CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

COE DAT

BORDER SECURITY IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT

WORKSHOP

REPORT

02-03 December 2020

Ankara, Turkey

Contents

Disclaimer

General Information of the Workshop

Subject: COE-DAT's "Border Security in Contested Environment." Lessons Learned Workshop

Background: Authorized in the COEDAT 2020 Yearly Activity Plan by the COEDAT Executive Steering Committee. Lessons Learned workshop was conducted online between 02 and 03 December 2020 hosted by COEDAT Ankara, Turkey.

Aim: The workshops is organized to collect, analyze, and share international best practices / experiences with a view towards aggregating tactical and operational lessons and converting them into practical recommendations for partner nations' border security in contested environments. Within this frame, the workshop contributes a greater common understanding of good principles for border security in non-permissive environments that can be used to counter terrorism that will complement the existing UN good practices in permissive environments. Through enhancing links between academia's resourceful and innovative members and the NATO's military circles, the project aims to build an interactive platform of expertise in which the best methods, strategies, and national responses on counter-terrorism would be discussed, documented, and transferred in service of the Alliance and the Partner Nations with the highlights on the role of military in border security.

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Paper Overview

This lessons learned workshop report presents the overview of presentations and outcomes from the two-day online event held in December 2020 and hosted by COEDAT's Ankara, Turkey. The triggering event of this workshop was the "Best Practices on Border Security for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Advanced Research Workshop (ARW)", which was conducted by COE-DAT in collaboration with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) and Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) from 7 to 9 October 2019 in JAF facility. As part of this event, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) presented information describing how terrorist groups/transnational criminal organizations illegally cross porous land borders to traffic Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), ammunition & explosives, drugs, contraband, other illicit goods and human beings and to deploy terrorist operatives to conduct attacks/intelligence gathering. As a result, international peace and security is adversely affected as this activity undermines States' efforts to counter terrorism and restrict cross-border organized crime, increases the vulnerability of affected populations and provides financing to terrorist and criminal networks. This above mentioned workshop was the basis for the workshop and the projected follow-on workshops in 2021.

Our intent is based on in-depth analysis of current border security gaps in the context of counter-terrorism previously identified in projects such as: the UNCCT-Global Counter Terrorism Forum Border Security Initiative, the project on Raising Awareness and Building Capacity on Advance Passenger Information (API), and projects relating to border security and management (BSM). COE-DAT in cooperation with the UNCCT and academia intends to collect best practices in military border security in contested environments to include counter-terrorism. The ambition is to offer this publication to the NATO community, partner nations, other nations of interest, and academia in order to promulgate best practices as noted by COE-DAT in support of NATO's CT vision.

Potential good practices for militaries in border security derived from this workshop are (many are existing good practices for civilian border security agencies and law enforcement):

- *Good Practice 1*: Enhance intra-agency cooperation (GP1 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)

- *Good Practice 2*: Enhance inter-agency cooperation (GP2 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)

    o Military expertise in operational planning is not often matched by other agencies. The military can facilitate a combined, interagency environment with the capacity to interconnect multiple agencies to coordinate efforts

- *Good Practice 3*: Develop and establish comprehensive remote border area surveillance programs (GP4 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)

- *Good Practice 4*: Engage with and empower border communities as key contributors in BSM; recognizing continuity to understand local issues is a key contributor in BSM (GP5 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)

- *Good Practice 5*: Develop and implement BSM information exchange programs and mechanisms (GP7 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)

    o 1) Providing on-the-ground intelligence collection, exploitation, and assessments to enhance overall situational awareness;

    o 2) Sharing of relevant counter-terrorism information with key non-military actors (law enforcement and emergency services);

    o 3) Maintaining a system of indicators and warnings to facilitate early detection of imminent threats;

- *Good Practice 6*: Nominate and assign military Border Liaison Officers to Border Cooperation Centers

- *Good Practice 7*: Conduct an effective risk analysis assessment (GP12 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)

- *Good Practice 8*: Create National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans (GP13 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)

- *Good Practice 9*: Identify corruption as a serious risk for effective and robust BSM (GP15 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)

- *Good Practice 10:* Conduct joint and coordinated border patrols with law enforcement as the lead agency, as well as joint multiagency and interdisciplinary operation exercises (mostly GP 10 from the UN with LE added)

- *Good Practice 11*: Develop policies and procedures for military support during crisis periods to provide support as first responders, during mass casualty events, and reinforce civil law enforcement

- *Good Practice 12*: Build physical infrastructure to support border security

- *Good Practice 13*: Training, advising, and assisting host nation security forces.

Furthermore, conclusions of this workshop report are intended to initiate further discussions by enhancing links between academia and NATO military, in order to identify the best methods, strategies, and national responses on counter-terrorism. The best methods and strategies will be considered as "Best Practices" (BP), which will enable NATO and Partner Nations to draw BP from the field and from the academic literature to transform their border security counter-terrorism framework based on the best alternative solutions to deal with the matter.

Ankara, 21 January 2021.

Col Daniel W. Stone
Col Daniel W. Stone (US AF)
Deputy Director of COE DAT

Comprehensive Summary of the Workshop

"Individual experience of nations facing most serious border security problems shows that an integrated, layered approach to border management is the most efficient option."

Statement by Lord Jopling, a British lawmaker.[1]

"In the past several years, the ability to protect the external borders of Europe has been tested by the extraordinary movement of people fleeing violence and poverty in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The security of borders has become a top priority for many NATO Allies, from the United States to Southern and Central Europe" stated by rapporteur in the special report on border security.[2] Indeed, almost all presenters of the workshop highlighted that States face increased border management challenges due to the large irregular migration flow from Central Asia, Western Balkans, West and Eastern Africa. Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Western Balkans suffer from transnational criminal activities including drug trafficking, smuggling of cash and goods, as well as high level of corruption and risk associated with a large scale of labor-migration flows, refugees, and asylum seekers. The strategic location of these countries makes the area particularly attractive to the criminal organizations and terrorist groups. Furthermore, the Eastern African Region, with porous political borders, has long been suffering from drug and SALW[3] trafficking, illicit financial flows as well as returning and relocating FTFs[4], and homegrown terrorists. The reversed flow of FTFs returning to their countries or settling down in a third country poses a new challenge from the Border Security and Management (BSM) perspective. Within three years, the flow of people travelling to Iraq and Syria has diminished dramatically in light of the military operations against DAESH and its collapse. It was noted by the presenters that the threat still continues when those people return their homeland or settle down in a third country as the returnees may join another terror cells or carry out attacks.[5]

However, Dr. Avci argues in his presentation during the workshop that the border issue is not a new phenomenon. The first steps in terms of controlling borders were laid out during the Roman Empire in 3rd and 4th centuries, in which external borders were used to separate barbarism and civilization.[6] The evaluation of border security has continued throughout the centuries and lead to passports as the most important identification document to cross borders between sovereign states. The extensive involvement

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[1] NATO News: NATO nations pressed to share best practices on border security, respect asylum rules Source: https://www.nato-pa.int/news/nato-nations-pressed-share-best-practices-border-security-respect-asylum-rules Accessed: 24. 01. 2021.

[2] Lord Jopling: Border Security special report. Source: https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2019-11/134%20CDS%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20-%20BORDER%20SECURITY.pdf Accessed: 24. 01. 2021.

[3] Small Arms and Light Weapon

[4] Foreign Terrorist Fighters

[5] See details in ANNEX-C of this report.

[6] Dr. Engin AVCI presentation on What are the key principles for border security management (BSM) and what are the military-es' changing role in border security? See details in ANNEX-C of this report.

of military in securing the borders were regulated with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Vienna Congress (1815), stated Dr. Avci.

Nowadays, in the SAHEL region, multiple layered crisis generate turmoil, extending the problem in the realms of politics, security, humanitarian and health. These dynamics have a great impact on border security. The borders in the area possess different qualities while being porous and facing issues such as ethnical clashes and climate problems. This requires a different and even more comprehensive understanding, including a countrywide perspective and a human factor. In particular, internally displaced people are a common problem for countries in the region. Therefore, usual thinking of the use of the military is quite challenging as the scope of the problem goes beyond the abilities of the militaries. Even if the ongoing clashes are to be finished under the responsibility of the military, it requires a common understanding, not only to tackle the ongoing problem but also to prevent the origins such as violent extremism and radicalism. As a result, both internal and sub-regional responses are important, emphasized by Mr. Badreddine El Harti, UN special adviser to the President of Burkina Faso.[7] It is worth to affirm that border management issues are controlled by law enforcement in most of the countries in present days.

Meanwhile, bringing the military into law enforcement controlled area can encourage some positive effect. Such as, militaries might have a unique position due to its ability to deploy forces in such a large area. As well as its capacity to deploy forces and in addition, military also has the advantage to administrate several factors such as communications, intelligence, and health services. However, empowering military, empowering the intelligence agencies, it leads to downsize the role of law enforcement and militarizes security, highlighted by El Harti.[8] On the other hand, with regard to the vulnerabilities exploited by crime organizations and FTFs, Dr. Akdemir stressed that these individuals, groups or organizations heavily benefit from conflicts, instability, lack of the rule of law, porous borders, high levels of corruption, weak democratic institutions, and weak law enforcement.[9] His statement highlights the Routine Activities Theory, introduced by Cohen and Felson in 1979. The theory posits that when a motivated offender and suitable target converge at the same time and place, the crime occurs. This theory further argues that are always motivated offenders who are willing to exploit crime opportunities. Criminal organizations, as Dr. Akdemir stated, exploit weaknesses in borders to gain financial aids. Drug trafficking, human smuggling, weapon trafficking and trafficking of cultural properties are concrete examples of the illicit activities of those transnational organizations. These activities include deploying terrorist operatives (human smuggling) to conduct attacks which is the most serious threats posed by criminal organizations.[10] Another issue is when the border is created by a political settlement like in 1921 when Ireland was divided into two. Mr. Agnew's presentation pointed out, that the roots of disorder was creating two individual identities, each with unique religious identity as well as cultural and political legacy. Northern Ireland was

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[7] Mr. Badreddine El Harti presentation on The SAHEL Region Border Security Challenges In Relation To Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime with the Special Focus On Military's Role in Border Security Management. See details in ANNEX-C of this report.

[8] ANNEX-C Harti's presentation.

[9] Naci Akdemir's presentation on Border Security Management in Contested Environment: Understanding the Challenges Posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Organized Crime. See details in ANNEX-C.

