH, which was established in Iraq and Syria. Many people lost their lives due to the acts of terrorism and lawlessness (the laws they set) by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and al-Shabaab in Somalia, and millions of people are in the position of international immigrants. When we consider the existence of a link between terrorism and migration, it is seen that terrorism actually leads to more migration, especially forced migration.[55] All these examples are striking examples of the effects of terrorism on international migration.

**Table 2.** Overall terrorism index score

| COUNTRY | COUTRY RANKING | INCIDENTS | FATALITIES | INJURIES | HOSTAGES | OVERALL SCORE | TERRORISM INDEX |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | 1/163 | 837 | 1426 | 2199 | 91 | 9.110 | 9.109/10 |
| Iraq | 2/163 | 833 | 524 | 836 | 32 | 8.510 | 8.511/10 |
| Somalia | 3/163 | 308 | 599 | 478 | 14 | 8.400 | 8.398/10 |
| Burkina Faso | 4/163 | 216 | 732 | 231 | 33 | 8.270 | 8.27/10 |
| Syria | 5/163 | 338 | 488 | 502 | 47 | 8.250 | 8.25/10 |
| Nigeria | 6/163 | 204 | 448 | 161 | 49 | 8.230 | 8.233/10 |

\*    This chart has been prepared by the author of the article based on the Global Terrorism Index data. (https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/) (accessed: 05.05.2022)

[51]  Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism" in; ICCT Research Paper, p; 26, 2016.

[52]  Suna Gülfer IHLAMUR-ÖNER, ""Delinking the Migration-Terrorism Nexus: Strategies for the De-Securitization of Migration", in; Autumn-Winter 2019, Volume; 24, Issue; 2, p; 198, 2019.

[53]  Enzo NUSSIO, "The consequences of terrorism on migration attitudes across Europe", in; Political Geography Volume; 75, p; 1, 2019.

[54]  Peter IMBUSCH, "Uygarlık Kuramları ve Şiddet Sorunu", in; Toplum ve Bilim Dergisi, Issue; 84, p; 93, 2000.

[55]  Suna Gülfer IHLAMUR-ÖNER, ""Delinking the Migration-Terrorism Nexus: Strategies for the De-Securitization of Migration", in; Autumn-Winter 2019, Volume; 24, Issue; 2, p; 198, 2019.

As can be seen in this chart, which is prepared based on the world terrorism index (based on incidents, fatalities, injuries, hostages), the countries with the highest number of terrorist incidents and which are in the top six in the terror order are listed. On the Worldpopulationreview.com site, we see the above 6 states in the first 48 countries with the highest emmigration according to the data of 2020. When the emmigration rates of these countries are taken as a percentage of the population, China, which has an emigration rate of 0.7 percent compared to its population, is ahead of Syria, which has an immigration rate of 31 percent compared to its population. If the percentage of the number of immigrants relative to the population of the countries is taken, it will be seen that this 6 countrys rank in the ranking of the countries with the highest number of emmigration will increase even more. These results are important in terms of showing us that terrorism has an effect on migration. Millions of citizens of western countries, who think that there is a link between Muslims and terrorism, may not even be aware that the people most affected by terrorism are Muslims, but in the light of these data, we can say that Muslims are the most victims of terrorism in the above 6 countries in terms of the high rate of Muslim citizens. According to 2015 Global Terrorism Index "In 2014, people who lost their lives due to terrorism in countries where more than half of the population is Muslim, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and Nigeria, account for more than 70% of those who died due to terrorism."[56] Again, in the light of these data, the relationship between death and migration in these countries, where terrorist incidents are most common, with terrorism is clearly seen. For example, the intense activities of the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab constantly trigger forced migration movements in Somalia due to its occupation of many regions and the instability it has created in the region.[57]

Economic causes as a result of terrorism can also be a reason for international migration. Terrorism restricts economic development, tourism, international flow of goods and money in a country by disrupting trade, and the instabilities (such as economic, social and governmental instability) caused by this restriction have negative effects. This negative impact environment as a result of terrorist activities

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[56] Alex P. SCHMID, "Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for counter-Terrorism" in; ICCT Research Paper, p; 11-12, 2016.