[10] ANNEX-C Akdemir's presentation.

leaning towards the unionist, protestant and loyalist dominance; while Ireland leaned towards the Catholic, nationalist and Republican legacy, leaded to a so called "the troubles."[11] The border did not only split the country in two but also split communities, farms and business interests. In this environment, terrorist organization developed who used the daily cross border movements of communities for their interest and weapon smuggling. The border offered an ideal location for economic interests of the terrorists. The land border had not only made political and economic difficulties but also tactical challenges and offered safe passage for mobile terrorists operating across porous borders. The management of border security policy was created and set the context for which all border operations would be conducted, including cross-border ID clearances. Those border operations were based on available intelligence and conducted in-depth to prevent terrorists operating across that borders. The threat to members of security forces in the border areas was particularly high. With this environment, the terrorists were able to plan and conduct attacks with relative ease whilst military's reactions to such attacks was constrained with limited acting with complete ineffectiveness. In order to solve all "the troubles" cooperation with the Irish became more mature in later years of the conflict in 1990s, while being difficult at the early stage and was important in countering terrorist operations at borders. This was assisted by maturing of the political relations between London and Dublin and recognition of the need for a common approach.[12]

The collective approach is characterized by the EU's perspective on border security to modernize the external border management of the EU and reinforce it with other comprehensive measures, especially on police cooperation, stated by Dr. Tóthi.[13] The EU has developed an integrated Border Management Strategy which aims to maintain high level of security by using information technology elements, i.e. visa information system as well and biometric features for identification. Moreover, the European Border and Coast Guard has been renewed and this new agency is a key step in the EU's border protection. As of 2021, the EU will start with a reintroduced mandate of FRONTEX and will have about 10,000 Border Guards by the end of 2027. As for migration and border protection element, in 2015, the flow of irregular migrants entering the EU reached a very high level, mostly from Africa, Middle East and Asia. Many of them turned to criminal networks and smugglers to get to the EU. Trafficking of human beings is also an issue which has led the EU to establish different Action Plans. One of the most important elements is the returning of FTFs. The first group of these FTFs came back in 2014 and they then soon released from prisons, possibly posing a further risk. As the part of the EU's countermeasures was the implementation of Integrated Border Management (IBM). IBM means that the national and international coordination exists between different law enforcement agencies and institutions for border security. The new and positive element is that the current implementation of the Schengen information system will use extended biometrics and new alerts on people with terrorism background. In terms of Hungary, the IBM Strategy follows the EU's 3-tier access control model. The border security belongs to the Hungarian National Police, supported by different agencies. The first element of the IBM Strategy is the coordination and

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[11] Stewart Agnew's presentation on How conventional military capabilities can be utilizing for counter-terrorism? What are the pros and cons using military force in a counter-terrorism setting and border security? Viewpoint of UK on police and military practices on the Northern Ireland/EIRE border. See details in ANNEX-C.
[12] ANNEX-C Agnew's presentation.
[13] Gábor TÓTHI presentation on What are the key challenges in border security management considering the recent security environment? What are the military's role in border security? Viewpoint of Hungary. See details in ANNEX-C.

implementation of activities in third countries, carried out by different immigration liaison officers delegated to different high-risk countries and Western Balkan migration route. Secondly, cooperation with neighboring countries through treaties, including border assistance activities; and thirdly, border control which is done by the national police. These tasks can be supported by military forces. The police focus on detection of human smuggling as well as primary and secondary illegal migratory movements. The national border management strategy and tasks are based on effective forecasting and preventive measures. Hungarian military forces are conducting border protection tasks by reinforcing the police patrols while only police and law enforcement agencies have the jurisdiction and have the authority to enforce certain measures. Military forces were also employed to build physical barriers to protect Hungary's borders from the increasing migration flow from the Western Balkan Migration route.[14]

Integrating and sharing of information is a challenge for the INTERPOL in field of CT, as Mr. Mohamed started his presentation.[15] INTERPOL's Counter-Terrorism Directorate is an initiative that acts as a global hub for intelligence on transnational terrorist networks shared by member countries worldwide. The Directorate analyses, collects, stores information on suspected terrorists, and share this information with member countries. The mission and its projects are working close within the frame of UN Resolutions 2396 and 2178, which have both highlighted the imperative of information sharing between countries on terrorism and FTFs. As of numbers in INTERPOL, it covers 18 databases and 194 member countries have connected INTERPOL via secure police security system. In addition, INTERPOL has color-coded notices that enable to share alerts and request for information worldwide, allowing police in different countries to share crime related information. As for the INTERPOL's identification activity's mission, its aim is to assist member countries in the detection and positive identification of members of known transnational terrorist groups and their facilitators. This is done through maintaining external data flow between law enforcement agencies; enhancing data flow from military forces deployed to relevant hotspots and promoting systematic inclusion of biometrics. When INTERPOL gives access to its databases, it is done to address operational demands (speedy passenger control) by leveraging fully interoperable databases (single query access to all data) supported by modern technology. This means that officers sitting at the border, as first line, can access one single window that has all INTERPOL and national databases available. Nevertheless, there are many challenges. For instance, legal aspects, if a government wants to get this data, it has to have a legal framework in place however; this legal framework is often absent. Also data collection is another challenge from legal point of view because, it has to be in line with human rights. Enhancing the secure collection and sharing of information INTERPOL is trying to promote projects with the aim to tackle terrorism in the MENA region and assist countries to identify, detect and intercept terrorists through border control operations, capacity building and technology.[16]

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[14] ANNEX-C Tóthi's presentation.
[15] Mr. Ahmet Mohamed presentation on Border Security Challenges in Relation to Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime from INTERPOL point of view. See details in ANNEX-C.
[16] ANNEX-C Mohamed's presentation.

All above observations and experiences appeared in the presentation of UN by introducing the UNCCT-Border Security and Management (BSM) Global Program.[17] Mr. Rocco Messina and Mrs. Esther Zubiri emphasized the strategic importance of Border Management to prevent terrorist related transnational crime. United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy has four pillars that includes:

- Pillar I: addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism

- Pillar II: preventing and combatting terrorism

- Pillar III: building states' capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations

- Pillar IV: ensuring human rights and the rule of law

The UN General Assembly resolved to "step up national efforts and bilateral, sub-regional, regional and international cooperation, as appropriate, to improve border and customs control in order to prevent and detect the movement of terrorists (…) while recognizing that states may require assistance to that effect." Especially because, the more recent UN Security Council Resolution 2482 in 2019 points out the nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime. The presenters highlighted, the UN's BSM Program is aligned with the **United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.** On the one hand, the program strengthens Member States' capacities to detect and prevent the **cross-border movement** of terrorists, including FTFs, by enhancing **cross-border cooperation** and **operational information sharing** to identify and disrupt the networks that facilitate their travel. The BSM program, on the other hand, enhances Member States expertise in **the responsible collection and sharing of biometric data** as means for border management and countering terrorism. They pointed out the key word is law enforcement agencies therefore, the law enforcement agencies in the borders has to be encouraged. As the border security in contested environment is a concern then the question is how to merge efforts of the military and law enforcement agencies. On the one hand, the aim is to secure the border; on the other hand, the challenge is to facilitate the legitimate movement of people and goods. In their view, the information sharing is one of the key elements and game-changer in counter-terrorism. The use of information sharing and the use of the INTERPOL's databases is a vital interest of the nations in general but in contested environment is more particular. In order to assist the member states to implement global strategy of counter-terrorism, UN in cooperation with the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, has set nonbinding 15 good practices in the area of the BSM, as follows:

- *Good Practice 1*: Enhance intra-agency cooperation
- *Good Practice 2*: Enhance inter-agency cooperation
- *Good Practice 3*: Enhance international cooperation
- *Good Practice 4*: Develop and establish comprehensive remote border area surveillance programs

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[17] Mr. Rocco Messina, UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, Head of Border Security and Management Unit; Mrs. Esther Zubiri, BSM Senior Expert presentation on Border Security and Management in Contested Environments in the Context of Counter-Terrorism and Related Transnational Organized Crime: UNCCT-Border Security and Management (BSM) Global Program. See details in ANNEX-C.

- *Good Practice 5*: Engage with empower border communities as key contributors in BSM
- *Good Practice 6*: Develop and implement Border Community Policing programs
- *Good Practice 7*: Develop and implement BSM information exchange programs and mechanisms
- *Good Practice 8*: Establish Border Cooperation Centers
- *Good Practice 9*: Nominate and assign Border Liaison Officers
- *Good Practice 10*: Conduct joint and coordinated cross-border patrols, as well as joint multiagency and interdisciplinary operation exercises
- *Good Practice 11*: define parameters for cross-border operational engagement
- *Good Practice 12*: Conduct and effective risk analysis assessment
- *Good Practice 13*: Create National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans
- *Good Practice 14*: Establish Joint Border Crossing Points
- *Good Practice 15*: Identify corruption as a serious risk for effective and robust BSM

These "Good Practices" are for consideration in order to build national Border Security and Management Strategy. The "Good Practices" is for inform and guide governments as they develop policies, guidelines, programmes for their effective BSM. As the general pillars of BSM is Legislative Measures, strengthening of the legal framework; Operative Measures, enhancement of institutional capacities; Capacity Building Measures, training programs and peer review exercises. However, the states National Action Plan (NAP) in regards of BSM should address the most special issues like transnational organized crime, terrorism and FTFs as well. The principles in terms of implementation of NAP are the data protection, risk analysis, evaluation and monitoring the process.

The presenters expressed their view on how military can contribute to border security when several factors need to be addressed to determine the threats at the borders, and then the military's role must be one that facilitates civil actions. In this context the military's contribution include, but are not limited to:

- Providing on-the-ground intelligence collection and assessment to enhance overall situational awareness,
- Sharing situational awareness of relevant counter-terrorism with key non-military actors, especially law enforcement and emergency services,
- Maintaining assistance to facilitate early detection of imminent threats,
- Training, advising and assisting host nation security forces.

Additionally, **the military can facilitate a combined inter-agency environment with a capacity to interconnect multiple efforts**.

The presenters clearly stated although, military may be called upon as first responders, operating in an area where there is a lack of capacity in terms of civilian response to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there are several scenarios where the military could find itself in a position to collect evidence or arrest the

suspects on behalf of the law enforcement agencies. It is important to know that the military presence cannot adequately provide a long-term replacement of law enforcement and emergency services and is in line with the lessons learned from Northern Ireland military's experiences. Mr Agnew pointed out, understanding the situation is not synonymous with intelligence because the locals' knowledge is very important, as he worded "no state can compensate **knowledge of local families** living in the area." He highlighted the disadvantages of use of the military forces for controlling border area by saying; there is no point to put troops on the ground when they do not understand what are they there to do. Continuity is the key - constant rotation does not help in terms of information passage. There should be a single authority to manage the border issue. However, as the view of the presenters, for managing it needs to have one organized body that can galvanize all resources. It was clear also after two days discussion the border security along the borderline on both sides required cooperation and coordination.

Ankara, 10 February 2021.

Csurgó Attila ezds

Col Attila CSURGO (HUN A)
Chief of Knowledge Department,
(Event OPR)

Observation

1. There are new and emerging threats to international security ranging from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, and cyber-attacks to climate change and infectious diseases. These threats transcend frontiers and require a holistic approach built on strategic multilateral cooperation and collective action from a perspective based on multidimensional security, with prevention as a top priority.

2. The challenges posed by dynamic and rapidly evolving contested environments amid existing conflicts in various regions of the world, extremist ideologies and transnational organized crime networks team up with terrorist groups.

3. The serious and growing threat, which has posed by violent extremism, as well as the foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin or nationality or moving to third countries, mainly from areas of conflict, are complex phenomena that oblige to reconsider existing strategies for preventing terrorism.

4. The ability to protect the external borders of Europe has been tested by the extraordinary movement of people fleeing violence and poverty in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The security of borders has become a top priority for many NATO Allies, from the United States to Southern and Central Europe as well.

5. The NATO partners in Middle East and North Africa have the unique challenges posed by porous borders, those States recognized the importance of securing these borders and the need for cross-border cooperation that allows inter-agency and neighboring border security agencies and border communities to collaborate with one another in a holistic way.

6. COE DAT has recognized the training needs of NATO as well as partner nations and developed and conducts its specific course on border security, refugees and CT. Although, the course has just the "Listed" status because the training requirements are not clearly defined yet. However, the demand for training is manifesting by the mobile education and onsite training requests by many partner nations.

7. COE-DAT was heavily involved in the update to NATO's military concept for CT where COE-DAT pressed for more inclusion of partner nation's CT requirements in support of the Fight Against Terrorism Action Plan (FATAP) and SACEUR's directive to focus on the South.

8. NATO is affected by political and security developments on its borders, NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept identified "the illegal trafficking of people" as one of the challenges for the Alliance.

9. NATO is well aware of the need for unified approaches not only for Allies but also for its Partner Nations in efforts to build their border management strategy.

10. UN, EU and INTERPOL is trying to strengthen States' capacities, to counter-terrorism and related transnational organized crime at borders and prevent the cross-border movement of terrorists and stem the flow of FTFs through improved border security and management.

11. The Alliance try to find militaries' roles in collaboration with other international stakeholders to strengthen the border security alongside its boundaries as well as in special cases like contested environment.

Discussion

NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division, COE-DAT, and UNCCT conducted a Border Security improvement workshop in Amman, Jordan, from 7 to 9 October 2019 in support of NATO Defence and Security related Science for Peace and Security. The aim of the event was twofold, in one hand, review of Jordan's border security needs to identify the priorities for Jordan and the other hand to share best practices and methods related to border security and management and provide tailored recommendations to reinforce Jordan's border security. As part of the event UNCCT presented information describing how terrorist groups/transnational criminal organizations illegally cross porous land borders to traffic SALW, ammunition & explosives, weapons of mass destruction, drugs, contraband, other illicit goods, and human beings and to deploy terrorist operatives to conduct attacks/intelligence gathering. As a result, international peace and security are adversely affected as these activities undermine States' efforts to counter terrorism and restrict cross-border organized crime, increase the vulnerability of affected populations, and provide financing to terrorist and criminal networks. Members of terrorist/transnational organized crime groups & FTFs target gaps of weak border infrastructure and porous/uncontrolled borders and make use of forged/fraudulently obtained travel documents/visas or abuse genuine travel documents of others, to cross international borders and conduct crimes/attacks or join extremist groups elsewhere. In contrast, corruption within border agencies undermines efforts to counter cross-border organized crime, terrorism, the flow of FTFs, and poses a risk to public safety and security. In order to address these challenges UNCCT and GCTF[18] collaboration has worked towards the development and implementation of the Border Security Initiative (BSI) and production of a set of non-binding Good Practices in the Area of Border Security & Management in the Context of Counterterrorism & Stemming the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. The BSI aims to assist UN Member State implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant SCR.[19] The following good practices has been identified in order to assist UN Member States to implement their border security strategy:

➢ Enhance intra-agency cooperation;

➢ Enhance inter-agency cooperation;

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[18] Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, see details on www.theGCTF.org
[19] United Nations Security Council Resolution such as, UNSCR 2178 on Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts

➢ Enhance international cooperation;

➢ Develop and establish comprehensive remote border area surveillance programs;

➢ Engage with empower border communities as key contributors in BSM;

➢ Develop and implement Border Community Policing programs;

➢ Develop and implement BSM information exchange programs and mechanisms;

➢ Establish Border Cooperation Centers;

➢ Nominate and assign Border Liaison Officers;

➢ Conduct joint and coordinated cross-border patrols, as well as joint multiagency and interdisciplinary operation exercises;

➢ Define parameters for cross-border operational engagement;

➢ Conduct and effective risk analysis assessment;

➢ Create National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans;

➢ Establish Joint Border Crossing Points; and

➢ Identify corruption as a serious risk for effective and robust BSM.

COE-DAT in collaboration with other international stakeholders has the aim to jointly hold multiple capacity-building and technical assistance activities. The main aim of those activities to collect, analyze, and share international best practices/experiences to aggregate tactical and operational lessons and convert them into practical recommendations. In order to build comprehensive border management strategies and plans of action for partner nations' border security in contested environments, in addition to and complementary to the existing UN Good Practices in Border Security that focus on permissive environments. Meanwhile, the achievements can be a subject to modify the curriculum of COE DAT's course on border security refugees and CT.

Conclusion

Members of terrorist and transnational organized crime groups, as well as FTFs, target the gaps of weak border infrastructure and continue to exploit with impunity porous and uncontrolled borders. FTFs make use of forged and/or fraudulently obtained travel documents and visas or abuse genuine travel documents of others, in order to cross international borders to conduct attacks or join extremist groups elsewhere. It is the obligation of every Member State to prevent the travel of FTFs, just as it is imperative for States' mutual security to stand against violent extremist groups such as Al-Qaida, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and their affiliates. Border demarcation or delimitation issues between States may complicate border security and management (BSM) related issues. Exercising sovereign jurisdiction through routine border operations may lead to an escalation of demarcation

matters if they are under dispute. At the same time, exercising caution in this regard could help terrorist organizations cross borders more easily.

Several factors need to be addressed to combat the terrorist threat at borders, and the military's role must be one that facilitates follow on civic action. The military does conduct certain functions that are essential to a counter-terrorism border management strategy. These include but are not limited to:

1) Providing on-the-ground intelligence collection, exploitation, and assessments to enhance overall situational awareness;

2) Sharing of relevant counter-terrorism information with key non-military actors (law enforcement and emergency services);

3) Maintaining a system of indicators and warnings to facilitate early detection of imminent threats;

4) Promoting, through engagement and strategic communication, a shared understanding of counter-terrorism concepts and the potential military contributions to counter-terrorism efforts;

5) Eliminating threats and targeting critical leaders in a terrorism network to dismantle its operational capabilities and discourage its growth and

6) Training, advising, and assisting host nation security forces.

Additionally, military expertise in operational planning is not often matched by other agencies. The military can facilitate a combined, interagency environment with the capacity to interconnect multiple agencies to coordinate efforts. The military may also be called upon as first responders, operating in areas wherein there is a lack of civilian capacity to respond to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there are several scenarios where the military could find itself in a position to collect evidence or arrest suspects on behalf of law enforcement, including both in conflict and non-conflict situations.

Although, the militarization of border security can be a solution especially, on long green border where patrolling is a challenge due to geographical conditions, but it cannot be a long-term solution. If the solution empower military, empower the intelligence agencies, downsize the role of law enforcement and militarizes the security. The militarization of security may lead the utilization of more and more kinetic forces, which can may provide more and more opportunities for terrorist groups to recruit new members. Therefore, usual thinking of the use of the military is quite challenging as the scope of the problem goes beyond the abilities of the militaries. Taking into account that, counter-terrorism in essence is a national security aspect, belonging to a law enforcement area. An internal security problem requires internal solutions. The use of power that determines this fight is much more adapted by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Consequently, the individual experiences of nations facing the most serious border security problems show that an integrated, layered approach to border management is the most efficient option, and that no single physical structure or operational concept will be sufficient for any single nation. However, in countries in which democratic gains are fragile, it is important to set security reforms and institutions according to clearly specified standards.

In general, the military is not the solution itself. Indeed, it is one component of the solution and it has to be a part of a comprehensive package. All pillars of security should interact together in a sustainable way.

Recommendation

For NATO consideration:

1. The review of MC 0472/1 military concept for counter terrorism, it should emphasize the importance of providing education and training to Allies and Partner Nations on Border Security and Management.

2. NATO organize seminars and conferences to engage the International Organizations such as UN, EU and INTERPOL in order to harmonize the militaries' involvements in specific fields of Border Security (INTEL, INFO sharing, evidence collection including biometric).

3. Provide a forum for border security experts, and practitioners responsible for developing and implementing National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans, policies, procedures, and related activities, to determine how such activities can be integrated with a more complex national security planning framework

4. NATO's Exercises should be a tool to practice border security tasks for law enforcement and military units in order to unify and /or complement each other capabilities.

5. NATO should increase cooperation with partner nations and not only provide E&T in NATO's ETFs regarding to Border Security and Management but also on-site team visits to help identifying gaps and building National Border Management Strategies.

For COE DAT consideration:

1. Continue to collect, analyze, and share international best practices/experiences to aggregate tactical and operational lessons and convert them into practical recommendations for consideration of militaries' role in border security.

2. Incorporate the considered practical recommendations to the current Border Security Refugees and CT course's curriculum.

3. Provide forum (i.e. seminar, conference) to deliver education for decision makers and practitioners who actually manage and directly work on National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans or involved in the related activities.

Ankara, 10 February 2021.

Csurgó Attila ezds
Col Attila CSURGO (HUN A)
Chief of Knowledge Department,
(Event OPR)

Workshop (online) on "Border Security in Contested Environment"

(02-03 December 2020 COE DAT, Ankara/TURKEY)

	Day One (02.12.2020)	
Timing (GMT+3, Ankara)	**Action**	**Lead**
18.00 – 18.15	**Opening remarks, introduction of participants. Introduction of WS' Subject and Aim.**	**Event director and Col Daniel W. STONE (US AF) Dep Director of COE DAT**
18.15 – 18.20	Welcome address by director of COE DAT.	**Director of COE DAT**
18.20 – 18.40	What are the Whole of Government key principles for border security management? What are the military's role in border security?	**Col Engin Avcı, PhD. Director of the Research Center, Turkish Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy**
18.40 – 18.50	**Discussion**	Event director
18.50 – 19.10	What are the key challenges in border security management considering the recent security environment? What are the military's role in border security? Viewpoint of Hungary	**Dr. Gábor TÓTHI, Department Head's European Cooperation of Hungarian Ministry of Interior**
19.10 – 19.25	**Discussion**	Event director
19.25 – 19.45	How conventional military capabilities can be utilizing for counter-terrorism? What are the pros and cons using military force in a counter-terrorism setting and border security? Viewpoint of UK on police and military practices on the N.Ireland/EIRE border	**Mr. Stewart Agnew Legal advisor of the HQ 38 Brigade in Northern Ireland**
19.45 – 20.00	**Discussion,** Wrap up, Conclusions and Recommendations of the day!	Event director

Day Two (03.12.2020)

Timing (GMT+3, Ankara)	Action	Lead
18.00 – 18.05	Opening remarks	Event director
18.05 – 18.25	Border Security Management in Contested Environment: Understanding the Challenges Posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Organized Crime	**Lt. Col. Naci Akdemir PhD. Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy, Security Sciences, Faculty Member, Graduated PhD on Sociology, University of Durham, UK.**
18.25 – 18.30	**Discussion**	Event director
18.30 – 18.50	Introduction of UNOCT-UNCCT Global Border Security & Management Programme! The UN foundations of border management strategy!	**Mr. Rocco Messina, UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, Head of Border Security and Management Unit. Mrs. Esther Zubiri, BSM Senior Expert.**
18.50 – 19.00	**Discussion**	Event director
19.00 – 19.20	The SAHEL region border security challenges in relation to counter-terrorism and transnational crime with the special focus on military's role in border security management.	**Mr. Badreddine El Harti, Principal Security Sector Reform-Rule of Low Adviser, UN Special Adviser to the President of Burkina Faso.**
19.20 – 19.30	**Discussion**	Event director
19.30 – 19.50	Border Security Challenges in Relation to Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime from INTERPOL point of view.	**Mr. Ahmed Mohamed, Border Security Expert, Counter-Terrorism Directorate, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).**
19.50 – 20.00	**Discussion,** Wrap up, Conclusions of the Workshop!	Event director

ANNEX – B Welcome Address by COE DAT's Director

Distinguished Guests,

I'm Col Barbaros DAGLI, director of COEDAT. As the COEDAT Director, I would like to cordially welcome you all from Ankara, on behalf of my staff and I. It is my great pleasure to open our workshop on Military Border Security in Contested Environments. The aim of this workshop on one hand supports COEDAT's Mission "to provide key decision-makers with a comprehensive understanding of terrorism and Counter-Terrorism (CT) challenges, in order to transform NATO and Nations of interest to meet future security challenges." On the other hand, it supports nation States' capacities to fight terrorism and related transnational organized crime at borders, and prevent the cross-border movement of terrorists and stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters through improved border security and management.