[57] Bülent ATASEVER, "Düzensiz Göç Hareketleri Çerçevesinde Türkiye Rotasındaki Göçmen Kaçakçılığı", Master's Degree in Nevşehir Haci Bektaş Veli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararasi Güvenlik ve Terörizm Anabilimdali, p; 43, 2021.

affects individuals' decision to migrate.[58] Of course, economic reasons are only one of the reasons for migration and high-skilled, high-education, and high-standard immigrants who immigrate for security purposes can do low-paid jobs where they are over-qualified. In this case, it shows us that the interpretation that the migration movement only takes place from poor countries to richer countries for economic reasons is not correct.[59]

### 8. Effects of Terrorism on Migration Policies

One of the effects of terrorism on immigration is the effects of some states on immigration policies. In some Western societies, the negative perspective and threat perception about immigrants, when combined with every terrorist incident that occurs, causes the formation of restrictive immigration policies. Especially with the terrorist attacks of 9/11, immigration and refugee policy came to the fore, and terrorism and national security discussions intensified with the attacks of religious extremist groups in major European cities such as Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016.[60]

Although countries have taken measures to prohibit the entry of immigrants from time to time, they also ease these measures to meet their labor needs. As the industrial revolution started the migration from the village to the city, the economic environment of the globalized world after World War II caused countries to give temporary residence permits to immigrants in order to meet their labor needs, maintain their heavy industries and maintain their economy. This situation changed over time and turned into a permanent residence permit for them and their families.[61] As a result, we can say that immigration and practices related to immigration have been shaped by economic reasons during the last century. However, with economic reasons being pushed into the background and immigration perceived as a threat, for immigrants it can result in causing general

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[58]   Axel DREHER, Tim KRİEGER & Daniel MEIERRIEKS, "Hit and Run: The Impact of Terrorism on Migration", in Economics Letters, Volume; 113, Issue; 1, p; 2, 2011.

[59]   Rey KOSLOWSKI, "Immigration, Crime and Terrorism, Oxford Handbook on International Migration", Oxford University Press, New York, p; 6, 2012.

[60]   James F. Hollifield, "American Immigration Politics: An Unending Controversy", in; Revue européenne des migrations internationals, Volume; 32, p; 20, 2016.

[61]   ORSAM (Center For Middle Eastern Strategic Studies) Rapor no: 123 The Black Sea Internatıonel Rapor No:22 "Global Migration and Development of Migration Policies of Turkey and European Union", Published by ORSAM, Ankara, p; 8, 2012.

changes in state policies and having a significant impact on foreign policy.[62] The situation that emerged as a result of the September 11 attacks had exactly such an effect, and thus, security concerns, not economic reasons, began to shape the immigration policies/practices of some countries. Each country's political context and personal history regarding immigrants and terrorism may differ in legislative and policy responses. For example, the United States and partly Australia placed national security interests above economic and personal freedom concerns, while Canada put its economic interests first.[63]

As a result of associating terrorist incidents with immigrants in some western societies, which prioritize national security interests, a negative perspective on immigrants has emerged. This negative point of view, which was formed in the general public, was quite suitable as policy material and political leaders in Europe and elsewhere increasingly associated the risk of terrorism to immigration. For example, the Polish President, Andrzej Duda, stated in 2017 "there is no doubt that the growing wave of terrorism is linked to migration" and that "migrants pose a security threat."[64] Especially after 9/11, due to security concerns and statements by some politicians that increased the negative views of society, most European Union countries strengthened their border controls and tightened their immigration policies, making it difficult for potential migrants to move to another country legally. A few days after the 2015 Paris attacks, European Union countries introduced new border controls, set up border fences, or discussed new ways to screen and register migrants, fearing religious extremist terrorists could infiltrate migrant flows.[65] We can see the effects of terrorism on immigration laws in the United States of America (USA) with the USA Patriot Act that came into effect in 2001. Expiring provisions of the Act were reauthorized by the USA Patriot Act improvement and reauthorization act of 2005, and by subsequent legislation in 2009 and 2011, allowing investigators to continue to use these vital authorities. The US Patriot Act expanded the fundamental grounds under which foreigns may be excluded or deported for

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[62] Rey KOSLOWSKI, "Immigration, Crime and Terrorism, Oxford Handbook on International Migration", Oxford University Press, New York, p; 2, 2012.