The serious and growing threat posed by violent extremism, as well as the foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin, or nationality, or moving to third countries, mainly from areas of conflict, are complex phenomena that oblige nations to reconsider existing strategies for preventing terrorism. NATO is well aware of the need for unified approaches not only for Allies but also for its Partner Nations in efforts to counter-terrorism. Therefore, I do not need to emphasize the importance of this workshop's focus on border security and management. This workshop is the first milestone because; our goal is to collaborate with nations and international organizations. Moreover, hold multiple capacity-building and technical assistance activities to collect, analyze, and share international best practices/experiences. In order to aggregate tactical and operational lessons and convert them into practical recommendations. It is also including, comprehensive border management strategies and plans of action for partner nations' border security in contested environments.

With these words, I officially open the workshop and I give the floor to our distinguished experts.

Thank you all once again, welcome and I wish you a very successful workshop.

Col Barbaros DAGLI
Col Barbaros DAGLI (TUR A)
   Director of COE DAT

by Alice Lõhmus and Elif Merve Dumankaya rapporteurs of the workshop

Workshop (online) on "Military Border Security in Contested Environment"

DAY I, 02.12.2020

Introduction

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reiterated in a press conference ahead of the meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 30 November 2020 that NATO will continue to fight terrorism and that the best weapon NATO has, is to train local and to provide assistance to Partner Nations.

The aim of this workshop was to support the COE DAT 's mission and key decision makers with a comprehensive understanding on terrorism and counter-terrorism (CT) challenges in order to transform NATO and nations of interest to meet future security challenges. It also supports states' capacity to fight terrorism and related transnational organized crime at borders; to prevent cross-border movement of terrorists as well as stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters through improved border security management (BSM).

Growing threat posed by violent extremism and foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin, or nationality, or moving to third countries mainly from areas of conflict, are a complex phenomenon that has obliged nations to reconsider existing strategies for preventing terrorism. NATO is well aware of the need for a unified approach - not only for Allies but also for Partner Nations. The goal of the workshop was to collaborate with nations and international organizations as well as hold multiple capacity building and technical activities to collect, analyse and share international best practices on military border security.

What are the Whole of Government key principles for border security management? What are the military's role in border security?

Engin Avcı, PhD. Director of the Research Center, Turkish Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy

Throughout the presentation, Dr. Avci seeked to answer questions of **what are the key principles for border security management (BSM) and what are the militaries' changing role in border security?** Dr. Avci explained this through an analytical model, based on his field experience and academic knowledge. Dr. Avci stressed that the border issue is not a new phenomenon - first steps in terms of controlling borders were laid out during the Roman Empire in 3rd and 4th centuries, in which external borders were used to separate barbarism and civilization. During the Middle Ages, kings and monarchs controlled the travels of serfs and merchants. At the time, also the issue of slave labour from Africa was emerging; and during the Colonial Period, the emergence of passports emerged as an aspect to control borders. Furthermore, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Vienna Congress (1815) initiated some official documents which regulate state borders.

One of the results of the Industrial Revolution as well as the WWI and WWII, were the changing character of migration flow, including waves of refugees and protective policies. The border concept can explain some changes stemming from internal and external factors like politics, economic issues as well as terrorism. The concept of *"border"* is seen as a "line separating two countries, administrative divisions and other areas".

We can divide borders and lines into two categories - there are **political boundaries** that are referred to as **artificial** or **manmade** which are the dividing lines between countries, states, provinces, counties, and cities. These borders are created by people to separate areas governed by different groups. Moreover, **political boundaries change over time** through wars, treaties and trade. Thus, this is a problematic border issue.

A **physical boundary** is a **naturally occurring barrier** between two areas such as rivers, mountain ranges, oceans and deserts. Many times, political boundaries between countries or states form along physical boundaries. As for **security aspect,** there is a difference between **Green** and **Blue Border Surveillance,** meaning that all activities and operations carried out by official authorities at external land, maritime and air borders to prevent persons from circumventing the official border crossing points, in order to evade checks and illegally enter the common area of freedom of movement.

We should also distinguish **Border Control** from **Border Security.** With regard to Border Checkpoints, there are legal ways to enter states via land, air and sea. Border Checkpoints use border guards, police officers, custom officers and migration officers. They should have some capabilities about technical issues such as fingerprints, visa and passport control as well as custom operations and be aware of fake documents, organized crime, drugs and other prohibited substances. As for Border Lines, these are the illegal ways to enter countries via air, land and sea. They face similar problems and use border patrols, border surveillance, migration officers and intelligence operations, as well as are responsible for building walls, fences, minefields, landmarks along borders. Moreover, Border Lines should be aware of human trafficking, infiltration of terrorists and criminals as well as uncontrolled migration flow.

For an effective border security strategy, attention should be paid to geographical position, foreign policy of the country and its neighbors, history of a border and a changing nature of threats. Dr. Avci highlighted his analytical model that on an analysis level, there are individual, community, state and international system-based levels while the threats cover military, political, social, economical, environmental, health and cyber sectors. Previously, states were focusing on military threats but now, it has been all mixed and widening and deepening of security can be seen.

At the **international system level, there are too many organizations working on border security issue,** ranging from UNOCT, IOM, INTERPOL to OSCE etc. By looking at the documents that some of these institutions have prepared on the BSM issue, there are common factors such as open and secure borders; inter-agency cooperation and coordination, risk analysis, threat assessment and information gathering; illegal cross-border movement of terrorists and nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime; effective border surveillance and control of green and blue borders. Other key factors of border policies of the UN, EU and OSCE include enhancing border security through

community engagement; comprehensive cross-border cooperation; biometrics and verification of travellers of parts of entry; creating an effective proportionality between technology based and traditional solutions; trained border law enforcement officers.

On a state level, we should understand the security perception of a state because it will affect the creation of border security. All states have their foreign policy - according to the concept of the border security, **they should also prepare a border security strategy that is compatible with their national security policies, foreign policy, capacity and strategic culture**. Legal infrastructure is very complex in border issues because there are **too many institutions responsible for border security.** Also, **national budget** is important - some states do not allocate much funds to border issues due to having other priorities. Furthermore, **states should decide who is responsible for border issues** - is it military; paramilitary groups; law enforcement or civil units? States may also have difficulties with neighbouring countries with regard to border issues, especially if a neighbour is a failed state and providing sanctuaries or safe havens to terrorist organizations. Turkey has faced this issue since the 1980s with neighbouring countries providing safe haven for the PKK.

There are also **external challenges** affecting border security issues. These may be related to issues stemming from neighbouring countries; civil wars and instability; capacity and security policy of neighbouring countries; external support for terrorism; as well as weaknesses in border security management. Another issue is that terrorist organizations and organized crime groups may have established a symbiotic relation that would create a big threat to border security. Geographical conditions, climatic difficulties and porosity of borders are also a distinguished issue for border security. Sometimes, protecting borders is not as easy because these borders may not be physical, but political, especially when it comes to mountainous areas.

With regard to perspectives on border security, the concept "*border security*" is defined differently by states according to their own needs and priorities. **In Turkey**, there are 25 institutions responsible for BSM, which were given authority by 27 acts and regulations. Previously, the border security mission in Turkey was carried out by Gendarmerie from 1980s to 2013, after 2013 this mission was handed over to the Turkish Land Forces. **How to manage border security at a state level?** There are 105 active border gates in Turkey; border stations at borderline; border patrols by coast guards and navy as well as air patrols. There is also border control, border surveillance, border protection and border aspects that should be paid attention. **There should be a strategy, which can cover all these activities.**

On a **group level,** the people living around borders are mostly given some sort of immunity from the government in order to do border trade. However, people living close to the borders do not usually like to do border trade, but prefer smuggling. There are also issues with **divided relatives and neighbourhood culture** - it is not easy to separate them with political borders. Also, there are some sympathizers of terrorism and issues of smuggling - it is hard to control them. As such, **legal infrastructure; logistics and transportations** should be in place and is needed in these border areas. In addition, physical security systems are important for temporary military bases - sometimes you need to

close bases for the winter and be flexible and practical; number and qualified personnel also play a role. There is a **gap between cooperation and collaboration** among security institutions.

As for Dr. Avci's personal experiences working on the field at the Iranian-Turkish border in 1995 in Van, there was lack of transportation, communication, water and limited power at the time. There was not enough barracks as well as food during wintertime - **you need to think about these issues, especially for winter.** You often need more people, but do not have enough barracks - it is a dilemma. In 2011, Dr. Avci was assigned to Turkish-Iraqi border in Sirnak but the same problems existed - there was limited transportation, barracks and power available. **This is not the problem of government or policy - mountainous areas are very difficult. It is difficult to build barracks and roads.** However, Turkish government succeeded in this issue by 2018, when a new border station and wall was constructed (KALEKOL) - this is now available in most borders.

On an **individual level, human security** plays an important role (humanitarian aid to irregular migrants). There needs to be a balance between freedom of movement and security. There are also issues to be addressed with fragmented families and foreign fighter returnees who need to be integrated to the society. On a military level, there is also a need to tackle issues such as personal motivation, special training for military personnel as well as operational planning.

We are living in a new security environment, especially with regard to hybrid threats. **What should be the role of military in BSM? Hybrid threats** are, for instance, irregular migration, terrorism and FTFs as well as transnational crimes. These problems are called as 'intermestic' problems, meaning that some problems are both international and domestic and this has increased with migratory movements. Security institutions should gain hybrid tools and abilities to overcome hybrid threats. If you see criminals as your foe, it is not right - if you use hard power, their reaction will be similar. **Therefore, soft power should be used instead.**

There are gaps in BSM. We **do not have effective international bodies dealing with the issue** - the UN, EU and OSCE mostly deal with failed states. There is **lack of cooperation and collaboration among public institutions** - which one is the leading organization? Border security strategy should be compatible with international system and national priorities. **Legal infrastructure and law enforcement need additional training.** We need a change, similar to CT vs struggling against terrorist organization. We should **adapt a problem-oriented approach.**

There are also other challenges such as porosity of the borderland - it is conducive to the border crossing of FTFs, immigrants, smugglers and ordinary people. There is a symbiotic relation between irregular migration, organized crime and terrorism - it is a supportive factor for illicit border crossings. Also, failed states generate safe havens for terrorist organizations. Failed states such as Syria and Iraq are major challenges for border security. Furthermore, in the absence of an international organization covering all border related issues, no BSM system can be effective.

In conclusion, Dr. Avci **recommended the need for balance between security and the licit flow of people and goods.** There needs to be a developed and integrated, layered approach to border

management. Also, establishing unity of effort across relevant government and non-governmental entities. States must create their own applicable Border Security Strategy and Action Plans, compatible with the international and regional security and national priorities. **Flexible, dynamic, hybrid and integrated approaches must be the main components of the BSM.** The changing nature of threats have forced security institutions to find quick solutions for current threats. Furthermore, hybrid BSM should consist of **technological** and **traditional surveillance** and **control systems.** Physical border security system can be a supportive element of the hybrid BSM. Technological surveillance and physical security systems can be effective only if they are set up and are supported by the **human factor.**

A **holistic approach** is needed for BSM. Military should be part of this comprehensive approach. Security forces that have the ability and authority of surveillance, preventing, protecting and investigation can be more effective in BSM. **The role of the military should evolve from traditional military tactics to the law enforcement strategies. Every border is unique**. Given the geographical conditions and nature of neighbouring countries and new threats, **there is no one-size-fits-all BSM in CT**. The number and types of security forces depend on the characteristic of the border. If the border is a major transit point, the operational unit will likely include more law enforcement, paramilitary and military forces. In the case of Turkey, it also benefitted from village guards living in these areas and taking care of the border. Furthermore, borderlands have different characters. The border security strategy, security condition and politics of the neighbouring countries directly affects BSM and strategy. It is useless to apply same strategy at different borders. Even neighbouring districts and border stations might need a different BSM system.

Col. Csurgo concluded that tactical and operational issues of the BSM were highlighted in the presentation and that the recommendations what militaries could do are valid. Geographical borders are always different - it is hard to apply the same procedure on each border. The threat assessment lead us to valid border strategy and the organizations' that deal with border issues, their work should be harmonized as well as there should be a central coordinating body for the subject matter.

What are the key challenges in border security management considering the recent security environment? What are the military's role in border security? Viewpoint of Hungary

Dr. Gábor TÓTHI, Department Head's European Cooperation of Hungarian Ministry of Interior

Dr. Gábor highlighted that in Hungary (HU) and the in the European Union (EU), border management issues are the task of the law enforcement. HU is a Schengen and the EU country, located on different migration routes and therefore has experience in border protection area. The establishment of the Schengen area is one of the most important achievements of the EU, giving the EU citizens to move freely within the territory of the EU and by further increasing the cooperation between law enforcement of different countries in order to protect the external borders. To join the Schengen area, Member States (MS) must prove that they are able to take the responsibility and be ready for controlling the external borders of the region and cooperate effectively - the EU and other Member States monitor these tasks.

For Hungary, the protection of external borders has been a top priority since the outbreak of the migration crisis in 2015. The migration of refugees to Europe and the increase in threat of security required a unified action from Member States. There are three things threatening HU borders: 1) immigration; 2) terrorism; 3) when some MS are using or reintroducing border controls at internal borders, disrupting the unity of the Schengen area. COVID-19 pandemic has been a test for this.

The Schengen area has both an important social and economic value. It enables the four basic freedoms - freedom of goods, persons, services and capital. Foundation of the Schengen remains strong and its economic value remains clear. **Schengen** is a common project of 22 Member States and 4 Associated Countries. In this zone, 26 countries abolished their internal borders for **the free movement of people in harmony with common rules.** There are common rules to obey which allowed lifting of these common borders and Schengen has ensured high level of mutual trust between its members. The refugee crisis of 2015 and the COVID-19 have posed new threats to EU's borders as well as a new challenge to HU. These different challenges have led to internal border controls in 5 different Member States. COVID-19 has also led to reintroduction to internal border controls in order to stop the pandemic - this has had a real negative impact on citizens' lives and economy.

From the **EU's perspective**, the idea was to modernize the external border management of the EU and reinforce it with other comprehensive measures, especially on police cooperation. In September 2019, the EU Commission issued a new Pact on Migration as well as a new Ministerial level Schengen Forum in order to have a better cooperation at political level, building on the work already done. The EU has also developed an **integrated Border Management Strategy**, which aims to maintain high level of security by using information technology elements, i.e. visa information system as well and biometric features for identification. Over the last five years, a lot of progress has been made, with the Commission implementing new measures through IT systems in order to enhance border management. These **new IT systems** are due to be functional by the end of 2023. Similarly, the **European Border and Coast Guard** has been renewed and this new agency is a key step in the EU's border protection. As of 2021, the EU will start with a reintroduced mandate of FRONTEX and will have about 10,000 Border Guards by the end of 2027.

Another challenge is the **smuggling of migrants** by sea as one of the most dangerous way of smuggling, requiring serious humanitarian assistance. The EU also implemented Coast Guard Neighbour Services which helps this effort. As for **migration and border protection element**, in 2015, the flow of irregular migrants entering the EU reached a very high level, i.e. from Africa, Middle East and Asia. Many of them turned to criminal networks and smugglers to get to the EU. There are limited availability of legal migration channels and this pushes people to illegal migration networks. As the journey to the EU is dangerous, these smugglers expose lives of migrants. The fight against migrant smugglers is part of the EU policies. In 2015, the EU Commission adopted an Action Plan against migrant smuggling and the idea was to transform smuggling from a high profit low-risk activity to a high-risk low profit business - the first steps have been encouraging, but real results are still needed. Migrants are vulnerable to exploitation by criminal networks and often depend on them when it comes to fake documents. Trafficking of human

beings is also an issue which has led the EU to establish different Action Plans. EU rules make sure that victims of trafficking have access to assistance.

In terms of the **CT and radicalization element,** in Europe the overall terrorist threat remains as high as before, despite attacks being decreased by COVID-19. However, terrorist propaganda has increased. The threat level of terrorism is quite high in Europe and there has been an increase in the number of inspired attacks between January and July 2020, with some MS being at higher risk than others, also with regard to violent right-wing extremism. Nevertheless, terrorism remains the biggest threat to EU intelligence services. One of the main aims of terrorist groups is to produce better online training manuals for potential European terrorists. However, with the feedback of intelligence services, this has not been very successful due to the prevented attacks, based on the poor knowledge of IT and poor devices made by terrorists.

Targets of terrorists as usually "soft targets", including religious centers and sports events. Radicalization in prisons is also a major challenge in which prisoners may be easy targets for recruiting terrorists. One of the most important elements is the **returning foreign fighters.** The first group of these FTFs came back in 2014 and they will be soon released from prisons, possibly posing a further risk. Extreme combatants are, however, serving a longer prison term. There are around 5,000 European terrorist fighters traveling to the Middle East battlefields in the last years. 75% of these fighters became members of the Islamic State. Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, there are no foreign fighter returnees known to be in Europe in 2020 but this issue needs to be tackled seriously. Those returnees have mostly been women and children, some of them fleeing from different camps in Syria - there have been only a few repatriations by Member States. Western Balkans has also provided to be a fertile ground to different forms of radicalization, leading to violent extremism and terrorism.

The new and positive element is that the current implementation of the Schengen information system will use extended biometrics and new alerts on people with terrorism background. The system is expected to go into force from 2022. With regard to **integrated border management issues**, the IBM means that the national and international coordination exists between different law enforcement agencies and institutions for border security. The main idea is to have open but well controlled and secure borders. The most important tools for implementing IBM in the EU is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency with the help of Member States and EU institutions. Moreover, FRONTEX is responsible for the tactical operation strategy for the IBM.

Hungary's border management is determined by its full Schengen membership and the further expansion of the Schengen area. There are about 1100 km external borders under Hungary's responsibility. While Hungary is still a transit country in the internal illegal migration routes, however, in long term, Hungary can also be considered as a country of destination. There are three different illegal migration routes in Hungary: 1) Balkan route, which reaches HU through Turkey, Greece, the Western Balkans and Serbia; 2) route via Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania; 3) route that gets to HU via Russia and Ukraine, with people moving towards Austria, Slovakia and Germany. Top countries of citizens are Pakistanis, Syrians, Kosovars and Iraqi migrants.

The **IBM Strategy** follows the EU's 4-tier access control model. The border security belongs to the Hungarian National Police, supported by different agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Asylum Administration, the National Customs Authority and the National Transport Authority and the Hungarian Labour Inspectorate. The first element of the IBM Strategy is the **coordination and implementation of activities in third countries,** carried out by different immigration liaison officers delegated to different high-risk countries and Western Balkan migration route. Secondly, **cooperation with neighboring countries** through treaties, including border assistance activities; and thirdly, **border control** which is done by the national police. **These tasks can be supported by military colleagues.** The police focuses on detection of human smuggling as well as primary and secondary illegal migratory movements. The national border management strategy and tasks are based on effective forecasting and preventive measures.

After the flow of 2015 refugees, the government of Hungary agreed to build a temporary fence to tackle the issue, covering 175 km on the Serbian-Hungarian border. A reinforced double-fence system is now deployed on almost 300 km on the Serbian-Croatian border. The system is composed of hybrid cameras as well as vibration sensors - in case of climbing or cutting the sensors, there will be an alert and the sound system will be activated, giving warnings in five different languages and detecting sabotage incidents. The inner fence is consisting of a double fence every 10 km; and for cars and pedestrian gates, every 2 km.

HU Defence Forces took part in the management and creation of this fence and cooperated under the mass immigration crisis, serving as a supportive force. **HU military forces are conducting border protection tasks by reinforcing the police patrols while only police and law enforcement agencies have the jurisdiction** and have the authority to enforce certain measures. Military assists with the work of police with border patrolling. **In the pandemic situation, one element was added - the military colleagues were allowed to take part in administrative and health tasks, supporting also national health services at the border.**

For HU, border management is the key to its migration policy, based on the functioning of Schengen area. The effective management of external borders is of paramount importance. **In HU, border protection activities are implemented by law enforcement but military has an important supportive role.**

Col. Csurgo highlighted that both Turkey and Hungary are specific cases in terms of their borders. As for Hungary, it is not only about implementing its own border strategy but Hungary also has to implement Schengen rules in specific parts of its borders. The EU has implemented important steps in border management strategies and information sharing that will be further developed. There are different agencies working on border issues in which **cooperation and information sharing is essential between different agencies.** There are also specific rules how the military can be used at the border and be in a supportive role for the law enforcement units at the borders.

How conventional military capabilities can be utilizing for counter-terrorism? What are the pros and cons using military force in a counter-terrorism setting and border security? Viewpoint of UK on police and military practices on the N.Ireland/EIRE border.

Mr. Stewart Agnew Legal advisor of the HQ 38 Brigade in Northern Ireland

Mr. Agnew's presentation focused on how to utilize conventional military capabilities on the border, what are the pros and cons in using military in border security as well as the historic experiences and viewpoints from the UK. Mr. Agnew has had close cooperation with the police and other security partners for a cause of a stable environment in which political agreement could be reached. There are different strategic challenges to consider in the case of Northern Ireland such as motivation and IRA's border campaign; community, reach; exploitation; capability and cooperation.

The aim of the military support to the civil part, known as the operation Banner, was achieved with the Good Friday Agreement. Alongside this normalization between Ireland and Northern Ireland, military garrison was reduced in size and the police force was reformed. The normalization process required much of the border security infrastructure to be demolished. This infrastructure, i.e. high-tech equipment and permanent border checkpoints and watchtowers had become representative symbols which divided the society, some seeing it as repressive and oppressive colonial force, whilst others saw it as bastions of protection against mobile insurgents who used the border as invisible protector force field.

The land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland was created by political settlement in 1921 by dividing Ireland into two, by creating two individual identities, each with unique religious identity as well as cultural and political legacy. Northern Ireland was leaning towards the unionist, protestant and loyalist dominance; while Ireland leaned towards the Catholic, nationalist and Republican legacy. For that reason, Republicans living in Northern Ireland tended to lean on Dublin for political guidance and unionists and loyalists towards London. The latter sought to bring about unification of Ireland by military force. This campaign commenced after the partition in 1921 through the 1930s, through the 1950s with the border campaign in Northern Ireland and late 1960s with the dissatisfaction with the unionist governance until the beginning of what we know as "the troubles".