[63] Joshua D.Freilich & Rob T. Guerette, "Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism", Publihed by Routledge, London & New York, p; 4, 2006.

[64] Vincenzo BOVE, Tobias BÖHMELT & Enzo NUSSIO, "Terrorism Abroad and Migration Policies at Home", Published in: Journal of European Public Policy, p; 2, 2020.

[65] Vincenzo BOVE, Tobias BÖHMELT & Enzo NUSSIO, "Terrorism Abroad and Migration Policies at Home", Published in: Journal of European Public Policy, p; 3, 2020.

terrorism (clause 411) and created a new mechanism for documenting/detaining foreigns awaiting deportation. The new criteria cover not only individuals who plan or act about terrorism, but also those who are more distantly connected with prohibited organizations.[66] In short, with the aforementioned law, the USA focused on preventing terrorism by making arrangements in areas such as financing of terrorism (subject 302) and immigration (subject 401-405).[67]

The rhetoric that the globalizing world will cause borders to disappear, which was frequently voiced in the 1980s, suddenly was replaced with tighter border security practices and some restrictions on entry to countries. In the globalizing world, the borders shown with thicker lines on the map have replaced the dream that borders would be removed.

## 9. Conclusion

Migration, which has existed almost throughout history and can have great effects on human history and on the world, continues to affect our world today. This effect has made itself felt more dominantly as a security problem (especially after the 9/11 attacks) in the last quarter of the last century. In many western societies, the relationship between migration and security has been replaced by the relationship between migration and terrorism. In the same way, terrorism leaves effects/ traces on the world by feeding on the fears of both individuals and communities through unacceptable and terrible methods. As a result of the mutual relationship between these two phenomena, large migrations as a result of terrorism, terrorist organizations filling the gap created by these migrations, money resources created for terrorist organizations as a result of migration, the possibility of migrants who cannot integrate sufficiently as a result of migration falling into the network of terrorist organizations, the possibility of infiltration of terrorist organization members among large migration movements to the destination country, etc. many situations arise. So fighting against the security problem arising from the naturally existing migration-terrorism relationship emerges as an inevitable necessity.

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[66] Shirin SINNAR, "Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act", in; Stanford Law Review, Volume; 55, p; 1422, 2003.

[67] Faruk TURHAN & Muharrem AKSU, "11 Eylül Sonrası ABD'de Özgürlük ve Güvenlik Dengesi Açısından Terörü Önleme Amaçlı Tedbirler / Özellikle Patriot Kanunu Ile Getirilen Kısıtlamalar", in; Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Volume 1, Issue 1, p; 65, 2011.

One of the most important steps to be taken in order to combat the dangers arising from the mutual relationship of terrorism and migration is to make a common definition of terrorism accepted by all states and international institutions. At the same time, the effectiveness of combating security problems arising from the migration-terrorism relationship can be increased in legal arrangements that will ensure the cooperation of States on the migration-terrorism relationship.

Another important measure to be taken against security problems that may arise as a result of the relationship between terrorism and migration is the measures to be taken before, during and at the end of migration. Among these measures to be taken, fighting poverty in the region where the unrest started before the migration started, strengthening the central governments, if any, that fight against terrorist organizations and etc. can be effective approaches to prevent possible migration movements. Tackling the roots of terrorism and eliminating the root causes may have more effective results than military combat or firing bullets at terrorist groups.

Effective cooperation among international organizations, transit countries on the migration route and destination countries/regions of migration, intelligence sharing, effective border security and measures to be taken in the fight against crime and criminal organizations in order to prevent vulnerable migrants from being a source of personnel and finance for terrorist organizations after the cross-border migration movements have started, is important.

At the end of the migration movement, establishment of safe refugee camps, taking the necessary steps for the integration of immigrants to the target country without exclusion, and effective intelligence within the country are other methods of struggle. It should not be forgotten that terrorism and migration are the problems of the whole world and cooperation is essential.

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