Mr. Agnew highlighted that the implementation of Schengen has been a challenge for both sides. The land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland is "truly international", stretching from 310 miles, 488 km, passing through sparsely populated and mostly agricultural areas. The alignment of the border follows country boundary lines with navigation difficulties as it rarely follows natural features. The border is known to have 270 public roads and hundreds of unapproved tracks, all of which are important to local families, communities and legitimate commercial activities for the border area. Customs controls were introduced in 1 April 1923, shortly after the establishment of Ireland. These controls remained until 1993 when systematic controls of custom checks were abolished between the EU Member States. There are no longer any operational customs posts along either side of the border. During the operation Banner, unauthorized incursions by the British military across the border invited diplomatic reaction with the highest level.

Largely protestant agricultural population along the border areas were intimidated to the extent with some leaving the area, while others joining security forces became easy targets for terrorist operations. This policy of cleansing was similar to the tactics utilized during the border campaign of the 1950s with attacks against isolated police stations and state infrastructure. Many of those killed were part time members of the security forces. The border did not only split the country in two but also **split communities,** farms and business interests. It is this environment that terrorism thrived and they used these daily borders of communities for their interest and weapon smuggling. The border offered ideal location for economic interests of the terrorists. Local bars and clubs paid less for the smuggled goods and for the purchase of products. Political relations between Dublin and London were played out by terrorists also to their advantage, with the Irish government came to uphold the rights of Catholic nationals and Republican community in the North but through a less aggressive policy against the provisional IRA. This stance was largely driven by apolitical appetite rather than a positive policy of supporting terrorism.

The land border had not only made political and economic difficulties but also tactical challenges and offering safe passage for mobile terrorists operating across porous borders. The border security policy management was created in 1997 and set the context for which all **border operations** would be conducted, including cross-border ID clearances. Those border operations were based on available intelligence and conducted in-depth to prevent terrorists operating across that borders. The threat to members of security forces in the border areas was particularly high. With this environment, the terrorists were able to plan and conduct attacks with relative ease whilst military's reactions to such attacks was constrained with limited acting with complete ineffectiveness. This gave terrorists clear advantage. For that reason, operating close to the border was only practical where the advantage could be tilted in favor of the security forces. It should have, at all times, ensured that the **risk to security personnel be minimized.**

During the early years of "the troubles", borders were difficult to manage with state infrastructure being destroyed by terrorists. The establishment of checkpoints on main routes, acted as a deterrent but later, permanent vehicle checkpoints came focus points as attacks. Whilst checkpoints served as a physical deterrent, they also served as community engagement. On one hand, it offered community reassurance but also offering opportunity for the passage of information from an increasingly observant community. Every terrorist operates on fear and the community on which it operates - it is also is reliant on obedience of those who collaborate with the enemy. **Intelligence is the "currency" of fighting insurgent groups but it is only one tool in the bag.** For terrorists, the wilderness of Irish border brought opportunity for the element of surprise - the open countryside was hard to be placed by roads while leaving military and the police vulnerable while providing increased scope of maneuvering for terrorists. In countering this, air transported troops following planned ground operations with focus of specific areas - this combination worked well and the element of surprise kept terrorists at the back foot.

Cooperation with the Irish became more mature in later years of the conflict in 1990s, while being difficult at the early stage and was important in countering terrorist operations at borders. This was assisted by maturing of the political relations between London and Dublin and recognition of the need for a common approach. Also, by early 1990s, IRA was starting to be involved in the possibility of a ceasefire and negotiations in political space. Cross border cooperation varied and built on relationships between

local police (Northern Ireland) and the Garda Síochána (Irish police force). The British military only had contact with the Garda Síochána or the Irish army in very exceptional circumstances. As the plan matured, military forces close to the border were notified by local police and the effect was positive, with joint patrolling when necessary. Cross border communications remained limited. Consideration was given to all Ireland anti-terrorist coordinating unit to joint patrolling either side of the border and military-military contact.

The **tactical deliverables** were clear - secure a porous border; secure the best possible information; establish practical cross border security measures and enhance the UK military capabilities as well as the Garda Síochána. **Intelligence matters!** Importance was put on pre-emptive intelligence which would feed cross border operations. The police-police relationship was strengthened to greater extent of information sharing. However, there was always greater extent of information passage from Dublin to London rather than from Ireland to Northern Ireland due to political influence. The issue of Irish terrorism was as much of an issue to Irish government as it was for the British.

Creation of a border zone was high on the agenda in which joint border posts and border patrols would be achieved effectively. Capability development was important as well as were technical solutions to a long-range observation was developed. The communications between the military and the Garda Síochána improved through police liaison officers. Aerial surveillance was developed with diplomatic clearance, permitted extended flights to Ireland and getting real time intelligence. There were manned checkpoints in some local areas but locals found ways to exploit. It was soon realized that the economic benefit of the roads and lands could not overcome the might of one single state and their desire to close a porous border.

Any type of border security on both sides required cooperation and coordination. In terms of **tactical command,** prevention is better than cure – there is a need to identify potential instability early and trigger engagement of relevant agencies is paramount; dissatisfaction is a sentiment and feeds off perceptions - the IRA fed off discrimination and deprivation and then exploited the perception that the security forces were partisan. Armed force can merely contain insurgent activity and create space for political progress, economic development and social engagement. Coherent strategy under a single campaign authority is paramount. Insurgency was engaged successfully, but tactically rather than at the operational level. Intelligence is the currency for fighting insurgency, though it is but one component in the machine of understanding. Conflict is complex, adversarial and evolutionary such that the advantage trends to the side that can adapt fastest. It is the adaption of lessons learnt that has value for other theatres rather than their reuse.

In terms of **lessons learnt coming from Northern Ireland,** it is to invest in "understanding"; this is not synonymous with intelligence and must be bolstered by local knowledge - no state can compensate **knowledge of local families** living in the area. Invest in preventative measures to mitigate against intervention; it will save blood and treasure in the long term - **do everything you can in terms of capability environment** - understand the task and borders. Adaptive training is vital - before, during and after. **There is no point to put troops on the ground when they do not understand what are they there**

to do. COIN and CT place a premium on coalface command; this is requiring of delegation which is born of education, training and trust and will breed tempo - it needs to be well educated and well trained. **Continuity is the key** - constant rotation does not help in terms of information passage. **Technology is a force multiplier**, if used properly. **Information operations are crucial** and the battle of the strategic narratives is as important as any other aspect. **Know when to stop becoming part of the solution.** In case of Northern Ireland, military should have taken away earlier. **There should be a single authority to manage the border issue** and have a one organized body that can galvanize all resources.

As for the final discussion, Col. Csurgo concluded that political borders are indeed sensitive issues, as seen from previous presenters. Things should be seen from a person to person level, not just from an organizational level. Technical solutions do play a role and is a force multiplier but unfortunately, there are some geographical areas where technological solutions do not work due to harsh weather conditions.

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DAY II, 03.12.2020

Border Security Management in Contested Environment: Understanding the Challenges Posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Organized Crime

Lt. Col. Naci Akdemir,(PhD) Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy, Security Sciences Faculty Member

Lt. Col. Naci Akdemir stated that there is criminological perspective in Border Security Management (BSM), by examining the *Routine Activities Theory,* introduced by Cohen and Felson in 1979. The theory posits that when a motivated offender and suitable target converge at the same time and place, the crime occurs. This theory further argues that are always motivated offenders who are willing to exploit crime opportunities. Afterwards, following Cohen and Felson's theory, Eck offered a model entitled "*Crime Triangle*" to analyze location-based crime events. In this presentation, Lt. Col. Akdemir took foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) as offenders in the organized crime - target is the borders and countries. Lt. Col. Akdemir's presentation covered the answers of the questions below:

- What could be guardianship measures to protect the borders?

- What would be the consequences of poor border management?

- Who should lead the border security management?

Handler · Manager · Offender · Place · CRIME · Target/Victim · Guardian

Criminal organizations, as Mr. Akdemir stated, exploit weaknesses in borders to gain financial aids. Drug trafficking, human smuggling, weapon trafficking and trafficking of cultural properties are concrete examples of the illicit activities of those transnational organizations. In some cases, they do not engage in terrorists organizations due to the intention of saving themselves from the sanctions of law enforcement. However, in most cases, there is a nexus between them. The evolving relationship from co-existence to symbiotic relations between them poses a great threat to international security. It has become even harder to differentiate the terrorist organizations and their criminal counterparts.

Terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations cross the porous borders to conduct criminal activities:

- Trafficking small arms and light weapons (SALW),

- Trafficking ammunition and explosives, drugs, contraband, other illicit goods, and human beings,

- Deploying terrorist operatives to conduct attacks which is the most serious threats posed by those groups. These activities undermine states' efforts to counter-terrorism and restrict cross-border organized crime.

With regard to the vulnerabilities exploited by crime organizations and FTFs, Mr. Akdemir stressed that **these individuals, groups or organizations heavily benefit from conflicts, instability, lack rule of law, porous borders, high levels of corruption and weak democratic institution and law enforcement**. In such an environment, transnational crime organizations and terror groups may find a ground to communicate with each other. After, these organizations further intersect, and this can contribute to the escalation of violence, intensification of conflicts in affected regions and undesired impacts on security.

Furthermore, as these organizations are not so easily understood, they may even engage in financial relations and operational purposes through the exchange of knowledge, skill-sharing and networks.

There are also a great number of challenges born out of Green and Blue Borders in border security management. Therefore, border demarcation and delamination issues between states may complicate the border security management. Exercising sovereign jurisdiction through Routine Border Operations at Green and Blue Borders may lead to an escalation of demarcation matters if they are under dispute. At the same time, exercising caution in this regard could help organization cross border even easily. States may also challenged in implementing good practices on international cooperation such as joint patrol if they do not agree on the exact location of the border. Long and porous borders are another aspect that needs to be stressed. Members of these groups as well as FTFs target the weak border infrastructure and exploits porous and uncontrolled borders. Even though states tempt to build borders through the lines of borders, tunnels are heavily utilized to circumvallate these walls. As a result, they are not so sufficient to protect.

Mr. Akdemir evaluated that *technology* can be considered as a challenge to border security. Technology provides illegal channels to transit the borders. For instance, terrorists do not necessarily cross the border to deliver their illegal products. UAVs provide them to deliver the products with a low possibility of detection. Additionally, *corruption* within border agencies undermines to counter border organized crime and the flow of FTFs.

Another issue regarding the border security management is **forged and fraudulently obtained travel documents and visas**. FTS makes use of them or abuse others documents in order to carry out attacks within different countries. Therefore, Lt. Col. Akdemir stressed that it becomes an obligation for every nation to prevent FTFs flow and crossing borders. On the other hand, the FTFs may travel to destination countries by disguising their travel in order to reach the third countries. For instance, one of the longest standing issues with Malaysian border security is Visa Waiver Program. This program allows foreigners to enter Malaysia easily. Free from the requirements of visa, foreigners, especially the ones posing a great deal of threat to the country, find the opportunity to freely move in and out. Furthermore, this country can be preferred as a transit country without any suspicion. In addition, FTFs may contribute to terrorism financing, human resources and recruitment for terrorist groups, training and capacity building of recruits. They have an impact on origin, transit and destination countries.

Returning terrorist fighters are also quite significant. They may commit terrorist's acts independently or as a part of a group; promote violence; provide guidance and operational expertise: raise funds; serve as recruiters and more broadly, encourage violence. Also, there has much to do with the issue of returnees in terms of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. These institutions must identify the FTFs prior to travel.

With regard to solutions, Mr. Akdemir referred to the *Tussing model* that has provided three types of border security management spectrums depending on the level of threat.

At the lower of the spectrum, *Border Control* entails the permissible human goods and movements. At this stage, the threat is very low. On the second stage, *Border Safety* requires prevention of smuggling, illegal drug trafficking and weapons. At this level, law enforcement institutions such as Turkish Gendarmerie would be useful to interdict the movements of organized crime and their actions. Finally, *Border Security* is at the top stage. This level shows the highest level of risk in terms of FTFs and illegally moving militants. We need more comprehensive, multidimensional and coordinated solutions to enhance the border security management. These solutions could be as follow:

- *High technology measures such as networked cameras and aerial surveillance,*

- *Low technology approaches, such as varying border patrol times,*

- *The timely sharing of information about FTF travel by origin and transit states.*

- *Building an integrated, layered approach to border management,*

- *Ensuring the unity of effort across all relevant governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders.*

Moreover, an integrated border security management approach should also include land, maritime and air borders of a nation. Ultimately, an integrated approach to physical security, intelligence collection, policy and military or police action are also required. Here, "border militarization" term emerges. The narrow definition is "*deployment of military troops, rather than civilian border patrols, along borders*". Broader understanding of border militarization definition is "*pervasive influence of military strategies, culture, technologies, hardware and combat veterans*". However, in many countries military does not appear to have a direct legislative mandate to protect or patrol the border or engage in immigration enforcement. On the other hand, in some countries setting up ad hoc or permanent multi-disciplinary teams such as 'task forces' seem to be useful. As the nature and severity of the threat increase, the character of response must change.

Lt. Col. Akdemir agreed that the task force or military units may function as force multiplier in the border security management environment. The first realm that military would be useful is *technological assistance* such as day and night cameras, UAVs and other systems can provide situational awareness at border locations. **Military can also help in terms of intelligence and gathering sharing**. Multiple source intelligence feeds can support the development of situational awareness. Logistical and engineer support may also contribute to the efforts on the ground. Training law enforcement, provide expertise local border agency. Also, response forces may support the border patrol in interdicting and arresting criminal elements as well as intercepting and deterring the flow of terrorists over the nation's border.

Border Security and Management in Contested Environments in the Context of Counter-Terrorism and Related Transnational Organized Crime: UNCCT-Border Security and Management (BSM) Global Program

Mr. Rocco Messina, UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, Head of Border Security and Management Unit; Mrs. Esther Zubiri, BSM Senior Expert

In their presentation, Mr. Rocco Messina and Mrs. Esther Zubiri introduced the UNCCT-Border Security and Management (BSM) Global Program. Mr. Messina stated that the strategic importance of Border Management is a top priority to prevent terrorist related transnational crime emphasized in numerous relevant resolutions. *United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* has four pillars that includes:

- Pillar I: *addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism*

- Pillar II: *preventing and combatting terrorism*

- Pillar III: *building states' capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations*

- Pillar IV: *ensuring human rights and the rule of law*

The UN General Assembly resolved to "*step up national efforts and bilateral, sub-regional, regional and international cooperation, as appropriate, to **improve border and customs control** in order to prevent and detect the movement of terrorists (...) while recognizing that states may require assistance to that effect*".

Since 2001, the UN Security Council also emphasizes the significance of the BSM. There are a number of resolutions. The more recent one, the Resolution 2482 in 2019 points out the nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime. **Madrid Guiding Principles** also provides some operational measures to strengthen border security. As the structure of threat is in an unstoppable transformation, responses should be developed and updated accordingly.

The main objectives of the BSM program are as follows:

- Providing thematic expertise to Member States, regional and/or sub-regional bodies in developing and implementing **comprehensive border management strategies** and action plans which **incorporate counter-terrorism measures**

- Enhancing the capacities of Member States to address challenges and emerging threats within all modes of **cross-border transportation**

- Development and dissemination of **reference material** and **guidance tools** including modules on cross-border travel circle pertaining to air, maritime, rail and bus travel relating to both people and cargo

- Close coordination with **Global Compact** partner entities – including the ability to respond **CTED assessments**

- Promotion and incorporatin of **Gender** and **Human Rights** dimensions

- **Sustainability** through leveraging partnerships; national ownership; ToT programming and ongoing mentoring

The priority regions of BSM in 2019-2020 are shown in the map below:

The UN wishes to include all the areas where the support is needed as there is a common understanding that terrorists networks exploits weak areas. The UN is trying to maintain the security standards at borders at the global stage.

The BSM Program is aligned with the **United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.** The program is in favor of supporting Member States to implement **relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.** On the one hand, the program strengthens Member States' capacities to detect and prevent the **cross-border movement** of terrorists, including FTFs, by enhancing **cross-border cooperation** and **operational information sharing** to identify and disrupt the networks that facilitate their travel. The BSM

program, on the other hand, enhances Member States LEAs' expertise in **the responsible collection and sharing of biometric data** as means for border management and countering terrorism.

Here, the key word is *law enforcement agencies*. This is the support the UN can provide in the military borders. The UN does not really encourage the use of the military borders. Therefore, the law enforcement agencies in the borders has to be encouraged. In a contested environment, this could be the UN's greatest support how to merge efforts of the military and law enforcement agencies. On the one hand, the aim is to secure the border; on the other hand, the challenge is also to facilitate the legitimate movement of people and goods.

The BSM Global Program combines elements of:

- *Outreach-awareness raising missions*

- *Capacity-building training*

- *Technical assistance*

- *Tactical border operations making use of biometric data collection and devices*

- *Regional exchange workshops*

- *Existing global initiatives to support Member States in building capacities in the responsible use and sharing of biometric data to detect, prevent, investigate, and prosecute terrorists' offences and other serious crimes at borders.*

Information sharing is one of the key elements and game-changer in counter-terrorism. The use of information sharing and the use of the INTERPOL database and the assessment of all these elements in every border that a nation has matter. Furthermore, in cooperation with the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, the UN has set nonbinding 15 good practices in the area of the BSM and the problems caused by FTFs and other related groups. The aim is to assist the Member States to implement global strategy of counter-terrorism.

These practices are as follows:

- ***Good Practice 1***: Enhance intra-agency cooperation

- ***Good Practice 2***: Enhance inter-agency cooperation

- ***Good Practice 3***: Enhance international cooperation

- ***Good Practice 4***: Develop and establish comprehensive remote border area surveillance programs

- ***Good Practice 5***: Engage with empower border communities as key contributors in BSM

- ***Good Practice 6***: Develop and implement Border Community Policing programs

- ***Good Practice 7***: Develop and implement BSM information exchange programs and mechanisms

- *Good Practice 8*: Establish Border Cooperation Centers

- *Good Practice 9*: Nominate and assign Border Liaison Officers

- *Good Practice 10*: Conduct joint and coordinated cross-border patrols, as well as joint multiagency and interdisciplinary operation exercises

- *Good Practice 11*: define parameters for cross-border operational engagement

- *Good Practice 12*: Conduct and effective risk analysis assessment

- *Good Practice 13*: Create National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans

- *Good Practice 14*: Establish Joint Border Crossing Points

- *Good Practice 15*: Identify corruption as a serious risk for effective and robust BSM

As obvious in the first three practices, cooperation is one of the most significant pillar of the BSM. As long as the institutions including the military and law enforcement agencies at different levels do not cooperate, it is hard to argue that there is a comprehensive strategy.

BSM GOOD PRACTICES

A) Inform and Guide Governments as they develop Policies, Guidelines, Programmes for effective BSM

B) Strengthen Cross-Border Cooperation and Border Surveillance in a Counterterrorism context

C) Shape Bilateral and/or Multilateral Collaboration on BSM through Capacity Building Assistance

The BSM strategies are critical tools they take into account all kinds of transnational threats in general and counter-terrorism, FTFs in particular. The BSM strategies provide every government with a comprehensive overview of current border management situation, threats and challenges. Also, several factors need to be addressed to determine the threats at the borders and the military's role must be one that facilitates civil actions.

Military's contributions include, but are not limited to:

- *Providing on-the-ground intelligence collection and assessment to enhance overall situational awareness,*

- *Sharing of relevant counter-terrorism with key non-military actors, especially law enforcement and emergency services,*

- *Maintaining assistance to facilitate early detection of imminent threats,*

- *Training, advising and assisting host nation security forces.*

Additionally, military planning does not often match with other agencies. Therefore, **the military can facilitate a combined inter-agency environment with a capacity to interconnect multiple efforts**. Interagency coordination is considered as a basic tool to counter-terrorism. The military also may be called upon as first responders, operating in an area where there is a lack of capacity in terms of civilian response to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there are several scenarios where the military could find itself in a position to collect evidence or arrest the suspects on behalf of the law enforcement agencies. **It is important to know that the military presence cannot adequately provide a long-term replacement of law enforcement and emergency services**.

The BSM strategies three main pillars are here as follow:

1) Legislative Measures, *strengthening of the legal framework*

2) Operative Measures, *enhancement of institutional capacities*

3) Capacity Building Measures, *training programs and peer review exercises*

A national strategy should clearly formulate the goals to be achieved for a period around 3 to 5 years with short, medium and long-term results; however, specific result to be reached should only be included in the national plan. The National Action plan should be in alignment with the standards of international stakeholders and institutions, the national priorities, and other relevant document in which the strategic and operational objectives are also addressed.

In examining the terrorist impact, the BSM considers several global threat challenges. Returnees and relocators hold great importance in terms of the challenges. In this regard, the reversed flow of FTFs returning their countries or settling down in a third country poses a new challenge from the BSM perspective. Within three years, the flow of people travelling to Iraq and Syria has diminished dramatically in light of the military operations against the DAESH and its collapse. A recent report noted that the threat still continues when those people return their homeland or settle down in a third country as the returnees may join another terror cells or carry out attacks. The FTF returnees may take advantage of porous borders, use the stolen passports, makes use of information technology, infiltrate the immigration routes, and finally adversely affect the development in the region.

Also, there are some **challenges in counter-terrorism in terms of legal and operational aspect.** *The legal challenges* in counter-terrorism can be listed as:

i) Lack of uniformity in the criminalization of terrorist offenses in compliance with international counter-terrorism instruments hamper extradition proceedings and mutual legal assistance.

ii) Lack of criminalization of recruitment and terrorism travel.

iii) Lack of transparency and accountability in CT investigations, prosecutions and trials.

iv) Lack of specialization of judges and prosecutors in the use of specialized investigative techniques in counter-terrorism and legal obstacles to accept intelligence as incriminatory evidence.

On the other hand, **counter-terrorism operational challenges** are as follows:

i) Limited access to the INTERPOL 24/7 communication system, including SLTD at all borders.

ii) Limited implementation at borders of API-PNR systems.

iii) Limited use and sharing of biometric data at borders.

iv) Lack of joint cross-border investigative teams.

v) Lack of BSM strategies and national plans of actions with counter-terrorism components.

vi) Lack of sub-regional and national mechanisms for cooperation and exchange of information and intelligence.

The BSM Global Program is designed to **be tailored for implementation in high-risk regions** and/or areas in which States face increased border management challenges due to the large irregular migration flow such as Central Asia, Western Balkans, West and Eastern Africa.

Also, areas such as Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Western Balkans are badly affected areas by the transnational criminal activities including drug trafficking, smuggling cash and goods as well as high level of corruption and risk associated with a large scale of labor-migration flows, refugees and asylum seekers. The strategic location of these countries makes the area particularly attractive to the criminal organizations and terrorist groups. As such, the region has been struggling with the FTF phenomena for many years. Furthermore, the Eastern African Region, with porous and political borders, has long been suffering from drug and SALW trafficking, illicit financial flows as well as returning and relocating FTFs and homegrown terrorists. The East African Region remains as a major hotspot for the mass immigration and has become an issue of great concern due to returning FTFs.

The SAHEL Region Border Security Challenges In Relation To Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime With The Special Focus On Military's Role in Border Security Management

Mr. Badreddine El Harti, Principal Security Sector Reform-Rule of Low Adviser, UN Special Adviser to the President of Burkina Faso.

Mr. El Harti's presentation mainly focused on border security and border security management in the SAHEL region. In the region, geographical dynamics has a great amount of impact on border security. The borders in the area possess different qualities while being porous and facing issues such as ethnical clashes and climate problems. This requires a different and even more comprehensive understanding, including a countrywide perspective and a human factor.

In the SAHEL, multiple layered crisis generate turmoil, extending the problem in the realms of politics, security, humanitarian and health. In particular, internally displaced people are a common problem for countries in the region. **Usual thinking of the use of the military is quite challenging as the scope of the problem goes beyond the abilities of the militaries.** Even if the ongoing clashes are to be finished under the responsibility of the military, it requires a common understanding, not only to tackle the ongoing problem but also to prevent the origins such as violent extremism and radicalism. As a result, both internal and sub-regional responses are important. As it is a complicated area and there are many ongoing problems, the strategies/intervention to overcome the challenges, highly differ. However, many aspects help find similarities in terms of solutions. Mr. El Harti stressed that the **number of actors in the region** is another challenge. He raised the case of Mali as an instance in which there are four different military operations present - the MINUSMA, the Malian armed forces, G5 and the French forces. As a result, this multiple-actor environment has complicated the situation further.

What are the challenges and opportunities in this environment for the military? What can the military bring at what cost? On the positive side, military might have a unique position due to its ability to deploy forces in such a large area. As well as its capacity to deploy forces, military also has the **advantage to administrate several factors such as communications, intelligence, and health services**. On the other hand, **human security** emerges as another problem. People have been marginalized for decades; as a result, the first thing they recognize is a 'weapon' and then, the bloodshed no matter who it belongs to. The moment kinetic force is used to decapitate one; the other side may recruit more militants. In sum, it is important to analyze how much it can take to neutralize the area by the means of military.

Counter-terrorism in essence is a national security aspect, belonging to a law enforcement area. It is an **internal security problem that requires internal solutions**. The use of power that determines this fight is much more adapted by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Therefore, **the military can be there as a second or third responder;** however, the solution has to be an internal security measure. Even for the long-established democracies like the US, there can never be military intelligence structures deployed over American cities for many reasons.

What does it mean for countries for countries like Burkina, Mali and many others in Africa? It gave the power to military to handle the situation. They empower military, empower the intelligence agencies, downsize the role of law enforcement and militarizes the security. These countries also militarize borders. It degrades the local capacity internally. Therefore, this may lead to several consequences as in the case of Mali, the military used the disruption to take the political power.

The images above show the change in incidents in Mali. Once the extremists were beaten by the brutal force, their movements have extended from North to South and West in time. They kept moving and went

along the borders to rebuild the organization. This instance proves that as long as there is lack of coordination, the problem can only be diffused, not solved.

In terms of national security vision, the countries in the region wants to deal numerous problems as well as building their nations. The governments, in the nation-building processes, do not prefer to empower the military to a level they do not have control over it.

For the countries in the region, the support they get from the outside is mostly military. They have the instruments of power; however, this makes the situation more fragile. The confidence building between the population and the military force is vital because CT is all about information and intelligence. **In general, the military is not the solution itself. Indeed, it is one component of the solution and it has to be a part of a comprehensive package. All pillars should interact together in a sustainable way.**

In order to understand the hard power effect, Mr. El Harti declared that he generally uses the MINUSMA example. When the terrorist organization is suppressed harder, they spill over and extend their impact on the territory. As a last point, Mr. El Harti raised the issue of 'no harm approach' and argued that the clarity of the mission between law enforcement and military in counter-terrorism is determined or agreed by universal measures, specific to the country. Moreover, in countries in which democratic gains are fragile, it is important to set security reforms and institutions according to clearly specified standards.

Border Security Challenges in Relation to Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime from INTERPOL point of view.

Mr. Ahmed Mohamed, Border Security Expert, Counter-Terrorism Directorate, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

Mr. Mohamed highlighted that in INTERPOL's view, Border Security Challenge, in large part, is an **information challenge.** INTERPOL's Counter-Terrorism Directorate is an initiative that acts as a global hub for intelligence on transnational terrorist networks shared by member countries worldwide. The Directorate analyses, collects, stores information on suspected terrorists, and share this information with member countries. The mission and its projects are working close within the frame of UN Resolutions 2396 and 2178, which have both highlighted the imperative of information sharing between countries on terrorism and FTFs.

Within the context of increasing terrorist attacks, INTERPOL has invested in substantial capital in strengthening its role in CT with strong support from the international community. INTERPOL plays close attention to the Middle East and Sahel, representing the most volatile regions for INTERPOL in terms of border control that are managed by specialized military agencies and law enforcement. However, still being below standards to control any legal or illegal activities. Moreover, unregulated borders that allow

terrorist activities to continue in the region, remains a challenge. Terrorists are present across borders and there is no sufficient capacity for BSM to address cross border movement in the region.

As of numbers in INTERPOL, it covers 18 databases and 194 member countries have connected INTERPOL via secure police security system, called **I-24/7** (INTERPOL's secure, global police communications network). Also, INTERPOL has color-coded notices that enable to share alerts and request for information worldwide, allowing police in different countries to share crime related information. Some of these notices are also available on the public website, especially if a request of help is needed from the public. All initiatives are implemented within the framework of the regional CT mandates and is aligned with 5 Action Streams and Interpol's Strategic Framework. INTERPOL supports law enforcement in its member countries to prevent and disrupt terrorist activities through five action streams. Their objectives are to tackle the key factors facilitating terrorists in finances, weapons and materials, online presence, travel and mobility as well as identification. All these factors are controlled through a geographical scope focus called the Regional Counter-Terrorism Nodes (RCTN), focusing on Africa, Asia, Middle East and Europe.

As for the INTERPOL's **identification activity's mission,** its aim is to assist member countries in the detection and positive identification of members of known transnational terrorist groups and their facilitators. This is done through maintaining external data flow between law enforcement agencies; enhancing data flow from military forces deployed to relevant hotspots and promoting systematic inclusion of biometrics.

Regarding the **travel and mobility unit,** its mission is to assist member countries in enhancing national and regional border security and reducing cross-border mobility of terrorists and their affiliates, and in identifying and disrupting networks that facilitate their travel. This is done through ensuring systematic and rapid population of SLTD database (stolen and lost documents); enabling access to frontline, hotspots and border posts, including in the context of API/PNR systems. Identifying high-value chokepoints, patterns and routes via strategic analysis, identifying facilitators/smuggling rings through operational intelligence analysis and facilitating intelligence-led screening operations in high-value terrorist travel nodes.

In terms of the **weapons and materials unit,** the initiative's mission is to assist member countries in the identification, tracking and interception of the illicit trafficking of weapons and materials necessary for terrorist activities through facilitating intelligence sharing. This is done through promoting connection to i-ARMS by member countries and seek interoperability with other national and regional systems; facilitating intelligence sharing among member countries about subjects and modus operandi linked to CBRN and IED incidents; enhancing the capacity of member countries to prevent and respond to CBRN and IED attacks by establishing countermeasure programs.

Another important INTERPOL's initiative is the **MILEX** (Battlefield Evidence Collection). It is aimed to fight terrorism and to improve the capability to better identify terrorist suspects through biometrics and collected information from the battlefield. It puts the information from conflict zones into the hands of law enforcement officers to support investigation and prosecution system. How is this done?

Militaries share declassified information collected from the battlefield with its INTERPOL National Centre Bureau who enters this information into INTERPOL databases.

Another INTERPOL's initiative is the **FIRST,** which is the facial imaging, recognition, searching and tracking in order to improve detection of suspected and potential terrorists and increase terrorist images in INTERPOL Facial recognition System. As also for MILEX, frontline users have information to this data in border-crossings. When INTERPOL gives access to its databases, it is done to address operational demands (speedy passenger control) by leveraging fully interoperable databases (single query access to all data) supported by modern technology. This means that officers sitting at the border, as first line, can access one single window that has all INTERPOL and national databases available. The most important aspect for INTERPOL is the **interoperability** with national and regional systems. INTERPOL's external goal is to have border-oriented databases interoperable with existing national systems ensuring data consistency (national and INTERPOL databases timely synchronized) and query effectiveness (queries performed through national applications are simultaneously performed against INTERPOL databases).

API and PNR is another "hot topic" on an international level - a single window from a border security perspective in order for the API system would capture all information at once, i.e. travelers' biographical information and screening security information in a single password airline-check within a machine-readable zone. This would ensure that API/PNR data transmission from aircraft operator is sent to a common national entry point while reducing the risk of miscommunication. INTERPOL is working hand in hand with the United Nations GoTravel to apply this system in INTERPOL's member countries to prepare their infrastructure to accept the API/PNR and connect it to the PIU unit in each country that will connected in the future to the I-24/7 initiative of INTERPOL. The initiative is especially important in a country that does not have a strong relationship between relevant infrastructure, agencies and secure government.

INTERPOL does such kinds of operations in which National Central Bureaus ask information from airline companies who have the passenger manifests in a specific format. However, this format is not adapted to the INTERPOL systems and this needs formatting, facing lots of complications for INTERPOL. An example from the field is project SHARAKA, which is a remote operation covering the Middle East and focusing on API/PNR in which National Central Bureaus have to spend a lot of time to make this data from airline companies readable for INTERPOL, so that INTERPOL can form checks. Therefore, the aim is to reduce this bureaucracy and do it easier. For instance, if one is to book a plane ticket by *booking.com* website, all information will be available in PNR systems. Thus, all this information can be used to identify an individual and is used for risk-based assessment where other information is not available.

Nevertheless, there are many **challenges.** For instance, **legal aspects** - if you do not have a law, you will not get the data. API/PNR data is collected by airlines and if a government wants to get this data, it has to have a legal framework in place and this legal framework is often absent. Also, collecting this data has to be in line with human rights. **Operational -** interagency collaboration and more information

sharing is needed. **Engagement -** states to partner/connect with airlines to get data. **Technical and financial aspects** are another challenge - INTERPOL is trying to promote projects and to receive donations for countries to get API/PNR ability.

With regard to Project SHARAKA, the aim is to tackle terrorism in the MENA region and assist countries to identify, detect and intercept terrorists through border control operations, capacity building and technology. The project objectives are to connect frontline agencies to I-24/7, particularly at airports, seaports and national borders; interdict terrorists mobility across borders; promote information sharing and regional intelligence analysis. One of the last activities done by Project SHARAKA is an operation carried out by Libyan authorities at the seaport of Khoms in October 2020. The INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NSB) in Tripoli led this in cooperation with the Customs Department, the Criminal Investigation Service and other security agencies. The project team gave remote operational and technical support to the NCB Tripoli and provided devices for mobile connection to INTERPOL's databases and biometric devices to collect fingerprints - this is one of the good examples how a project could run remotely during COVID-19.

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